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Introduction 
 
Understanding the 
Institutional Politics of the 
European Union 
The defining characteristic of the European Union, it can be 
argued, are its institutions. It has been through the creation, 
development and growth of a set of unique institutions that it 
has become possible to establish supranational governance at 
the European level. Everything else that matters in the 
European Union – the interaction of national and European 
actors, the design of policies, the creation of a system of 
laws, the preferences of member states – is not only related 
to, but largely also dependent on the way in which the EU 
institutions work. The study of European integration is 
therefore inevitably a study of institutionalisation, and of the 
peculiar institutional politics that this process has 
engendered. This collection of articles approaches the study 
of the European institutions and their politics from a 
particular perspective – a perspective that recognises that the 
institutional politics of the Union are closely tied to the 
process of integration. Institutional political in the European 
Union are therefore seen in the wider context of the 
integration process, and hence also in the context of the 
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theoretical and meta-theoretical debates that have 
surrounded the study of European integration.  
Starting from the recognition of a close linkage 
between the wider process of European integration and the 
institutional politics therefore requires an understanding of 
the nature of the integration process and the role that 
institutions play in this process. Such a contextual study of 
EU institutional politics seeks to bring together the generic 
insights from the study of institutions in such areas such as 
comparative politics, organisational theory, public 
administration and international relations with the 
particularities that supranational institutionalisation at the 
European level brings with it. This implies also that - rather 
than applying standard models of the study of institutions – 
we need to examine the degree to which EU institutions 
require the development of new approaches in order to 
account for the specific and potentially unique environment 
in which they have been established and in which they now 
operate. 
In the current volume, such an understanding for the 
particular environment of EU institutional politics is 
developed in chapter 1. In line with the objective of 
understanding both integration and institutionalisation as 
process, the emphasis here is on studying the nature of 
change (and continuity) in the context of European 
integration. The approach developed here seeks to ‘unpack’ 
integration as a process by distinguishing between a number 
of different layers of change. Integration is conceptualised as 
a process that implies the potential of dynamic change at a 
number of different levels or layers: first, with respect to the 
making of policies and the effects that this has in terms of 
legislative and other output. If public action is about 
changing conditions ‘on the ground’, then the immediate 
objective of European integration has also been to achieve 
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such results, be it the completion of a single market, or the 
creation of a single currency, or indeed the aspirations to 
making Europe a more competitive economy through 
instruments such as the Lisbon Strategy. 
A second layer of change is identified in terms of 
the deeper institutional changes and adaptations that have 
occurred in Europe, both as a direct result of institutional 
choices and as a result of the indirect consequences of other 
processes, including the ‘everyday’ policy-process described 
above. This ‘layer of change’, termed here ‘constitutional 
reform’, occurs both at the European and at the national 
level (and indeed also at the subnational level) and involves 
the changes in the institutional structures through which 
policy- and legislative decisions are made. They are deemed 
to be ‘constitutional’ because such change is the result of 
extraordinary developments - constitutional change is 
relatively slow but, if and when it happens, results in a more 
fundamental overhaul of the institutional structure of the 
polity. 
Finally, a third type of change is termed ‘structural 
transformation’ and identifies deep changes in the structure 
of society and politics in Europe. It is not really the outcome 
of any conscious or deliberate political act (even if such 
outcomes coincide with the visions of political thinkers or 
other actors) but rather results from the gradual and 
underlying changes to the nature of politics over time. It is 
therefore, by definition, a long-term process that can only be 
understood through the study of long period of time. Hence, 
in the context of European integration, this implies a focus at 
the ‘longue duree’ in a way that has been established by the 
Braudel school of historical analysis.  
These three layers of change are seen to be parallel 
process, occurring at the same time and dynamically 
reinforcing one another. Policy-making impacts on 
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institutional design, institutionalisation leads to deeper 
societal change over time, and the changing structural 
conditions in turn influence the way in which policies are 
made, and what impact these have. These are complex 
processes which need to be investigated in great depth, but 
the model is presented here mainly in order to provide the 
context for the study of the EU’s institutional politics. 
A number of observations are necessary here before 
taking this further. First, while the conceptualisation of 
separate layers of change provides for a clear distinction 
between different kinds of change, the identified layers are 
only ideal-typical and somewhat artificial. In practice, it will 
be more accurate to regard the depth of change along a 
continuum, starting from the very superficial and going to 
the deeply structural. Second, and following on from this, 
the movement along this continuum implies a need to shift 
one’s attention from the study of political action to the study 
of political structure in order to explain change. This 
sensitivity to the varying degree of analytical relevance of 
actors and structures has, in turn, significant implications for 
the study of institutions. Institutional analysis of the kind 
envisaged here is located towards the centre of the 
continuum, or, in the context of the framework developed 
here, institutional reform in the EU occurs at the second 
layer of change identified above. This means that institutions 
matter as an object of study in their own right because it is 
by studying the role and functioning of institutions that we 
can understand both change and continuity in the process of 
integration. 
Given the title of this study, it is important to define 
more clearly what is actually meant by ‘institution’ in this 
context. The concept of ‘institution’ is used in rather 
different ways in the study of the European Union, and 
indeed there are disciplinary differences between its usage in 
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political science, sociology and economics. In particular, 
there are two different meanings of the concept in use: first, 
the understanding of ‘institution’ as a pattern of social norms 
that shape the behaviour of individuals, creating a sense of 
predictability of social action. This understanding could be 
regarded as the structural perspective on institutions: 
institutions structure the interaction of social actors. 
However, a second perspective is the view of institutions as 
organisational units. Such organisations are composed of a 
(possibly large) number of individuals but these interact 
under certain conditions – hierarchical relations, clear 
boundaries, internal cohesiveness – which mean that the 
organisation as a whole possesses a degree of actorness, 
indeed that it can be viewed as a (collective) actor. 
Both these usages of ‘institution’, the structural and 
the organisational, have been in use in the study of the 
European Union. In the organisational sense, the “EU 
institutions” are seen as supranational actors and are 
important, if not crucial to the understanding of the shaping 
of policies and indeed the integration process as a whole. In 
the structural sense, institutions in the EU regulate the 
interaction of a large number of actors on various levels, 
create expectations about the nature and outcome of these 
interactions and thus contribute to the permanency of the 
European construction. In this study, ‘institution’ is used in 
both of these understandings, clarifying within the relevant 
context which meaning is being applied on which occasion. 
Having thus located the institutions within a 
framework of the different layers of change that are 
encapsulated in the European integration process, one can 
then move closer to the study of individual institutions 
themselves. It follows on from the perspective developed 
here that the temporal dimension is crucial, both at the 
higher level of abstraction (the different layers of change) 
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and from lower levels of abstraction (the study of individual 
institutions or the relations between them). With respect of 
the latter that implies the adoption of a historical perspective 
in the study of institutions. Such a historical perspective, 
provided by historical and sociological institutionalism, is 
crucial in order to capture the dual role that institutions play 
as both agents and structures. 
In the study of individual institutions, the approach 
that is being developed here thus combines insights from 
both sociological and historical aspects of 
institutionalisation. It follows the emergence over time of 
patterns of social interaction among those individuals who 
are working with or within an institution, the development of 
rules and norms defining their interaction, and the evolution 
of an institutional structure based on these rules and norms. 
Historical institutionalism as an approach is well-equipped 
in order to confront the puzzle of institutional stability and 
change. It makes a number of assumptions, however, that 
have to be spelt out clearly in advance. The first set of 
assumptions concerns the interaction between structures and 
agency. Unlike other approaches that give priority, whether 
explicitly or implicitly, to one or the other ontology, a 
historical institutionalist approach recognises both structures 
and actors to be mutually constituted. Actors are to some 
extent defined by their role within the broader structures 
within which they work and act, and even though their 
behaviour is not determined by these structures, their 
interests and their identity is shaped by it. At the same time, 
structures, and this includes both legal-institutional and 
ideational structures, cannot be seen as determining actors 
behaviour, and even less so decisional outcomes, but instead 
are themselves subject to change under the behaviour of 
actors. Denying both actors and structures ontological 
priority but instead regarding both as mutually constitutive 
of one another, is what requires us to look at the process of 
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interaction. Only over time can it be fully understood how 
the interaction between structures and agency, and between 
interests, ideas and identities, pans out. It is on the basis of 
such a procedural approach that we can then make 
statements that provide an explanation of institutional 
evolution.  
Such an approach also includes an awareness of the 
ideas, values and norms that form part of the institutional 
culture and that contribute to the direction of the institutional 
environment. Recognition of the role of ideas and norms can 
also be regarded as being part of a historical institutionalist 
approach  but can also be seen as constituting the core of a 
separate, sociological institutionalist approach. This 
sensitivity to (unwritten) cultural norms and values is a key 
part of the sociological dimension to institutional analysis. 
Ideas matter in this respect as part of a cognitive map that is 
being developed in an institution – a ‘theory of the 
institution’ about itself which then has consequences for the 
actions of individual actors. 
The empirical challenge of studying institutional 
politics in the European Union from such a perspective then 
lies in applying these insights to specific institutions, their 
internal politics and their ‘external’ relations. ‘EU 
institutions’ clearly is a broad concept in itself, and there is 
therefore a need to define more clearly the object of study. 
In the first instance, this involves the main legislative 
institutions of Commission, Council of Ministers and 
European Parliament. This is the institutional triangle that is 
at the heart of EU’s institutional dynamics and it 
consequently is this trio of institutions which has attracted 
the main part of both academic and political attention. There 
are, however, other institutions beyond these: the European 
Court of Justice (together with the Court of First Instance); 
the Court of Auditors; a number of consultative committees 
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(Committee of the Regions, Economic and Social 
Committee); the European Central Bank in monetary policy; 
a range of agencies with information-sharing, advisory or 
regulatory functions in many other sectors. And beyond even 
this broader definition of European institutions are further 
institutional forms and mechanisms which also deserve 
attention. There is, for example, the feature of EU politics 
which has come to be called ‘committee governance’ 
involving committees working with the European 
Commission in various stages of the policy-making process: 
expert advisory groups during the initiation phase of EU 
policy-making, and so-called comitology committees during 
the implementation phase. Such committee governance, to 
which one might also add the committees associated with the 
Open Method of Coordination (Economic and Financial 
Committee, Social Protection Committee, Employment 
Committee), are instances of the institutionalised co-
operation between national and European administration – 
something that can be seen as an example of the “fusion” of 
administrations on different levels in the EU’s system of 
multilevel governance. 
As this (still incomplete) list indicates, the 
institutional politics of the European Union cover a broad 
ground, requiring a choice to be made in order to conduct 
more detailed empirical research into processes of 
institutionalisation. In this volume, a choice has been made 
to focus, in particular, on the executive branch of the 
Union’s institutional structure. This involves primarily the 
study of the European Commission, which constitutes the 
Union’s executive branch. But beyond the Commission, also 
the Council of Ministers and parts of its administration, the 
General Secretariat of the Council – hereafter called Council 
Secretariat – has executive responsibilities and will therefore 
also be examined in contributions to this volume. 
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The internal dynamics of both the Commission and 
the Council are studied from the institutionalist perspective 
that has been developed above. Once chapter 2 and 3 have 
provided the background to each of these two institutions, 
subsequent provide a more detailed analysis of certain 
aspects of each institution. In Chapter 4 then conceptualises 
the Commission in a way that links the internal politics of 
this institution to the dynamics of the wider European 
Union. The internal politics of the Commission, often 
regarded as a single actor, are ‘unpacked’ along two 
dimensions: the degree of ‘decisional rigidity’, on the one 
hand, and the nature of institutional accountability, on the 
other hand. 
The different dimensions of both ‘decisional 
rigidity’ (a spectrum ranging from open-ended political 
bargaining to rule-bound administrative governance) and of 
‘institutional accountability’ - distinguishing between 
accountability to the states (in the Council) and 
accountability to the people (represented by the Parliament) 
– can be brought together in a matrix. Such a matrix 
provides us with four ideal-typical logics which are in 
tension in the European Commission: international 
secretariat; public administration; independent executive 
agency; and government cabinet. Such a matrix can be seen 
as a mapping device which not only helps us to understand 
the internal tensions inside the Commission – and thus the 
difficulties of managing coordination and achieving 
coherence in the work of the institution – but which can also 
be useful in detecting shifts over time. For example, if, at the 
outset of their institutional life, the European Commission or 
its predecessor, the High Authority, acted mainly as an 
international secretariat, then the overall evolution of the 
Union has moved it towards a politicised bureaucracy. 
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This conception of analysing the internal tensions 
inside the Commission along these two different dimensions 
therefore provides a mechanism for improving our 
understanding of the organisational logics that are present on 
different administrative levels, at different points in time or 
in the different sectoral sub-units in which the Commission 
is active. Altogether this provides a more complete picture 
of the way in which the Commission has evolved and of how 
it works today – a state of affairs which is illustrated by the 
competing logics which can be detected through a 
comparison of the Commission’s activity in two different 
areas of activity, that of state aid control and that of regional 
policy.  
Chapter 5 provides a similar, in-depth look at the 
internal politics of the Council Secretariat (CS). Other 
aspects of the administrative system of the Council of 
Ministers (such as the role of the Presidency and the 
distinction between the political (European and Ministerial 
Councils), diplomatic (COREPERs I and II) and technical 
levels (Council Working Parties), having already been 
discussed in Chapter 3, the focus is here on the different 
logics present in the CS. The historical institutionalist 
perspective adopted here demonstrates the presence of two 
competing logics present inside the institution: on the one 
hand, the traditionalist culture of the ‘old’ secretariat which 
is essentially legalistic and bureaucratic, involved in the 
legislative work of the Council – a culture that is perpetuated 
by an established administrative elite with a strong sense of 
‘how things are being done’ in the Council and in the Union; 
on the other hand, there is the arrival of the military and 
diplomatic elites which are not so much tasked with 
protecting the status quo, but are rather busy establishing 
something new – the Union’s security policy apparatus. 
Most of the officials who are constituting the ‘new’ CS are 
seconded officials from the national administrations bringing 
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with them different administrative cultures and lacking the 
‘Brussels insider’ perspective that has been dominant among 
the staff of the ‘old’ CS.  
The CS has to cope with the tensions arising from 
this old/new split in the administration at a time as additional 
pressures arise from the rapid growth of the institution, 
including the dispersion of the administration across 
multiple sites, the impact of enlargement, in particular the 
arrival of staff from the new member states, and the new 
demands that are placed on the service due to the process of 
constitutionalisation. The result is an organisation that is, in 
many ways, experiencing the arrival of the same internal 
tensions that have been identified in the Commission 
previously. 
The detailed analysis of the internal politics of both 
Commission and Council Secretariat undertaken in Chapters 
4 and 5, respectively, is complemented in Chapter 6 by the 
study of the external relations between the two institutions. 
Following on from the study of each institution’s internal 
politics, this provides an opportunity for the systematic 
analysis of their inter-institutional relations. The key concept 
introduced here is that of ‘inter-institutional coherence’ 
which is defined in terms of the presence of coherent and 
well-coordinated processes of deliberation and decision-
making in the relations between the institutions. This 
emphasis on coherence is juxtaposed with the more 
traditional concept of the separation of powers which is 
sometimes used as benchmark in the evaluation of inter-
institutional relations.  
The examination of Commission-CS relations 
undertaken here demonstrates that competitive relations 
between the two institutions result from the way in which 
the institutional architecture of the Union pitches one against 
the other in certain respects. However, it also shows that 
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there is a considerable amount of common interest and 
above all a shared identity that stretches across the 
institutions. These commonalities counter-balance the 
factors that divide the institutions somewhat. In combination 
with the internal tensions that have already been discussed, 
the conclusion is that there is a considerable degree of inter-
institutional coherence that is better explained by 
sociological and cultural factors rather than by the 
distribution of rational interests across the institutions. 
The aim of chapters 2 - 6 is to provide a 
comprehensive picture of the internal workings and inter-
institutional relations of the two institutions that together 
make up the executive branch of the European Union. As 
such, they demonstrate the value of an analysis that is driven 
by the insights of historical and sociological institutionalism, 
with a focus on the way in which rules, norms and cultural 
values evolve over time and influence both the intra- and 
inter-institutional politics in the Union. 
This is a study meant to identify the dynamics on the 
second layer of change – that of institutional and 
constitutional reform in the Union. So far, one important 
element in this process has been absent: the nature of 
changes to the treaties which provide the legal framework 
which provides the foundation for institutional politics in the 
EU, the EU treaties. Hence, Chapter 7 turns to address this 
question through an analysis of the way in which both 
Commission and CS are involved in the treaty reform 
process. 
Whereas in the previous chapters Commission and 
CS appear as the objects of deeper fault-lines within the 
integration process – wider tensions in the European Union 
finding their specific expression in the institutional politics – 
chapter 7 looks at both institutions as actors in the process of 
treaty reform. Such a perspective is based on a particular 
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conception of EU treaty reform, again derived from the 
recognition that the temporal dimension is crucial in 
understanding the process of treaty reform. It is from such a 
procedural perspective that treaty reform appears as more 
than the bargaining among member states that it often 
appears in traditional analyses.  
In the framework developed and applied here, treaty 
reform involves not only national actors as part of a ‘two-
level game’, but also involves EU level actors in a ‘two-way 
process’. While member state actors project their 
preferences onto the European level, enter a bargaining 
process and ultimately make decisions about the delegation 
of powers to European institutions, they are themselves 
subject to influences from the European level. This has both 
direct and indirect significance for the nature of the 
intergovernmental conferences (IGCs) which negotiate 
treaty change. One channel of influence results from the 
Commission, CS and EP – all of which are involved in 
varying ways in the reform process – introducing practices 
and norms derived from the ‘everyday politics’ of European 
integration into the negotiations. In part, these rules provide 
the institutional frame for the negotiations in the IGC, and 
such a framework in turn constraints the ability of national 
actors to act as the sole ‘masters of the treaty’. Commission 
and CS, as well as EP and ECJ, also intervene more directly 
in treaty reforms. Even if their influence in the decision-
making phase is limited – they clearly do not act as an 
additional member state – they nevertheless play an 
important role in the agenda-setting and in the ratification 
phase of the treaty reform process. 
This study of treaty reform completes the analysis of 
institutional politics undertaken here. Framed within a wider 
conception of different layers of change, the focus is on the 
intermediate level of constitutional reform in the Union, that 
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is, the way in which processes of institutionalisation provide 
for both continuity and change in the integration process. 
The related studies of Commission and Council Secretariat 
are being used to illustrate the way in which the sociological 
and historical institutionalist approach can be used to 
enhance our understanding of the workings of these 
institutions, and of their place in the wider architecture of the 
Union. And the study of treaty reform, in turn, shows the 
degree to which these institutions are involved in decisions 
about the evolution of the wider European architecture. 
 As a study of institutional politics in the European 
Union this is far from comprehensive: the focus has only 
been on developments on one of the three layers of change 
that have initially been identified. A more comprehensive 
analysis would also need to look at both the layers of the 
policy-process and the layer of structural transformation. 
And this volume has concentrated on the analysis of 
institutional dynamics of the main institutions of the EU’s 
executive branch. In order to have a fuller picture one would 
need also to study the other branches, and indeed apply this 
approach also to the other institutional mechanisms 
identified above.  
Nevertheless, the present study proposes a 
framework for the systematic study of European institutions 
and therefore goes some way to provide for an 
understanding of the nature of institutional politics in the 
European Union. Further studies of the other layers and a 
wider range of institutions would be required in order to 
complete the picture. What this present study achieves, it is 
hoped, is to provide not only a convincing that the EU 
institutions matter, but also how they function and how their 
evolution is related to the wider process of integration in 
Europe.  
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Chapter 1 
 
The Evolution on Institutional 
Structures in the European 
Union: 
The Longue Durée of European 
Integration  
In the 1990s, European integration has become dominated by 
Intergovernmental Conferences - their preparation, 
negotiation, ratification and implementation. Due to their 
increasing frequency, length, scope and intensity, IGCs are 
now an omnipresent aspect of EU politics, whereas only ten 
years ago an IGC was regarded as a single and highly 
exceptional event. As a result, the study of integration has 
had to grapple with a paradox: on the one hand, the reforms 
contained in the past three IGCs have massively enhanced 
the significance of the supranational institutions. On the other 
hand, the intergovernmentalism inherent in treaty reform has 
emphasised the hold national actors have on the development 
of the EU.  
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 The acceleration of the integration process has 
spawned renewed interest in the development of integration 
theory. In particular, the above paradox has revived a debate 
between those favouring, respectively, supranationalist and 
intergovernmentalist approaches to the study of integration. 
Apart from revisions of liberal intergovernmentalism and the 
revival of neofunctionalism, novel concepts such as 
multilevel governance, new institutionalism or judicial 
politics have contributed to this debate. We witness, as a 
result, the proliferation of theoretical work on the EU, a very 
welcome development after the earlier dearth of such efforts. 
 Considering the proliferation and the increasing 
diversity of integration theory, this articles sets out towards a 
meta-theoretical mapping of the field. In doing so, it takes a 
closer look at the ontological grounding of various 
approaches. In particular, it questions the degree to which 
integration theory is still concerned with the analysis of 
process. Considering that the argument between 
supranational and intergovernmental explanation has 
revolved around the role of political actors and the study of 
individual decisions and events, it argues for a broader notion 
of ‘process’ as the core of analysis. 
 The article proceeds in three steps. The first section 
briefly discusses the dominant ontology of approaches to 
European integration in two key disciplines, law and political 
science. The second section deals in more detail with the way 
in which we can ‘bring process back in’. European 
integration is conceptualised as a process occurring on a 
number of different levels, which are termed here ‘layers of 
change’. An improved understanding of integration, it is 
argued, results from an awareness not only of the dynamics 
of each level, but also from their interconnectedness. The 
third section discusses how the process of macro-social 
transformation of Europe - the study of the longue durée of 
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integration which has so far been underdeveloped - can be 
brought into the analysis. Imports from other disciplines into 
political science are suggested to assist this objective. By 
way of conclusion, the article suggests that this view of 
integration as a multi-layered process helps to map the terrain 
of EU studies, facilitates communication between disciplines 
and can usefully organise the future development of 
integration theory. 
 
 
Disciplinary Boundaries and the Agency/Structure 
Problem 
For most of the past decades law and political science have 
charted very different stories of European integration. Legal 
science has been concerned with the construction, 
interpretation and development of the edifice of Community 
Law. Its gradual and seemingly automatic progress has been, 
to most analysis of European law, a self-referential exercise 
that, starting from the skeleton of the original Treaties, built 
up a body of legal doctrine, case law, secondary legislation, 
administrative procedures and informal rules. Products of this 
process, such as the principles of primacy, direct effect and 
mutual recognition, are now key parts of the European legal 
order. Whether the direction this process has taken is 
welcomed (Mancini, 1991) or criticised (Rasmussen, 1988), 
legal science appears to have well established the great 
lengths to which ‘integration through law’ has taken the 
European project. 
 By contrast, political science views on the progress 
of integration in the 1970s and 1980s were more muted. 
After the crisis of neo-functional integration theory in the late 
1960s, analysis concentrated on the ‘limits’ of integration 
(Taylor, 1980) and the ‘conjunctural’ nature of agreement 
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among the Member States (Keohane and Hoffmann, 1990). 
Federalism, as analytical category as much as political 
project, took to the back-stage. More recently, both 
neofunctionalism (Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 1991) and 
federalism (Scharpf, 1994) received renewed attention. Yet, 
by the early 1990s, the most widely cited theoretical 
literature still revolved around intergovernmentalist 
conceptions of integration, emphasising the problematic and 
contingent nature of the process (Moravcsik, 1991; 1993; 
1994a; 1994b). 
 Consequently, with such different views on the 
progress of European integration, the legal and political 
sciences had, for long periods of time, little to exchange on 
the subject. Often, it was a case of mutual neglect. This is, of 
course, not the whole story. As Joerges (1995) argues, there 
are, in both disciplines, parallel approaches and common 
problems, which make for connecting bridges across the 
disciplines. Indeed, the past fifteen years have seen 
impressive advances towards interdisciplinary debate. 
Weiler’s work), identifying the complementary logics of 
normative and decisional supranationalism, has gone a far 
way to bring the conflicting conclusions of political and legal 
analysis together (Weiler, 1981; 1991). Similarly, the 
discussion of judicial politics in Europe (Stone, 1994) and 
within the Community legal order (Alter and Meunier-
Aitsahalia, 1994) indicates that there is much merit in the 
intercourse of the two disciplines. The debate between Garret 
(1992; 1995), on the one hand, and Burley and Mattli (1993; 
1995), on the other, has injected legal scholarship into the 
traditional debate between neofunctionalism and 
intergovernmentalism in integration theory. 
 All this is proof enough that debate - if not synthesis 
- across disciplinary boundaries is possible and productive. 
But each discipline’s mainstream still remains tied to 
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established ways of looking at the subject-matter, at the 
expense of valuable imports from other fields. if it is 
recognised that the divergence between legal and political 
science treatments of the integration process is the 
consequence of an ontological antagonism: legal science 
usually proceeds under the assumption that structural factors 
- the law - are ontologically dominant. Political science work 
on integration, by contrast, has habitually assumed that 
actors, their interests and the distribution of power among 
them are primary. While such assumptions are rarely spelled 
out explicitly, their influence on empirical research and on 
the ‘facts’ it will look at, are highly consequential - as argued 
by Ruggie in his critique of traditional international relations 
methods:  
 How we think about transformation fundamentally 
shapes what we look for; what we look for obviously has an 
effect on what we find; if we look for signs of transformation 
through the lenses of the conventional approach of our 
discipline we are unlikely to conclude that anything much is 
happening out there; but we cannot be sure whether or not 
that conclusion is correct because the epistemological biases 
of that approach are such that it is ill-equipped to detect signs 
of transformation. 
 Such a recognition of the relevance of meta-theory is 
the underlying rationale of the present argument: it does 
matter what kind of change we study, and it matters under 
which ontological and epistemological star the subsequent 
research is carried out. 
 The main body of political science literature on 
European integration has been concentrating on policy-
making processes and treaty reform. This concentration on 
events as opposed to transformation has influenced the 
results of the respective research agenda: the ‘events’ of a 
certain phase of integration are taken to indicate a general 
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course of integration, whether, as with the first wave of 
neofunctionalism, the move towards an ever-more integrated 
political system, or, as claimed by liberal 
intergovernmentalism, the continued importance of state 
interests. 
 A tendency towards deterministic views on the 
integration process can be seen as a consequence of the 
ontological choices implied in studies of this kind. The 
ontology of any research into the ‘event history’ of European 
integration is bound to be based on the primacy of actors 
over structures, whether these are bureaucratic and business 
elites (as in neofunctionalism), governmental executives or 
collective actors such as Member States (as in 
intergovernmentalism). This does not mean that structures 
are completely left out of the picture - both neofunctionalism 
and intergovernmentalism do take structures into account. 
But agency is, implicitly or explicitly, considered primary - 
actors ultimately determine the shape of overall structures. 
Consequently, their actions must be regarded as of being of 
high relevance. Hence the tendency for this kind of studies - 
those concentrating on policy-making and treaty-revision - to 
rely on the explanation of ‘key events’ at the expense of 
considerations for about structural change. 
 The determinism inherent in studies based on the 
primacy of either agency or structure has been extensively 
discussed elsewhere (Wendt, 1987; 1991; 1992; Hollis and 
Smith, 1991a; 1991b; 1992; Dessler, 1989; Carlsnæs, 1992; 
Ruggie, 1989). The recognition that meta-theoretical choices 
like those related to the agency-structure problem are of high 
relevance for both conceptual work and empirical research 
has been fuelling major debates in the social sciences. Yet, 
even though its implications are clearly felt also in the field 
of European integration, a discussion of meta-theory and of 
the agency-structure problem have hardly featured there. 
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Re-conceptualising the Integration Process: 
Multiple ‘Layers of Change’ 
While it is generally accepted that integration is a procedural 
phenomena, there is little consensus on the time-span that 
requires analysis. That is precisely why, as demonstrated 
above, much of the literature has concerned itself with ‘event 
history’. The ‘structural depth’ of the integration process has 
generally remained unexplained. While many analyses, in 
particular those concerned with individual policy-sectors or 
specific decisions, set out to record limited measures of 
change, others have been concentrating on a larger scale of 
transformation. Sometimes, not always, this is the result of 
concentration on micro- as opposed to macro-analysis of 
integration. 
 Judgements about the effects of integration are not 
necessarily affected by choices of ‘structural depth’ of the 
analysis. In other words, the predilection for one or the other 
scale of analysis does not, in itself, predetermine the 
outcome. A specific policy-analysis, for example, might 
come up with the conclusion that something has 
fundamentally changed in a certain sector of Community 
activity. Yet the application of the same methods, tools and 
assumptions to another sector might present quite a different 
picture, that of no or very little change. Indeed, the turning 
out of dissimilar and even contradictory results of this kind 
across different sectors has been the recurring feature of EU 
policy-analysis.  
 For our purposes it is useful to distinguish between 
different layers of change. This is, essentially, the utilisation 
of Braudel’s distinction between longue durée and histoire 
eventenement (Braudel, 1981) to the study of contemporary 
European politics. In political science, a similar distinction is 
found in Downs’ study of organisations. He conceptualised 
change in bureaucracies along four ‘organisational layers ... 
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of structural depth’ (Downs, 1967, pp-167-171). Similarly, 
but adding the temporal element, a number of scholars have 
viewed the end of the Cold War in Europe along a number of 
layers of different depths (Jørgensen, 1995; Wæver, 1993). 
 Also European integration can be visualised as part 
of a multi-layered territorial process, as is implied by Allott.  
The biological history of present-day Europe is a 
triple helix of interacting strands: the strand of 
international relations, the strand of internal national 
developments, and the strand of European culture, of 
the European spirit. The European Community is a 
striking example of an effect produced by the causes 
in all three strands of the European social process 
(Allot, 1991, p.2990). 
  
Peterson (1995) has distinguished between three levels of 
analysis: super-systemic, systemic, sub-systemic. In this 
conception, the ‘super-systemic’ is identified as ‘history-
making’ decisions by national governments in European 
Councils and ICGs and by the ECJ. The ‘systemic’ level is 
constituted by ‘policy-setting’ decisions in the Council, and 
the ‘sub-systemic’ level consists of ‘policy-shaping’ 
decisions by Commission and committees (Peterson, 1995, 
p.71). Such advances demonstrate that the usefulness of a 
‘layers of change’ concept is well recognised as an analytical 
tool. 
 Nevertheless, the usage of the concept here is 
distinct from the above studies in a number of ways. Firstly, 
it is about conceptualising different modes of analysis rather 
than real-world events. The point here is not to study the 
actual process of European integration, but to propose ways 
of integrating different approaches to that study. Secondly, 
the differing layers of change are not about the territorial 
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reach of integration processes, but about their historical 
depth. 
 The conception here suggests three temporal layers 
of change, as set out in the table below, which are termed as 
policy-making process, constitutional reform process and 
macro-social transformation process. 
 
Layer of 
Change Ontology 
Structural 
Depth 
Time-
span Scope 
Policy-making 
process agency shallow 
months-
years 
sector/ 
network of 
actors 
constitutional 
reform process 
agency/ 
structure 
Inter-
mediate 
years-
decades 
EU and 
national 
institutions 
macro-social 
transformation structure deep 
decades-
centuries 
social and 
political 
structures 
Figure 1: Layers of Change in the European Integration Process 
 
Structural depth is meant to indicate the ontological weight 
of structure and agency. ‘Shallow’ here indicates that 
explanations about change - or the absence of change - 
essentially rely on the study of the strategies and resources of 
individual or collective actors. Studies of constitutional 
reform are of ‘intermediate’ structural depth since they 
combine elements of agency and structure in the explanation 
of change. Finally, ‘deep’, indicates that change is seen to be 
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of a structural nature, beyond the influence of individual 
actors. 
 Analysing the policy-making processes of the 
European Community involves the detailed study of 
individual ‘policy-makers’, their intentions and resources, the 
relationships among them - for example the identification of 
‘policy-networks’ or ‘epistemic communities’ - and to their 
‘clients’ - the business community, associational lobbies, 
citizens, political parties or affected social groups - and the 
legal and institutional environment in which they find 
themselves and which - depending on the results of their 
(inter)action - might be maintained or changed. 
 Arguably, the bulk of political science research on 
European integration in the past twenty years - in the period 
since the demise of the neofunctionalism - was of this kind. 
All kinds of sectors touching on Community activity were 
studied in great depths, bringing to the fore the details 
involved in the creation of specific, sectoral ‘regimes’. Not 
much of this related to the larger questions about the 
integration process, mainly because there was little explicit, 
theoretical effort to do so. But vast literature on policy-
analysis was important in that it showed the extent to which 
EU policy-making has fused previously separate structures. 
Both horizontally (that is, between interest groups, 
bureaucrats and political elites) and vertically (between 
subnational, national and EU-decision-makers) ever-closer 
links were being built up, while at the same time highly 
complex regulatory regimes grew within and beyond the 
legal perimeter of the Treaty. 
 More recently, both the revival of neofunctionalism 
and the emergence of a growing body of literature on multi-
level governance has been fuelled by the insights received 
from this multitude of sectoral studies. Constructing and 
testing theories around the concept of spill-over - integration 
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progressing more or less inevitably from one sector to 
another - requires, first and foremost - an understanding that 
individual sectors are in fact integrating. Substantiating, or 
refuting, such an understanding has relied on the insights of 
EU policy-analysis. 
 Multilevel governance, as advanced by Marks, 
Hooghe, Kohler-Koch and others, emerged from the detailed 
study of one particular area of EU governance: the 
bargaining over and implementation of the reform of the 
structural funds (Marks, 1993; Hooghe, 1996; Kohler-Koch, 
1996). The conceptualisation of the European Union as a 
system of non-hierarchical governance has since been 
generalised to provides one of the main theoretical challenges 
to the intergovernmentalist approach (Marks et al., 1996; 
Kohler-Koch, 1997; Stone and Sandholtz, 1997; 
Jachtenfuchs, 1995; Zürn, 1996). 
 On the whole, though, policy-analysis has tended to 
look at individual sectors, often in individual national 
settings. Opening up theoretical avenues - as in the case of 
multi-level governance - or conducting genuine comparison 
between a number of sectors (Héritier, 1997) has remained 
the exception. Indeed, the growing number of specialised 
journals for specific EU policy-areas - regional policy, social 
policy, environmental policy, foreign policy - indicates that 
policy-analysis continues to proliferate within segmental 
boundaries. 
 A layer of change deeper than the policy-process is 
studied by those analysing what may be called here the 
process of constitutional reform. There is debate about 
whether the Treaties and the Community legal order can 
actually be understood as a ‘European Constitution’. 
Whatever the merits of either view, the idea of constitutional 
reform - the fundamental change of the meta-rules 
underlying a legal system - may well be applied well to the 
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Union’s periodical exercises in treaty reform. This 
perspective includes the analysis of IGC preparation, 
domestic interest formation, evolution of national and EU 
institutional negotiating positions, processes of bargaining 
and coalition-formation during the Conference, mediation of 
results to the respective publics and the process of 
ratification, including possible re-negotiation of draft treaties, 
within the domestic systems. 
 There are two phases with a high intensity of 
constitutional reform in the history of European integration: 
the mid-1950s and the period from 1985 to the present up to 
the 1996-7 IGC. Both have spawned a bulk of literature on 
the dynamics or otherwise of this process. The early phase of 
integration produced the neofunctionalist research agenda, 
while recent of IGCs (1986, 1989 I and II, 1996) has led to 
much debate about the ‘liberal institutionalist’ approach to 
integration (Moravcsik, 1993). Equally, the period from the 
late 1960s to the early 1980s with especially low reform 
intensity led to mainstream literature emphasising the limits 
of integration (Taylor, 1980; Hoffmann, 1966; 1982) 
 All these approaches have been concerned with 
middle-range explanations of European integration. 
Removed from the everyday life of the Community and 
therefore from the observation of micro-level change, they 
have tended to concentrate on the power and interests of 
member states. Often the argument of such studies has been 
that the explanation of key events of the integration project, 
such as, for example, the coming about of the Single Act, 
must lie at the heart of attempts to theorise about integration. 
But such analysis implies a bias towards political integration 
as opposed to functional integration, thus over-emphasising 
the positions of Member States at the expense of the power 
that Community institutions and other non-state actors have 
to influence the course of events (Wincott, 1995). 
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 On the other hand it is clear that the integration 
project has, in recent years, become more ‘political’, and that 
the difficulties involved in such a move were not properly 
accounted for in the ‘functional’ bias of the neofunctionalist 
project. As the implementation of the essence of Maastricht - 
the creation of a single currency - and the ratification of 
Amsterdam approaches, this debate is an important one. We 
stated at the outset the over-riding significance of treaty 
reform for  the current phase of integration. Moreover, as will 
be argued below, constitutional reform is best seen as the 
crucial intermediate process which links policy-making to 
structural transformation.  
 The dominant view on treaty reform has so far been 
that the more serious business of integration will attract the 
more serious attention of the national executives, that this 
will cause more serious scrutiny of the proposed reform and 
that agreement will only come about when key Member 
States’ interests are served and can be successfully 
communicated to the domestic public. This reading of the 
chances of constitutional reform to move forward the 
integration process, explains, after all, also the early failure of 
political integration in the mid-1950s. Consequently, the 
focus on EU constitutional reform - or its absence - is 
important and indeed paramount to an overall understanding 
of the integration project. Yet it can only be understood as a 
partial explanation of that process. Crucially, as Wincott has 
argued - this perspective misses the link between the 
instances of constitutional reform, isolated (in time), and the 
continuous, ‘everyday’ business of EU policy-making. 
 For taking a single instance of EU reform - whether 
Single Act, Maastricht or Amsterdam - and studying the 
resultant decisions on the basis Member State preferences - 
must surely miss out on important influences on the crucial 
question about how national preferences are formed. It is a 
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very myopic view of the integration process which perceives 
the formation and aggregation of interests as a one-way street 
leading from the national domain to the intergovernmental 
conference table. Taking into account, as Moravcsik has 
done, domestic actors - industry, parties, the wider public - in 
the formation of ‘national interests’, begs the question as to 
who or how the preferences of these actors are set. 
 Answering that question would in many cases refer 
the analysis of processes towards deeper changes - the 
changing structural environment which over time has 
fundamentally redrawn the arenas in which  domestic and 
European actors operate when they make policy or negotiate 
treaty reforms. It is this missing link, the structural 
transformation of the Euro-polity, which has so far escaped 
wider analysis. In much of the agency-dominated literature 
mentioned above structural change remains either 
unexamined or enter the stage as an ‘externality’. But the 
transformation of Europe is closely linked to the 
establishment of the Euro-polity - it is one of the key 
processes of integration that needs to be studied along side 
the policy-making and treaty reform processes.  
 Studying the longue durée of integration therefore 
goes beyond the modelling of different states’ modes of 
behaviour and opens up to questioning the very nature of the 
system in which they operate. Ultimately, as far as European 
integration is concerned, such a look at the longue durée of 
integration will want to go back in time beyond the actual 
creation of the EC or ECSC. It will need to look at the 
evolution of the ‘Westphalian state system’, the formation of 
territorial and national states, the conceptual history of key 
principles such as state sovereignty and national self-
determination, the development of the idea of European 
unity, the gradual growth of a framework of rules for co-
operation and the changing intensity of communication 
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flows. And this is not an exhaustive, merely an indicative list 
of what the changes we need to study to develop an 
understanding of what Allott has called ‘total history of 
Europe’ (Allott, 1991). But an acknowledgements of the 
significance of a this ‘third layer’ for the study of integration 
does hardly amount to a specific research agenda. This article 
proposes to move in that direction - indicating the ways of 
studying the structure of European integration and integrating 
it with the current body of literature.  
The necessity for studying structural transformation 
is evidenced by a growing body of opinion that sees the 
developments in Western Europe as a fundamental departure 
from previous ordering principles. If the European Union is 
‘less than a federation, [but] more than a regime’ (Wallace, 
1982), it must be a completely ‘novel form of political 
domination’ (Schmitter, 1991). To investigate this rather than 
to gauge the influence within such a system of individual 
nation-states - as is the intergovernmentalist design - one 
needs to go deeper into the structure of European governance 
and further back in time.  
To do so means to question rather than to assume the 
analytical categories which are traditionally applied to the 
study of the EU. In this perspective, the crucial questions for 
inquiry are, first at all about the state. Rather than asking: 
what do states do or how much influence state actors have in 
the EU system, we ought to question the nature of the state in 
Western Europe today. A long-term analysis might 
demonstrate not only that the ‘national interest’ of even the 
more powerful states in Western Europe has fundamentally 
changed as a result of decades of integration. Also the very 
identity of the state - of each individual state as well as of the 
concept as such - is clearly as stake in the course of 
integration. If statehood has been characterised as territorially 
delimited government, EU member states are hardly in the 
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business of governing ‘their’ territory any more. In essence 
they are probably much better understood as channels of 
interest representation, endowing actors tied into supra- and 
transnational decision-processes with resources and 
legitimacy. In studying integration, therefore, it might make 
better analytical sense to emphasise the membership, not the 
statehood, of EU member states. 
The literature of European integration has rarely 
addressed these issues head-on. Caporaso’s recent article on 
the EU as a postmodern form of state was a notable 
exception (Caporaso, 1996).  What follows from the 
argument here is that the structural aspects of integration 
deserve more attention. The subsequent section proposes 
various models which can be utilised towards that purpose. 
But such recommendations are meant as additions to the 
existing research agenda, not replacements of it. Ultimately, 
a comprehensive perspective hinges on the recognition of 
integration as multiple processes, and on the recognition that 
these are inter-connected in the manner indicated here. 
 
Figure 2 Dynamic Model of Change in European integration 
This model indicates that research on any one level ought to 
recognise to the findings of analyses on the other two levels. 
Such a linkage between EU research on the micro- and 
macro-level will then not only have a value in itself, but will 
be of crucial significance in terms of the development of a 
comprehensive perspective to the EU. Observing the need for 
linking research concentrated on any one layer of change to 
Policy-Process 
Constitutional  
Reforms 
Structural 
Transformation 
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the others, will thus also prevent false generalisations about 
how much or how little is actually changing. 
 
 
Studying the Longue Duree of European Integration 
From what has been said so far follows that political science 
has so far turned a rather blind eye to the elements of 
structure in the integration process and the way in which 
structural changes have potentially changed the arenas in 
which policy-making and treaty reform are being negotiated. 
In order to develop a greater sensitivity to these aspects, 
political science would do well to import ideas and 
approaches from other disciplines. Law, History, Sociology 
and International Relations have all generated structuralist 
perspectives which could enhance the more holistic approach 
to the study of European integration which is advocated here. 
This section briefly introduces some useful avenues and 
suggests ways of relating them to mainstream political 
science work on European integration. 
 It will be apparent from the preceding argument that 
structural analysis is closely tied up with a historical 
perspective. In an elementary sense, structuralist analysis 
implies the need to dig deep into history in order to identify 
the fundamental patterns of political life, to be able to gauge 
which are unaffected by short-term events and which are, in 
fact, changing (Tilly, 1984). The utility of long-term history 
thus lies in the disentanglement of current events from more 
long-term developments and in the isolation of trends 
towards path-dependency. As regards the development of 
what has been, until now, the primary ordering principle of 
political life - the modern state - this has been a common 
approach (Herz, 1957; 1968; Linz, 1993; Tilly, 1975; 
Anderson, 1974; Poggi, 1990).  
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 As far as the development of the European state 
system is concerned, path-breaking research of this long-term 
historical process has been carried out by Stein Rokkan and 
Otto Hintze. Their emphasis lay on the last major incidence 
of structural transformation: the establishment and 
consolidation of territorial states in Europe (Rokkan, 1973; 
Flora, 1981; Page, 1990). Recently, there have been attempts 
to return to this encompassing, cross-temporal comparison in 
European political development (Therborn, 1995; 1997). 
 In the study of European integration, one use of 
history has been the recourse to historical categories of 
governance that modernity and its state-centrism had done 
away with (Schmitter, 1992). Returning to the ordering 
principles of pre-modern political life has led to the 
suggestion that the current state of transformation can be 
likened to neo-medievalism - including the normative perils 
contained in such a move (Wæver, 1994; Evers, 1994). 
 Political structures are, first and foremost, the 
institutions of governance. In this context, ‘institutions’ is 
used as a broad term, denoting not only of hierarchical, 
governing organisations, but rather the formalised and 
continuously reproduced patterns of interaction in social or 
political life. In this understanding, political institutions are 
not simply the European Commission or other ‘European 
institutions’, but also ‘the state’ or ‘European integration’ 
(Jørgensen, 1996). Historical institutionalism thus goes 
further than the more traditional institutional analysis of the 
EU. To the extent that in western Europe the formal 
institutionalisation of transnational, previously ‘international’ 
politics is accepted as the norm, European integration has 
become an institution in this larger sense. In Sociology this 
has been identified as a fundamental change, denoting 
structural transformation in the west European state system 
(Bach, 1993). 
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 To be sure, the ‘strength’ or the ‘power’ of the state - 
by which is meant the ability of member state representatives 
to affect certain outcomes - is a regular item in the literature. 
What is rarely questioned is the state as the primary ordering 
principle of political life in Western Europe. On the one 
hand, the state is an older, more entrenched and more easily 
recognisable institution and therefore deserves the analytical 
attention that goes with this significance (Evans et al., 1985; 
Cerny, 1990). 
 But this does not mean that European integration is 
not also an ordering principle of political life and must also 
be studied as a political institution - an institution that is 
partly complementary, partly competitive, to the state. While 
in a more immediate sense traditional state structures and 
emerging European structures are being fused in the process 
of integration (Wessels, 1992), a long-term vision of the 
process must recognise that the state is being superseded in 
its role of exclusively legitimating territorial governance 
(Christiansen 1997). In this sense, European integration - the 
growth of new forms of legitimate governance in Western 
Europe - is also a factor in the decline of the state as a source 
of political legitimation (Haaland Matláry, 1995). 
 The need for historical analysis and the view of 
European integration as a political institution links the 
present discussion to an approach that is sometimes called 
‘historical institutionalism’. The past decade has witnessed 
the formulation of a new research programme under the label 
‘new institutionalism’ (see Evans et al., 1985; March and 
Olsen, 1984; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Thelen and 
Steinmo, 1991). As has been pointed out, this renewed 
attention to organisational factors in political life has taken 
very different forms (Koelble, 1995). More specifically, both 
reflectivist and rationalist strands of institutionalist thinking 
regarding politics and society have developed (Grendstad and 
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Selle, 1995; Cammack, 1992; Gebhardt, 1992). It is the 
reflectivist variety of neo-institutionalism that has developed 
ways of integrating historical analysis and long-term 
developments in the study of political institutions.  
Rather than going into the details of that approach, it should 
be pointed out that tools, methods and paradigms are being 
formulated in political science that intend to bring structural 
elements such as history and institutions into the analytical 
picture. One empirical application of this approach - the 
evolution of the principle of sovereignty (Krasner, 1988; 
Onuf, 1991; Philpott, 1995) - is also of high relevance for the 
study of European integration (Waever, 1995; Christiansen, 
1994).  
 Historical institutionalism is, of course, making 
significant inroads into European studies (Bulmer, 1993; 
Peterson, 1995; Pierson, 1996; Olsen, 1995). To the extent to 
which such studies establish the link between long-term 
changes and micro-processes in the policy-making field, 
historical institutionalism provides precisely the kind 
perspective that is needed to close existing gaps. Bulmer’s 
analysis of the governance of the single market is a perfect 
example (Bulmer, 1997) 
 Applying a historical-institutionalist perspective to 
the study of European integration would not suggest any 
particular view on the actual outcome of such an analysis. 
Opinions might well differ. Wessels has stated that  
European integration is a ‘thread woven into the 
fabric’ of the European society  at least in the 1990s. 
The Community and its institutions are more than 
just the ‘political will’ of heads of governments or 
just legal treaty properties (as important as they 
might be). They are reactions to persistent 
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fundamental patterns of West European political and 
social developments. (Wessels, 1991, p.136). 
  
In other words, a long-term vision of the integration process 
might identify persistent features of integration that go 
deeper than the (dis)agreements among current actors and 
their legal obligations. But another interpretation of history 
and of institutions might come up with a quite different view: 
institutions are not more than insignificant additions to an 
otherwise state-centred world (Milward, 1992; Mearsheimer, 
1995; Mann, 1993). This notwithstanding, the value of the 
historical-institutionalist approach is to question the current 
configuration of actors, interests and powers and to make that 
itself, rather than its outcome, the subject of inquiry. 
 One way of overcoming the agency-structure 
dilemma, it has been suggested, is by changing also 
epistemological track. This implies a move away from a 
rationalistic epistemology towards a more constructivist 
understanding of politics (Onuf, 1990). In the present context 
a constructivist approach must stand for the way of studying 
how Europe has come to be seen as a political space for joint 
decision-making. 
 In traditional accounts of European integration it is 
all too readily accepted that politics and policies are defined 
within a European space. A more structural account of that 
process would focus on the creation, not of joint policies or 
common institutions, but on the discourses and practices 
which must have preceded these activities in order to make 
them possible. The argument here is that the European 
project is about more than economic rationality and utility-
maximisation. It is also, crucially, about those reflexive 
foundations that provide the legitimacy, the purpose and 
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ultimately the rationale for common governance (Jørgensen, 
1997). 
 Constructivism in the social sciences has made 
considerable advances in recent years, especially in the 
discipline of international relations (Schaber and Ulbert, 
1994). This work can certainly contribute to new thinking in 
the study of the European processes. It is important, in this 
context, to examine the construction of ‘Europe’ - not in 
terms of the growth of an institutional framework, but in 
terms of the social construction of a polity. This includes, but 
goes beyond, the debate about whether there is a ‘European 
identity’ able to compete with established national identities 
(Smith, 1993; Garcia, 1993; Münch, 1993). 
 At stake is also the more general discourse about the 
‘Europe’ - the way in which the region has come to be seen 
as a natural space for politics (even if these are adversarial). 
Such constructivist analyses on region-building have been 
proposed for diverse territorial levels (Neumann, 1992; Paasi, 
1986). As regards Europe, there has been, until recently, only 
little attention to the formation of a coherent constructivist 
research programme (Jørgensen, 1995). 
However, the building-blocks for a constructivist perspective 
on ‘Europe’ are there: in literature and the arts, in general, the 
presence of a specifically ‘European’ dimension is long 
recognised (Lützler, 1982). Yet, this ‘Europe’ is a 
construction: there is no ‘natural’ boundary to this Europe 
(Sperling and Karger, 1989, pp.13-16; Isensee, 1993). The 
acceptance of a specifically European perspective to politics 
in this region was, indeed is, contingent and competing with 
alternative visions such as ‘the Atlantic’ or ‘the West’. 
 At the same time, the construction of this ‘Europe’ 
has depended on the parallel construction of an ‘Other’ 
against which a separate identity could be established 
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(Neumann and Welsh, 1993). There are also diverse national 
and temporal interpretations of what ‘Europe’ actually 
constitutes (Wæver, 1990; Holm, 1993). Indeed, the success 
of the European project might well depend on the distinctive 
of the interpretation each nation can extract from the 
discourse on ‘Europe’.  
 This approach indicates that the political meaning of 
‘Europe’ has a structuring impact on the present which is, to 
a large extent, independent of any current rationalisation that 
is preoccupied with ‘facts’ or ‘interests’. A constructivist 
perspective on the presence of ‘Europe’ is bound to show the 
elements of structure that are, respectively, underpinning and 
weakening the significance of that space. At the same time, a 
constructivist perspective will, of course, also confront the 
state with its ‘unnatural’ nature. Thus a straight record might 
be set where in the past the nation-state has often been reified 
as the only imaginable framework for political processes. 
Constructivism tends to illuminate the contingency of any 
form of structural configuration of politics, and, as such, 
would certainly assist a better understanding of how the 
integration of Europe has been coming about. 
 This section has sought to demonstrate that 
ontological choices matter, and that, in the past, the study of 
European integration has had a tendency to accord 
ontological primacy to political action. If this is criticism 
accepted, two items belong onto the integration research 
agenda: first, the development of structuralist perspectives on 
the integration process, in order to fill the gaps left by 
research based on an agent-primary ontology; second, 
attempts to resolve of the potential contradictions by agency- 
and structure-dominated views with the aim of developing a 
perspective on European integration that is both 
comprehensive and meta-theoretically consistent. 
 52
 The best-known approach towards the integration of 
actional and of structural explanations has come from 
Anthony Giddens, in the form of structuration theory. 
Essentially, it is the attempt of reconciling the explanatory 
power of both actors and structures by defining them as ‘co-
constituting’ each other. The ‘duality of structure’ - the 
notion that structures constitute actors while, at the same 
time, these structures are being constituted by the continued 
and repeated action of the actors - is at the heart of this 
attempt towards ontological reconciliation (Giddens, 1977; 
1983; 1984; Cohen, 1991) 
 Insights drawn from structuration theory and from 
the wider agency-structure debate could therefore be used 
here to link developments on the different layers of change 
identified here. In this way the attempt to link micro- and 
macro-level analysis regarding the causes and effects of 
integration would ensure the tenets of meta-theoretical 
consistency. It will also be a way of bringing the insights and 
values of legal scholarship - where structuration theory has 
already been utilised (Snyder, 1990) - more firmly into the 
fold of political science. Currently structuration theory, 
which has been widely debated in other disciplines, has only 
seen little application in the study of integration (Wind, 1996; 
Christiansen, 1997; Christiansen and Jørgensen, 1997). 
Together with constructivism and historical institutionalism 
more generally, it would be useful item in the toolbox of 
future integration theory. 
 
 
Conclusion 
The above discussion was consciously selective. This 
selectivity should not be misunderstood: structural elements 
from a variety of disciplines have been advanced so that they 
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may be added to traditional work on integration theory in 
political science. Patterns of agency - the identification of 
actors, their preference formation, the distribution of power 
resources - were left out of the discussion. The reasons for 
this were twofold: on the one hand are patterns of agency, as 
we argued above, already dominant in the traditional, 
neofunctionalist and liberal intergovernmentalist theories of 
integration. On the other hand, it is precisely the short-
termism and agency-dominance of so much political science 
literature that renders it incompatible with the mainstream of 
legal work on the European Community. 
 This article has only signposted a comprehensive 
perspective on European integration - a perspective which 
recognises that integration involves a number of process of 
varying historical depth. Developing integration theory in a 
more inclusive manner would, in the first instance, seek more 
research into the long-term or structural effects of the 
integration process - what has been called here the longue 
durée of integration. Constructivism, historical 
institutionalism and structuration theory have been identified 
as fertile ground for the generation of such insights. 
 As a second step, there would need to be greater 
sensitivity to the identification of linkages between various 
levels. How do structural changes impact on the 
environment, resource base and interest structure of policy-
makers and IGC negotiators? How have repeated treaty 
reforms and policy-change affected the underlying structure 
of European governance? These are questions that past 
integration research has rarely addressed. To provide a 
framework for asking these questions, and to suggest 
directions in which to find the answers, was the purpose of 
this article. 
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 Chapter 2 
 
The European Commission 
The European executive between 
continuity and change 
National governments like to claim that their European 
policies place them at the heart of the European Union, but 
it may be more appropriate to place the European 
Commission at this prime location (Nugent 2000). From the 
outset, when Jean Monnet became the first president of the 
Commission’s precursor, the High Authority of the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the 
institution has been closely linked to, even identified with, 
the progress of the integration project. 
 The Commission is central to the integration 
process because in most areas of EU policy-making it 
carries the sole responsibility for proposing new legislation. 
The monopoly of initiative with respect to most first-pillar 
matters has made the Commission a pivotal actor in the EU 
policy-process, placing it in a privileged position in relation 
to national governments, organised interests and the 
European Parliament. It has allowed the Commission a part 
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in framing the issues, setting the agenda and, in a wider 
sense, shaping the evolution of the European Union. 
 Beyond initiating EU legislation, the Commission’s 
functions also include the mediation – even ‘manipulation’ 
– of member state positions during the decision-taking 
phase of the policy-process (Schmidt 2000), and control 
over compliance with EU legislation once this has been 
passed (Mendrinou 1996; Peters 2000). Furthermore, in a 
range of areas, the Commission itself is either the decision-
taker (for example in competition policy) (McGowan 2000; 
Brent 1995) or policy-manager (for example in managing 
pre-accession assistance to the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe) (Levy 2000; Laffan 1997). Finally, the 
Commission also has a role in informing citizens about EU 
policies (Mak 2000) and representing the EU’s trade 
interests in international fora (Woolcock 2000). 
 The variety of tasks it has to perform within the 
system of European governance make the Commission a 
complex institution. It has to possess technical expertise in 
almost every area of government activity as well as an 
astute awareness of the politics of these issues, if it wants to 
see its policy proposals and other initiatives succeed. The 
need to handle the often contradictory demands of 
administrative expertise and political preference within the 
same institution can exacerbate tensions within the 
Commission. And pressure to meet an expanding range of 
tasks with often limited resources can create problems with 
administrative ‘overload’, which in turn may damage the 
efficiency and legitimacy of Commission actions. 
 The identification of administrative and political 
logics within the Commission make it essential to stress one 
fundamental point at the beginning of this chapter: the term 
‘Commission’ is being used to denote a number of different 
‘animals’: ‘Commission’ stands both for the college of 25 
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individual Commissioners constituting the political, quasi- 
ministerial level of the institution, as well as for the body of 
more than 20,000 officials who make up its administrative 
services. In view of the tensions mentioned above, the 
relationship between these political and administrative 
levels of the Commission has been difficult. 
 In the early phase, Commissioners tended to be 
senior civil servants, but in the recent past have been 
recruited from among senior politicians in the member 
states (Donnelly and Ritchie 1994; MacMullen 2000). 
Commission staff are normally recruited through 
competitive examinations from across the European Union, 
but at the higher echelons of the administration 
appointments have traditionally involved an element of 
‘parachuting’ – the appointment of senior officials 
according to national and party political patronage rather 
than by promotion through the ranks (Spence 1994) as well 
as the growing practice of filling Commission posts through 
secondment of officials from national administrations 
(Trondal 2001).  
 While the need to reconcile administrative and 
political responsibility within the Commission can be dated 
back to the origins of the High Authority, the more recent 
phase of dynamic integration following the creation of the 
Single Market has brought new pressures. Given the direct 
or indirect relevance of Commission activities for 
governments, interest groups, businesses and consumers, 
the institution is now frequently in the spotlight of public 
attention. This higher profile has had two consequences 
which are essential to an understanding of recent 
developments concerning the Commission: on the one hand, 
there is now an often critical, if not hostile, scrutiny of 
Commission activity by the – predominantly national – 
media. In this respect, the focus is not only on potentially 
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controversial policy proposals or decisions the Commission 
is preparing, say in areas of tax harmonisation or state aid 
control. Crucially, the focus is on the Commission itself, 
often with heavy emphasis on its arcane internal practices 
and its alleged propensity to mismanagement or even fraud 
(Grey 2000). 
 The second, related consequence is a lingering 
debate about the Commission’s lack of public 
accountability. The Commissioners are nominated and 
appointed by national governments, and while they are not 
‘faceless bureaucrats’, as critics sometimes claim, they can 
legitimately be called ‘unelected’. Changes introduced in 
recent treaty reforms have enhanced the role of the 
European Parliament in the confirmation of the 
Commission President and the College of Commissioners 
have not altered this basic fact, and the legitimacy of the 
Commission has been precarious as a result. Indeed, when 
objections from MEPs to individual candidates for 
Commissioner posts caused a delay in the appointment of 
the Barroso Commission the public reaction was one of 
crisis, rather than seeing this as the legitimate consequence 
of the democratic process. 
 The combination of high political profile, 
administrative overload, media scrutiny and questionable 
public accountability has made for a heady brew in the 
1990s. Jacques Delors, Commission President in 1984–94, 
had invigorated the institution after decades of 
‘eurosclerosis’ by putting it into the driving seat of the 
successful and dynamic Single Market programme. But the 
next big project, the agreements on Economic and 
Monetary Union and on Political Union contained in the 
Maastricht Treaty, already saw the Commission’s star 
wane. Delors’ successor, Jacques Santer, assumed office 
with the motto ‘Doing less, but doing it better’, but towards 
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the end of his term he became the victim of the volatile mix 
of political ambition, administrative mismanagement and 
fragile legitimacy which the Commission had developed in 
the 1990s. In response to criticism from within and outside 
the Commission, the European Parliament first instituted a 
Committee of Independent Experts to investigate fraud and 
mismanagement. When the EP then threatened to dismiss 
the Commission on the basis of the Committee’s report 
(Committee 1999), emphasising the absence of either 
collective or individual responsibility in the Commission, 
the entire Santer Commission was forced to resign in March 
1999. 
 The events at the end of the 1990s constituted a 
major crisis for the Commission, but it also constituted an 
opportunity to approach the first substantial reform of the 
Commission in twenty-five years (Spence 2000). The Prodi 
Commission had to embark on a wide-ranging process of 
reform which implied significant changes for the institution, 
the individuals working within it, and its relations with 
other institutions, the member states and the wider public. 
For a time, the 1999 crisis and the subsequent reform 
process appeared to have certainly weakened, even 
traumatised, the Commission. In the long run, though, the 
‘fresh start’ afforded by these events may come to be seen 
as invigorating, and that ultimately a ‘new Commission’ 
will emerge as a stronger player in the policy process. At 
the end of the Prodi Commission, academic opinion on the 
outcome of the reforms remained divided (Rhinard and 
Vaccari 2005). 
 This chapter analyses the evolution of the European 
Commission against the background of these problems and 
opportunities. The next section charts the development of 
the Commission’s role in the European policy process. 
Subsequent sections deal with the resulting pressures for the 
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administrative and political levels of the Commission, 
before attention returns to the current internal and treaty-
based reforms. By way of conclusion, the chapter discusses 
the key issues for the Commission in view of the challenges 
ahead. 
 
 
Conflicting demands and internal tensions 
The above comments have already indicated that the 
Commission is having to deal with internal tensions such as 
the political/administrative divide (Christiansen 1997). 
Another such contradiction is the Commission’s dual role of 
providing both stability and dynamism for the European 
Union. To some extent, this balancing act between 
dynamism and continuity which the Commission has to 
perform matches a related conflict: from the beginnings of 
the High Authority, Jean Monnet, its first president, had 
been aware of what he regarded as the dangers of 
bureaucratisation (Mazey 1992). He had wanted the High 
Authority to remain an elitist body of policy-making 
experts, rather than risk becoming bogged down in the 
quagmire of parliamentary politics (Wallace and Smith 
1995) or in the minutiae of sectoral integration (Mazey 
1992). Walter Hallstein, the first EEC Commission 
President and former diplomat, chose a more explicitly 
political approach to conducting Commission business. 
When clashing with de Gaulle, he learned to his cost what 
the dangers of a ‘political’ Commission were. The ‘1965 
crisis’ – which had France withdrawing from the Council 
for almost a year after a dispute over the Common 
Agricultural Policy – was as much about the content of 
policy as it was about the power of the Commission. De 
Gaulle’s concern at this juncture was not only to preserve 
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French interests in a particular policy field. In a wider 
sense, the crisis was sparked by – and put an end to – 
Hallstein’s ambition to turn the Commission into something 
like an internationally recognised ‘European government’. 
 What followed the show-down between de Gaulle 
and Hallstein were two decades of a decidedly ‘non-
political’ Commission: implementing treaty provisions 
where it was acceptable to member states, but remaining 
passive where there was opposition from national capitals. 
The initiative on institutional reform was definitely left to 
member states and the European Court. 
 But while the experience of the 1960s spelled an 
end to far-reaching federalist ambitions, it did not 
incapacitate the Commission in its more subtle policy-
making role. In what remained a cumbersome institutional 
framework and an unfavourable overall climate, the 
Commission executed its assigned tasks and indeed sought 
to extend Community competences. The main aim of the 
Rome Treaty, the abolition of all custom tariffs within the 
Community and the creation of a Common External Tariff 
by 1969, was achieved ahead of schedule. But more than 
just the administration of agreed policies, and the successful 
management of two rounds of enlargement in the 1970s and 
early 1980s, this period also saw the Commission ‘quietly’ 
extending the limits of Community activity. 
 In fields such as education, research and 
development and the environment, on which the treaties 
were silent, the Commission developed, first, a Community 
agenda, and, subsequently, the policy tools to facilitate 
Community action. In regional policy the Commission 
sought to go beyond the straightforward budget bargain 
among member states and began to design policies such as 
the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes that actually had 
a substantial regional dimension. Progress in all of these 
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cases was gradual, cumbersome and slow-moving, and yet 
these early advances were the essential foundations for the 
Commission’s more ambitious and self-confident projects 
of the late 1980s. 
 The pattern of Commission activity in this period 
was to circumvent potential obstruction of national 
governments by involving a wide range of non-
governmental groups and interests in deliberation about 
new policy initiatives. Such groups and organisations were 
regularly drawn into the ambit of the Commission by its 
comparative openness to outside views and representation 
(Mazey and Richardson 1994). They would then emerge 
favourable to the development of a European policy in the 
design of which they had participated. The advantage of 
such a strategy was that the emerging transnational network 
of interest groups and non-governmental organisations, 
supportive of a Community role in social regulation, would 
eventually put pressure on national administrations and 
governments to ‘fall into line’. At the very least, the 
Commission could point to ‘demand’ from private interests 
in a given Community policy, and in this way legitimise its 
activity in the unchartered waters outside the treaty. 
 Simultaneously, the Commission built up a body of 
‘soft law’: it oversaw the growth of frameworks of rules, 
recommendations, decisions and practices in novel policy 
sectors which were strong enough to structure social and 
economic interests – leading them to accept that ‘Europe 
matters’ – without having to seek explicit member state 
approval by sending formal proposals to the Council. This 
construction of soft law continued to be significant even 
when policy-making in the wide variety of sectors become 
codified later (Snyder 1993). It provided valuable 
experience in a novel system of administration and 
implementation – a system in which the Commission cannot 
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rely on hierarchy or coercion, but where its power must be 
based on negotiation and persuasion. 
 In this way, although its political ambitions had run 
dry, the Commission’s capacity to mould social and 
economic interests, to construct agendas for EC action and 
to develop the innovative practices necessary for European 
governance, meant that the 1970s and early 1980s were an 
important phase in its ‘maturation process’. It was on the 
basis of this experience that, with Jacques Delors taking up 
the presidency in 1985, there was a return to a proactive, 
political leadership from the Berlaymont. A number of 
factors – and many of them external to the Commission and 
even the Community itself – came together in the success of 
the ‘1992’ programme. But there was also Delors’ ability to 
invigorate and lead an administration that had in many areas 
shown the kind of bureaucratic fatigue Monnet had feared 
from the outset. At the end of Delors’ ten-year tenure at the 
helm of the Commission its potential for political leadership 
(Drake 1995) had been demonstrated conclusively. 
 Jacques Santer may have tried to scale back the 
profile and politicisation of the Commission, concentrating 
instead on consolidation of policies and a series of modest 
reforms (Peterson 1999). But it was too late to return the 
genie to the bottle. Given the range of activities in which 
the Commission is now involved and the potential for any 
matter, however technical, to become a matter of 
controversy and thereby of ‘high politics’, the Commission 
could not shy away from publicity and exposure to public 
debate. The appointment of Romany Prodi – a former prime 
minister from one of the larger member states – to succeed 
the disgraced Santer in 1999 appeared as an 
acknowledgement of this state of affairs among national 
governments. Prodi did not shy away from either limelight 
or political controversy, although he soon had to confront a 
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hostile media reception (Financial Times, 18 January 2000). 
The challenge of communicating from the centre to a broad 
and diverse (and increasingly sceptical) European public 
has increased further with the enlargement to 25 member 
states, and has accordingly been elevated to one of the key 
tasks of the Barroso Commission.  
 As a result of its increasing significance and high 
profile, the Commission has been facing a broad range of 
criticisms. It is castigated for being too bureaucratic or 
technocratic (for which read: insensitive to the political 
priorities of the day) as well as for too much political 
activism (for which read: too involved in deciding political 
priorities). Such criticisms of the Commission are 
contradictory, but not necessarily wrong. The fact of the 
matter is that there is an inherent contradiction in the 
Commission providing both political leadership and an 
impartial civil service to the EU system. The tension, if not 
contradiction, between the organisational modes underlying 
‘bureaucracy’ and ‘politics’ were recognised early on as 
fundamental issues for the Commission (Coombes 1970; 
Scheinmann 1966). Insofar as there is a general problem of 
reconciling democracy and bureaucracy in liberal 
democratic systems (Pollit 1988), the problem for the 
Commission was simply the reproduction, perhaps 
exacerbation, of similar conflicts erupting in national 
administrative systems. 
 As already indicated at the outset, the Commission 
had been treading such a path between the scylla of 
bureaucratisation and charybdis of politicisation for a long 
time, and the resulting tension has been a persistent feature 
in the work and the public perception of the Commission. A 
recent review of the literature on the Commission reveals 
that this is still a dominant preoccupation of observers in the 
early 21st century (Rhinard and Vaccari 2005). 
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 But from the mid-1990s onwards the Commission 
started to face more than the traditional balancing act 
between political bargaining and technocratic rule. The 
pressures on the Commission appeared as a triangular force-
field, in which the ‘corners’ were constituted by public 
accountability, attention to member state interests and a 
measure of independent expertise. This state of affairs 
reflects, for the Commission, the overall  
contradictions between intergovernmental 
bargaining, functional administration and 
democracy [which are] embedded in the treaties 
establishing the European Communities (Wallace 
and Smith 1995: 140). 
  
Such an observation leads us to concentrate on the study of 
the Commission’s internal tensions. Studying the internal 
dynamics of the Commission is analytically useful because 
such a perspective avoids the pitfalls of envisaging the 
Commission as a single, unitary organisation, without 
having to abandon the idea of institutional self-interest. The 
institutional self-interest (or ‘survival’) argument, often 
advanced when it comes to explaining Commission activity 
(Moravcsik 1993; Fuchs 1995), while useful, is in itself not 
very profound. It does not tell us much about the precise 
content of that self-interest. As has been pointed out, in the 
making of public policy, a complex interaction is going on 
between individual bureaucrats’ self-interest and their 
institutional environment (Egeberg 1995). Charting the 
Commission’s activity in terms of the demands put on it by 
democratic, intergovernmental and technocratic pressures 
helps to fill the notion of institutional self-interest with 
content. Crucially, it allows us to account better for its 
change over time. 
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 Second, studying its internal dynamics will lead us 
to an understanding of differences within the Commission. 
It is a complex and varied institution, where organisational 
logics are not always compatible with each other. The 
coexistence of a number of distinct administrative traditions 
and policy styles (Richardson 1982; Burnham and Maor 
1995), the autonomy of individual administrative units 
(Schink 1992), the way in which sectoral policies engender 
differing organisational cultures (Cini 2000), the persistence 
of national allegiance within ‘inter-national’ organisations 
(Egeberg 1999; Macdonald 2000) – all these are important 
in generating a comprehensive understanding of the 
European Commission. 
 
 
Expansion and functional specialisation of the 
Commission’s services 
The European Commission is the product of a functionalist 
path of integration. While often seen as the champion of a 
federalist cause for Europe, its organisational design has 
largely been determined by the tasks it has had to fulfil 
within the European Union. As these have grown over time, 
so the Commission has grown in size and administrative 
specialisation. Commission services are organised in some 
25 Directorates-General (DGs) and a number of centralized 
services which the Commission provides for the EU 
institutions (e.g. the  Publication Office or the European 
Personnel Selection Office). These are predominantly 
sectoral in nature, that is, they provide for the specialised 
technical and administrative know-how in the various 
policy sectors in which the Union is active. In addition, 
there are ‘horizontal’ DGs which are dealing with cross-
cutting concerns such as the budget, personnel or financial 
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control. (Nugent 1995, 2001). The European External 
Action Service, the establishment of which is foreseen by 
the Constitutional Treaty, may in the future constitute a new 
institutional form bringing together officials from the 
Commission, the Council Secretariat and the member states. 
 As a result of this process of expansion and 
specialisation, it is probably fair to say that the Commission 
is now both too large and too small. It is too large 
considering Monnet’s initial plans were for a moderate 
supranational agency with limited functional responsibility. 
It is too large also for those who want to see European 
integration as an intergovernmental affair that can do 
without expansive bureaucratisation at the centre. Yet, at 
the same time, the Commission’s services are small in 
relation to both the size of national administrations and the 
size of the problems it has to address. It is also for these 
reasons of size, and because of constrained financial and 
administrative resources, that the Commission now operates 
largely regulatory policies. 
 Most of the Commission’s competences relate to 
the regulation of the internal market. Creating and 
maintaining the ‘four freedoms’ – the free movement of 
capital, goods, services and persons – has precedence over 
the regulation of individual sectors. The Commission 
continues to spend considerable resources managing the 
coal and steel, agriculture and fisheries sectors, but the 
balance has been steadily tilting. With the implementation 
of the ‘1992’ programme, overseeing deregulation on the 
national level and building up a corresponding European-
wide regulatory framework has taken centre-stage inside the 
Commission. There are essentially three aspects to this 
issue: facilitating the abolition of national rules, policing the 
emerging single market, and developing minimum 
standards for those areas affected by deregulation. 
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 The main task for the Commission here is in 
dealing with non-tariff barriers – the vast amount of 
national health, safety and trading standards inhibiting free 
trade and the free movement of production factors. In 
theory, there is a distinction to be made between the 
distortion of trade through illegitimate practices designed to 
benefit national producers, and the legitimate interests in 
social and environmental protection that member states may 
continue to undertake. In practice, member states had used 
taxes, technical and health standards for products and 
services, state subsidies and public procurement policies as 
subtle forms of protectionism, after tariffs and customs 
duties had been abolished. 
 A key tool in approaching this issue has been the 
mutual recognition principle, which the Commission first 
spelt out in its 1985 White Paper on the Single Market. 
Forcing all member states to allow trade in products once 
they have been licensed for trade in one member state, and 
the resulting process of regulatory competition, the 
introduction of this principle has allowed the Commission 
to concentrate on designing the minimum requirements that 
all products still have to fulfil, and on policing the market 
that is emerging (Majone 1993). 
 In this way, the Commission could leave the 
cumbersome process of harmonisation, which had bogged 
down Community activity in the decades before the Single 
Act, to market-led competition between member states’ 
regulatory systems. It could then concentrate on the creation 
of the policy tools necessary to police the emerging market, 
and to devise auxiliary policies to provide for minimum 
standards in fields affected by deregulation. Yet even this 
was in many cases decentralised to bodies such as CEN and 
CENELEC – European-wide industry-based standardisation 
organisations seeking to develop non-binding standards for 
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product safety and electrical appliances, respectively. 
Consensus on standards emerging from these private 
organisations would, once endorsed by the Commission, 
become de facto EU standards for the single market. 
Essentially, the Commission developed a policy of merely 
overseeing what became in many sectors market self-
regulation. 
 Policing the internal market – which for the 
Commission has mainly meant the definition and 
application of rules for merger control and state aid control 
– has also become increasingly important. The 
Commission’s DG Competition is widely seen as one of the 
most powerful sections of the administration. The direct, 
wide-ranging and open-ended powers given to the 
Commission in this field justify the observation that this is 
‘the first supranational policy of the Union’ (McGowan and 
Wilks 1995). A legal scholar even likens the Commission, 
combining the roles of prosecutor and of judge in this 
policy field, to that of a ‘leviathan’ that must be ‘bound’ in 
the future (Brent 1995). 
 If the policing of the internal market has not been 
an uncontroversial process, then the same is true for the 
regulatory framework the Commission is building up to 
ameliorate its effects and provide for minimum social, 
environmental and health standards. Arguably, the 
Commission has often used the ‘free movement’ argument 
on a tenuous legal basis to build up additional competences. 
A result of this, and of subsequent treaty changes, are 
extensive policy competences in the education, 
environmental and social field, and policies which 
constitute more than simply a combat against non-tariff 
barriers (Pollack 1994; Eichener 1992; Mazey 1995). 
 The often uncertain legal basis, its limited financial 
resources and the sometimes hostile attitude of member 
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states have forced the Commission to be innovative in 
going about the creation of such policy competences. The 
presence of a ‘health and safety at work’ clause in the 
Single Act, requiring only a qualified majority vote in the 
Council, has resulted in the Commission basing a whole 
host of social policies on this article rather than facing the 
national veto in the Social Chapter procedures (Cram 1993). 
 There is, however, more to the Commission’s work 
than just the more or less extensive definition of the internal 
market programme. The Single Act had introduced, next to 
the ‘four freedoms’, Community competences in 
environmental policy and made the achievement of 
economic and social cohesion a goal of the integration 
process. The latter, in turn led to the reform and extension 
of structural funds for regional policy, the development of 
‘Trans-European Networks’ and of a ‘European Spatial 
Development Perspective’ as well as the creation of the 
Cohesion Fund. 
 The reformed structural funds and the associated 
process of implementation and lobbying, in particular, 
brought state actors in direct contact with the Commission 
(Marks et al. 1996). The Commission actively assisted this 
‘partnership’ by establishing an advisory committee 
composed of local and regional decision-makers (Hooghe 
2000). The combined effect of these developments was, for 
the EU, the establishment of the Committee of the Regions 
in the TEU and for the Commission an involvement in 
European territorial politics. 
 Periodically expanding framework programmes for 
environment and research and development policy did 
much the same in these fields. Here, too, the Commission 
established direct links with affected actors in domestic 
systems: national administrations, business firms, 
universities, research institutes, interest and pressure 
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groups. Again, the DGs involved increased in size and 
significance, but also had to resort to policy innovation and 
indeed experimentation in order to find a way of co-
operating with often hesitant or reluctant national 
administrations. 
 After Maastricht, the Commission had accumulated 
competences in most fields that national administrations 
have traditionally controlled. In some areas, such as state 
aid control or the management of aid for Eastern Europe, 
the Commission’s responsibilities are, in fact, unique even 
by national standards. In the hangover mood following the 
Maastricht ratification it came as little surprise, therefore, 
that questions should be asked about the ‘limits’ (Dehousse 
1994) of this ‘creeping’ (Pollack 1994) extension of 
competences. In a variety of policy areas there were 
demands for ‘decentralisation’ – often little-disguised 
attempts at repatriation of Commission powers back to 
national administrations. At the same time, the Commission 
has had to accept the imposition of limitations set on its role 
even in areas like trade where its dominance had been long-
established (Meunier and Nicolaides 1999). In other areas 
in which the Commission had begun to acquire a recognised 
role – in particular CFSP/external relations (Nuttall 1996; 
Bruter 1999) and Treaty reform (Christiansen and 
Jørgensen 1998; Dinan 2000; Christiansen and Gray 2004) 
– it has to contend with the established role of the Council 
Secretariat. Further challenges to the ‘community method’ 
have come from the increased use of the Open Method of 
Co-ordination which tends to marginalise the role of the 
Commission.  
 Member states had already been attempting to 
regain some control over policy management and 
implementation through increased use of ‘comitology’ 
(Chapter 7, this volume). In addition, a growing number of 
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‘Decentralised Community Agencies’ were established 
from  the early 1990s onwards (e.g. the European 
Environmental Agency in Copenhagen, the European 
Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction in Lisbon, 
and the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal 
Products in London) – a development that received a new 
impetus with the agreement to create new agencies in the 
areas of transport, health and food safety since 2000. 
 Decentralised agencies are meant to facilitate the 
exchange of information and to prepare the harmonisation 
of national provisions in areas requiring detailed technical 
expertise. The creation of such agencies first appeared like 
an intrusion into what would otherwise have been the 
territory of the Commission, but now looks more like a 
sensible ‘outsourcing’ of specialised knowledge, allowing 
the Commission to concentrate on core tasks. 
 With respect to the impact of institutional changes 
elsewhere, it is worth mentioning the way in which the 
Council Secretariat has increased in significance as a result 
of recent Treaty changes. The ‘triple-hatting’ of the 
Council’s Secretary-General as ‘Mr CFSP’ and WEU 
Secretary-General, the establishment of a CFSP policy unit 
in the Secretariat and its partial merger with the WEU 
secretariat have turned the Secretariat into an important 
institution in its own right. The next step of this evolution, 
as foreseen by the Constitutional Treaty may be the fusing 
of the posts of EU foreign minister  and External Relations 
Commissioner, which, together with the creation of the 
External Action Service, will lead to a much closer co-
operation between the two institutions.   
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The challenge of policy co-ordination 
But it would be misleading to look just at the conflict 
between the Commission and the member states without 
also recognising the incidence of conflicts and bureaucratic 
politics within the Commission. The dual aim of the Union, 
to provide for an internal market and for economic and 
social cohesion – reminiscent of the earlier distinction 
between negative and positive integration – has also led to 
conflicts between the DGs in the Commission championing 
different objectives. Internal disputes between the 
environment and the internal market DGs about the 
stringency of environmental protection, or between the 
Competition and Regional Policy DGs about the degree of 
public support for poorer regions (Wishlade 1993), are 
prime examples in this respect. The point to be made is a 
straightforward one: far from being a unitary actor, the 
Commission is an internally much-fragmented organisation. 
The term ‘multi-organisation’ has been coined to capture 
the way in which different logics are being followed by 
different parts of the administration (Cram 1994). 
 Consequently, there are dangers of fragmentation: 
inter-institutional contacts and relations proliferate in 
specific sectoral areas, so that ultimately each DG has 
regular contact with ‘its’ working groups in the Council, 
with ‘its’ committee in Parliament, and, indeed, with ‘its’ 
specific policy ‘constituency of interests’ in European 
society or market-place. The emergence of ‘epistemic 
communities’ – the development of and emergence of 
shared values among dedicated policy-makers, -recipients, -
advisors, and experts in a given field – is a recognisable 
phenomenon (Richardson 1996). The extent to which the 
Commission not only participates but actively encourages 
such transnational policy communities is only one side of 
the coin. The other side is the increasing difficulty of 
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uniting the policy-making strands of various DGs behind a 
formal ‘Commission line’. More significantly, perhaps, in 
addition to inter-institutional wrangles, deadlock within the 
Commission may be becoming an obstacle to Union 
decision-making. 
 Such intra-Commission conflict is not simply an 
issue for technocratic co-ordination. It affects the cohesion 
among Commissioners and, given the increasingly 
politicised nature of their work, leads to cabinet-style 
instances of ‘bureaucratic politics’ under the motto ‘where 
you stand depends on where you sit’ (Peters 1992; Page and 
Wouters 1994). It might well be a sign that it is because 
more power and significance now go with the job, that it 
has become difficult for the Commissioners to avoid turf-
battles and political differences. But, whatever the 
underlying reasons, this has not made it any easier for the 
Commission to carry out its mission. 
 If the Commission has matured from a small 
agency to an extended bureaucracy, then individual DGs 
have turned from organisational sub-sections into quasi-
ministries in their own right. Consequently, insofar as the 
Commission has been able, also on behalf of the EC/EU as 
a whole, to project the image of ‘corporate actor’ (Kenis 
and Schneider 1987; Fuchs 1995), and indeed to continue 
functioning as a unified institution, it is important to look at 
the institutional arrangements which bind it together. There 
are a variety of procedures to counter such centrifugal 
trends. 
 First of all, there are various bureaucratic 
mechanisms to provide for the harmonisation of 
Commission business. Most of these involve the 
Secretariat-General (SG), which is designed to co-ordinate 
the work of the various DGs. Its responsibility of co-
ordinating the drafting of legislative texts within the 
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Commission makes the SG the nerve-centre of the 
institution. The increasing difficulties of such horizontal co-
ordination have led to suggestions for the development of 
the SG into something like a ‘clearing-house’ for the 
Commission’s legislative proposals (Dehousse et al. 1992). 
Monitoring legislation, chairing the regular meetings of 
Directors-General, and representing the Commission in 
inter-institutional negotiations, the SG is the gatekeeper 
between the Commission’s internal activities and its 
relations with other institutions. 
 Further mechanisms for co-ordinations are provided 
by the weekly meetings of Directors-General, chefs des 
cabinets and deputy chefs des cabinets, respectively. The 
cabinets, the personal advisory staffs of each 
Commissioner, are primarily responsible for relaying 
information back and forth between the Commissioner’s 
desk and the Directorate-General under his or her 
responsibility. In this sense they play a crucial part in the 
vertical integration of political and administrative spheres 
within the Commission. But in the post-1992 phase their 
role in the conduct of the Commission’s horizontal co-
ordination has become equally, if not more, important. In 
monitoring policies conducted by other Commissioners and 
DGs, the cabinet members provide their Commissioner with 
the ability to keep track of the whole range of business at 
the weekly Commission meeting (Donnelly and Ritchie 
1994; Ross 1994). This function is more than merely 
supportive of policy co-ordination: each Commissioner’s 
capacity to follow and accept the whole of the Commission 
agenda is the necessary basis for the principle of collegiality 
– the acceptance that Commission decisions will be 
supported and defended collectively vis-à-vis other 
institutions and the general public. 
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 Thus there are elaborate efforts the Commission 
undertakes, through the formal ‘inter-service consulation’ 
procedure, but also at the Director-General and chef de 
cabinet level, to co-ordinate its policy-making activity 
internally. Yet the very need for such extensive co-
ordination indicates the ways in which the Commission is 
different from ordinary bureaucracies. It lacks, in this 
context, a full-blown hierarchical structure: while the 
individual DGs provide the ‘chain of command’ which is 
traditionally associated with bureaucracies, the Commission 
– the college of Commissioners – is essentially a non-
hierarchical body. Its members are equals, with equal voting 
rights, and their President a primus inter pares, even 
though, since Nice, the President’s hand been strengthened 
in that he (or she) can request the resignation of individual 
Commissioners. However, that possibility is likely to 
remain an exceptional instrument meant for crises rather 
than the everyday work of the institutions.  
 What is crucially important in understanding the 
nature of the Commission is the principle of collegiality: 
individual Commissioners, unlike national ministers in 
some member states, are not meant to run their portfolio 
autonomously. Instead, decisions by the Commission are 
taken collectively: the entire college takes the decision 
(though that can be delegated to individual Commissioners 
or even Director-Generals for routine matters). Commission 
decisions require a simple majority of the college, though 
here as elsewhere in the Union the general practice is one of 
searching for common ground and maintaining a consensual 
approach. The collegiality principle also implies that a 
Commission decision, once taken by the college, must be 
supported by all Commissioners and that, in turn, all 
Commissioners take an interest in every portfolio. 
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 This co-ordination imperative places considerable 
strain on cabinets of the President and the Commissioners 
as well as on the Secretariat-General. Their work to co-
ordinate policy is not only directed at identifying overlap, 
closing gaps and avoiding inconsistency, but also at 
bringing the principle underlying the Commission’s work – 
that the Commissioners speak with a collective voice – 
closer to becoming reality. The officials involved have to 
look as much sideways as they have to look up and down. 
Procedural delays and inter-departmental differences within 
the Commission are a result of this basic requirement for 
co-ordination. But there is also the positive effect of a 
culture of compromise and bargaining, which prepares the 
Commission well for the inter-institutional negotiations that 
follow. The internal process of policy co-ordination will 
probably have brought out the sensitive issues of a policy 
proposal, and the result is something that is less likely to 
offend Council and Parliament than any directive that might 
be the product of a single DG acting autonomously. 
 
 
Problems of accountability and legitimacy 
The re-emergence of a proactive and ‘political’ 
Commission from the late 1980s onwards, together with the 
more general critique of the Union’s ‘democratic deficit’, 
meant that there has been increasing focus on the 
democratic credentials of the Commissioners and of the 
Commission President (Haaland Matlary 1997). The most 
immediate response has been a redefinition of the 
Parliament’s powers of supervision vis-à-vis the 
Commission. Until Maastricht, parliamentary powers over 
the Commission were purely negative: the EP could, with a 
two-thirds majority, force the entire Commission to resign – 
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a provision potentially so damaging that the Santer 
Commission chose to resign voluntarily rather than face 
such a vote in the EP. 
 For a long time, the EP had no say in the more 
‘positive’ process of appointing the Commission. A number 
of reforms have since changed this situation. First, the 
change in the Commission’s term of office – extending it to 
five years and making it run parallel to the parliamentary 
term – enhanced the potential for linking the Union’s party 
politics and the appointment for the Commission. This 
linkage was not very strong during the 1994 European 
elections, and the 1999 election was overshadowed by the 
wider crisis of the Commission. However, the potential for 
a more dynamic relationship in the future is certainly there, 
especially as parties become more involved in the 
legitimation of Union politics (Hix 1995). In 2004, the 
debate preceding the selection of the Commission President 
illustrated that this had become an appointment that was 
not, any more, solely about the preferences of Member 
States, but also that the choice of the Commission President 
needed to reflect the parliamentary majority.  
 One important development in this respect has been 
the investiture procedure, which requires the 
Commissioners-designate not just to undergo lengthy 
hearings in front of the respective committees of the 
European Parliament, but also to complete extensive 
questionnaires about their competence and their European 
credentials. The new investiture procedure may, in itself, 
not do much about the EU’s ‘democratic deficit’ as long as 
the Parliament lacks a stronger link to the electorate (Hix 
2000), but it is a reform that strengthens further the hand of 
the Parliament vis-à-vis the Commission. The revised 
procedure is part of an emerging model of appointments in 
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the EU which provides the Parliament with considerable 
leverage vis-à-vis the EU’s ‘executive’ (Jacobs 1999). 
 This turns the discussion to the more general area 
of the Commission’s inter- institutional relations. Above we 
discussed the explosion of the Commission’s contacts with 
interest groups and other non-governmental organisations 
during the past ten years. During the same time, the nature 
of inter-institutional relations between Commission, 
Council and Parliament has changed fundamentally. As we 
have seen, the Commission’s relationship with the 
Parliament has become more adversarial as the EP’s 
influence and self-confidence have increased – the 
traditional partners in the integration project are now also 
rivals (Westlake 1994). 
 The Commission’s relations with the Council of 
Ministers have also become more structured, despite the 
balance between autonomy from national interference and 
dependence on member state support. One aspect of this has 
been the allocation of executive tasks to the Council 
Secretariat, as mentioned above. Another feature is the 
growth of what is now generally referred to as 
‘comitology’. Council and Commission share the executive 
function in the Union, and the preferred method of 
conducting the execution of policies is through the creation 
of specialised committees (Docksey and Williams 1994). 
With the expansion of Union competences, the 
‘comitology’ structure has been greatly expanded: there are 
hundreds of these committees now, and their supervision – 
not to mention legitimation – has become increasingly 
difficult (Buitendijk and van Schendelen 1995). In a wider 
sense, the expansive layer of committees dealing with 
consultation, co-ordination, management and 
implementation can be seen as a form of joint governance 
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of EU policies by Commission officials and member states 
representatives (Christiansen and Kirchner 2000). 
 Perhaps more importantly, the Commission’s 
relations with the other institutions have been altered 
through successive changes to the legislative procedure, 
leading to the co-decision procedure becoming the standard 
procedure for adopting legislation in the first pillar. Co-
decision requires constant communication and frequent 
mediation between the two legislative institutions. The 
Commission’s role in this context is crucial not only with 
respect to its efforts of shepherding legislative proposals 
through the various stages of the procedure, but also to 
actively participate in the so-called ‘trialogue’, the tripartite  
negotiations between EP, Council and Commission if and 
when proposals come before the Conciliation Committee. It 
is a demanding role for the Commission which requires not 
only some flexibility in responding to member state 
positions that emerge in the course of the legislative 
procedure, but also good relations with MEPs and EP 
officials (Burns 2004). 
 
 
The challenge of continuous institutional reform  
The driving forces for the recent phase of reforming the 
Commission are derived from a mixture of external and 
internal pressures on the Union. Externally, the prospect of 
enlargement demanded institutional changes for almost a 
decade. Minor changes to the Commission resulted from 
successive treaty reforms, but – perhaps more significantly 
– internal reforms outside the treaty change became 
necessary because of the circumstances of the Santer 
Commission’s resignation in 1999. The following Prodi 
Commission took office on a platform of reform, resulting 
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in a White Paper on Commission Reform (European 
Commission 2000). 
 In fact internal reforms had already been initiated 
during Santer’s Presidency (Peterson 1999), and to a limited 
extent the current reform programme is a continuation of 
earlier reforms. In the light of the events in 1999, there is 
now much greater impetus and political will to change the 
workings of the Commission. But at the more technical 
level, there are definite signs of continuity: for example, the 
DECODE exercise – a kind of internal census and survey of 
Commission staff and their occupation – was launched in 
October 1997, and its results informed Kinnock’s reform 
programme (European Commission 1999b). 
 Further and far-reaching changes have become 
necessary in response to the report into mismanagement and 
corruption by the Committee of Independent Experts 
(Committee 1999) mentioned at the outset. These concern a 
number of issues both at the micro-level – in terms of 
internal auditing and accounting – as well as at the macro-
level – in terms of the redefinition of the relationship 
between Commission and Parliament. The former issues 
have been tied into the catalogue of reforms contained in 
the White Paper. The latter have in part been addressed by 
ad hoc arrangements between the new Commission 
President, the Commissioners and the European Parliament, 
and are in part on the agenda of treaty reform. Beyond, or 
rather below, the treaty reform process, the Commission 
sought to contribute to the debate about the future of 
European governance with the publication of the White 
Paper on European Governance. By proposing a more 
structured relationship between civil society and EU 
institutions, and in the process to re-position, and to 
legitimise, the European Commission as the central actor at 
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the interface between societal demands and the EU 
legislative process (Tsakatika 2004). 
 The 1999 crisis could be seen to point in two quite 
different directions for the Commission: it could either be 
used to support the argument that the Commission is too 
unprofessional, badly organised and mismanaged to be 
entrusted with the high politics tasks with which it now 
deals on a daily basis – a rolling back of its competences 
and a greater degree of oversight by the member states 
would have been the logical response based on this 
reasoning. But the opposing view seems to have won out: 
that the Commission needs to be fundamentally reformed in 
order to be equipped for the tasks assigned to it by the 
member states. 
 In looking at the direction of these ongoing 
changes, three trends can be identified: the search for 
greater public accountability, a strengthening of internal 
hierarchy and an enhanced institutional independence for 
the Commission. These are, to some extent, interrelated 
developments, but reforms feed into each of these 
individually, making distinct trends discernible. There are 
further reform issues not captured by these trends, but they 
are of lesser significance in this context. The remainder of 
the section will discuss the direction of the Kinnock reforms 
in more detail. 
 In line with greater accountability to the public, the 
Commission is heading for a more hierarchical internal 
organisation. In part, the latter is a result of the former: if 
individual action is more clearly identifiable (thanks to 
greater transparency) and more likely to be subject to 
sanction (thanks to greater accountability), then the 
dynamics of command and control are more likely to 
respond. But there are also reform trends directly aiming at 
 83
making the Commission more hierarchical and 
strengthening the role of the Commission President. 
 Beyond its aim of addressing the Commission’s 
inherent need for co-ordination, the above-mentioned 
principle of collegiality has an important consequence: 
providing sustained leadership and giving direction to 
Commission affairs are extremely difficult to achieve. 
Traditionally, the lack of formal powers to ‘govern’ the 
Commission have been very challenging for successive 
holders of this office. The Commission President has to 
oversee an increasingly large administration and a diverse 
group of Commissioners. To advance, in this context, the 
course of European integration against at times sceptical 
national governments and an uncertain public takes special 
qualities. In retrospect it is perhaps fair to say that some of 
the previous Presidents failed in their task of actively 
promoting European integration. Much of what the 
Commission does and can do depends on the willingness of 
national governments to proceed with European integration. 
But the Commission President can exercise political 
leadership and thereby exert significant influence on the 
course of integration. Jacques Delors’ two and a half terms 
in office are the best manifestation of this potential (Drake 
1995). 
 What is important, in this respect, is that an 
effective Commission President’s qualities must include not 
only a determination to advance the course of European 
integration, and an awareness of what is politically feasible, 
but also a relatively tight control over the institution itself. 
As is well documented (Ross 1994; Grant 1994), Delors’ 
success as Commission President hinged also on his ability 
to ‘run’ the Commission itself. Towards this aim, the 
presence of a group of dedicated staff, in particular Delors’ 
chef de cabinet Lamy, and Secretary-General Williamson, 
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was critical in allowing Delors to streamline policy-making, 
to promote forcefully his strategy for a ‘relaunch’ of the 
Community and, ultimately, to enhance greatly the 
institutional standing of the Commission. A leadership role 
for the Commission depends therefore much on the 
individual choices made by the President in office – it is a 
capacity for leadership that depends on the utilisation of the 
Commission’s resources (Nugent 1995). 
 Successive treaty revisions agreed at Amsterdam 
and Nice provided for two further changes here: first, that 
the designated Commission President now has to agree to 
the nominations of the other members of the 
Commissioners (Art. 158) and, second, that the 
Commission shall work under the ‘political guidance’ of the 
President (Art. 163). The President now also has a greater 
say in the allocations of portfolios to individual 
Commissioners. 
 Both Prodi and Barroso made use of his new power 
of ‘political guidance’ by appointing a number of new 
‘Commissioners’ Groups’, bringing a number of 
Commissioners together in order to oversee developments 
in a particular area (Reform, Inter-institutional Relations, 
External Relations, etc.). As these Groups are tasked with 
overseeing the co-ordination of Commission policy in a 
particular area, and since the Commission President 
reserves the right to attend and chair these Groups, they can 
be seen as a means not only of improved horizontal linkage 
of policy, but also of greater control of the college by the 
President.  
 During the Prodi Presidency there had also been a 
reform the cabinets, with mixed results: what was first a 
demand to appoint a chef de cabinet of a different 
nationality was then downgraded to chef or deputy chef and 
eventually became a minimum requirement of three 
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nationalities to be represented among the members in the 
cabinet. Allowing for the nationality of the Commissioner, 
this has meant the appointment of at least two non-nationals 
– which is one more than was required previously. The size 
of cabinets was also reduced to six members. 
 When Prodi took over as Commission President, he 
also initiated a territorial shift: Commissioners had to leave 
of the Breydel Building where up to then the entire college 
has been residing, and moved to new offices close to their 
respective services. While this assisted the vertical 
integration of the work done by DGs, cabinet  and 
Commissioner, it made horizontal co-ordination among 
cabinets and the college more difficult and may thus have 
contributed to a more fragmented Commission. Barroso, 
upon taking office, reversed this decision and brought the 
college back together into the same building – conveniently 
just as the Commission was able to move back into the 
Berlaymont, its historical headquarters, which has been 
closed for refurbishment for some 13 years.  
 Changes were also made at the top of the 
administrative level of the Commission. While a new rule 
that Directors-Generals may not be of the same nationality 
as their Commissioner has led to some movement among 
the top grades (Peterson 2000), Kinnock has also stated on 
more than one occasion that the practice of ‘flags on posts’ 
(Spence 1994) will come to an end (European Commission 
1999a). Given what was said earlier about the nature of 
appointments in the Commission, this development can be 
regarded as the beginning of a ‘cultural revolution’ 
(European Voice 1999). The effort to maintain broad 
geographical representation will remain, but it will be a 
matter for the Commission to decide who gets which job.  
 The reform White Paper, while talking the language 
of new public management, may yet make the Commission 
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a more traditionally bureaucratic organisation, with greater 
central control over the activities of its various parts. At the 
same time, treaty changes and secular developments 
promise to make the college of Commissioners more like a 
traditional cabinet, with the ability of the President to direct, 
and dismiss, individual members. The sum product would 
be a more hierarchical institution. 
 The Nice Treaty included changes with regard to 
both in the size of the Commission and the appointment of 
its President and its members. The question of the size of 
the Commission has been resolved in the following manner: 
from 2005 the Commission will include only one national 
from each member state. Implying the loss of a second 
Commissioner for the larger member states, this concession 
contributed to their demand to increase their relative voting 
power in the Council and the Parliament. As such, this 
reform of the Commission was part of the wider 
confrontation between smaller and larger member states at 
Nice. 
 Finally, the Nice Treaty also contained changes in 
the appointment procedure of the Commission President 
and Commissioners. The European Council is to select the 
Commission President, and the Council is to adopt the list 
of Commissioners, by qualified majority vote – a departure 
from the previous provision where these decisions required 
unanimity. President and Commissioners will be formally 
appointed by the Council by QMV, after they have received 
the approval by the European Parliament. This is a reform 
that may be seen to reduce the hold of individual member 
states over members of the Commission; the clear link 
between Commissioner and member state has, however, 
been reinforced through the new provisions mentioned 
above. 
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 Dependence on support from the European 
Parliament has become more significant, whereas the 
Commission President now has greater freedom to act 
independently of guidance from national governments. It is 
important, however, to remember that, in the main, formal 
changes have been outlined here, and that informal 
influence from the member states is, if at all, only indirectly 
affected. But the formal changes are already quite 
significant, in that member states are increasingly bound to 
lose control over the appointment procedures, both at the 
Commissioner level and at the level of senior officials. The 
Treaty changes giving the Commission President new 
powers while making him (or her) more directly 
accountable to the EP ought to marginalise the role of 
member states – once the President has been nominated. As 
regards senior officials, it will have to be seen whether, 
after the turmoil of the initial changes, a new modus vivendi 
develops, or whether member states and/or informal 
networks based on nationality find a way to play the new 
system in a fashion similar to the old one. 
 
 
Conclusion 
The past decade has been an extremely turbulent period for 
the European Commission. At the outset was the ambitious 
and largely successful project by Jacques Delors to 
reposition the Commission within the system of EU 
governance. But the advances the Commission had made 
had been bought with credit, on the assumption that the 
Commission would in due course deliver efficient and 
accountable decision-making. At the end of the decade, the 
bills kept coming in, and the modest reforms offered by 
Jacques Santer were not enough to cover the debt. The year 
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1999 was a nadir for the European Commission, but it has 
also opened the door for a unique opportunity to overhaul 
the institution and restructure its place within the Union’s 
architecture. 
 The wide-ranging reforms implemented under 
Prodi and Kinnock sought to modernise and ‘streamline’ the 
institution had to confront bureaucratic inertia, staff unions 
and the vested interests of national governments. The latter 
are bound to lose their privileged access to Commissioners 
and officials, if the Commission as a whole is to operate in 
a more transparent, accountable and ‘consumer-oriented’ 
fashion. But while direct access for member states may be 
waning, co-operation and co-ordination between 
Commission and Council Secretariat is becoming more 
important. More important still will be the Commission’s 
relationship with the Parliament, not only in the 
extraordinary circumstances of investiture or potential 
dismissal, but also with respect to routine decision-making. 
 Beyond the formal process of internal reform, 
which had been largely completed by the time Barroso took 
office, there is the anticipation of further changes and 
challenges ahead. Apart from the implementation of the 
changes which would have been required by the 
Constitutional Treaty, if that was ratified, the new 
Commission also needs to manage the institutional impact 
of enlargement (Christiansen and Gray 2005). This 
concerns inter alia the impact of officials recruited from the 
new Member States will have on the nature of the 
Commission's administration. There is, for example, the 
likely impact on language, with much greater use of English 
language rather than the traditional French among the new 
recruits. The whole culture of language use will be affected, 
both in terms of fewer languages used in internal meetings 
and documents (these already feature almost only French 
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and English) and in terms of pressure on Commission staff 
to keep documents requiring translation as short as possible. 
Thus the counterintuitive effect of the arrival of new 
nationalities among the Commission staff, and the increase 
in the number of official languages may actually be a 
rationalisation of language use inside the Commission.  
 Similarly, one should also expect the arrival of new 
administrative cultures to challenge the traditional modus 
operandi in the Commission. This will most likely be a 
gradual change, but over time there is the expectation that 
the Commission will be transformed by thousands of new 
staff from Central and Eastern Europe. However, what the 
medium- to long-term impact of the arrival of different 
administrative traditions will be is difficult to predict. On 
the one hand, it may exacerbate the already fragmented 
nature of the Commission. This a significant number of new 
staff with a very different culture of public administration 
may be making their mark on the institution, just as the 
arrival of a wave of officials from Sweden did lead to a 
push for greater transparency in the work of the 
Commission. On the other hand, the new nationalities in the 
Commission may ‘dilute’ the existing patterns of different 
national cultures, proving better chances of the development 
of a genuine European administrative culture. And, last but 
not least, the arrival of new Commissioners will have an 
impact on the nature of politics in the college, suggesting a 
Commission that is becoming more liberal than 
interventionist.  This trend has already been visible in initial 
moves by the Commission that indicated that regulatory 
activity might be curbed in comparison to the previous 
Commission. It was also reflected by Barroso when 
outlining his plans to the European Parliament, where he 
stated his intention to do less, but to do it better – 
incidentally a statement that sounded uncannily like Jacques 
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Santer when he presented his programme some ten years 
earlier.  
 The Commission continues to face numerous 
challenges both internally and vis-à-vis the outside world. 
Recent reforms which have sought to make the institution 
leaner have yet to demonstrate their medium and long-term 
effects, and the same is true with respect to the impact on 
enlargement. The need to communicate policies and 
institutional choices at the European level effectively to the 
wider public is greater than given the problems the 
Constitutional Treaty has been facing in the course of 
ratification, and thus communication has become a key task 
for the Barroso Commission. And while its role as a 
strategic leader in the public debate and the making of 
policies may have been waning in the post-Delors era, the 
Commission remains central to the European project. The 
high political profile of the Commission sits uneasily next 
to the growing need to maintain independence and to work 
closer together with the European Parliament, the Council 
Secretariat and the Member States. The long-standing 
tension between the politicisation and bureaucratisation is 
as alive as ever, and after a decade of sometimes significant 
reforms one may be forgiven for thinking of the famous 
dictum from Tommasi di Lampedusa’s novel that 
“everything has to change so that everything can remain the 
same”. It is a different Commission that has to face the new 
challenges of the 21st century, but it is also a Commission 
that is still subject to the tensions that have been inherent in 
this institution from the outset, and its remarkable 
development will continue to be driven by the dynamics 
resulting from the way these tensions play out in the future. 
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Chapter 3 
 
The Council of Ministers 
Facilitating interaction and 
developing actorness in the EU 
Given its prominence in the decision-making process of the 
European Union, the Council of Ministers is strangely 
elusive: it is both a permanent institution and the frequent 
gathering of ministers from all member states, 
representatives or officials. It is part of the EU’s executive 
(with the European Commission) and part of the EU’s 
legislature (with the European Parliament), but its work is 
less transparent than either of the other two institutions. The 
Council occupies the impressive Justus Lipsius buildings in 
the heart of the Brussels Euro-district, yet several times a 
year ministerial meetings take place in Luxemburg. All this 
may make it difficult to generalise about the Council, but it 
also makes for an interesting institution. 
 At the most basic level, the Council provides for the 
formal representation of member states in the European 
Union. Ministers, attending Council meetings, arrive with 
positions derived from domestic preferences regarding the 
issues under consideration. Yet this almost immediately 
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leads to one fundamental tension in the work of the 
Council: given that member state positions on policy-
proposals are rarely ever identical, the Council is not simply 
an – or even the – decision-making organ of the Union, but 
also the main forum for negotiation in the EU. 
 The idea that a single institution should be the 
channel of the multiplicity of national interests is a subset of 
the wider ‘unity in diversity’ paradox of the European 
Union. The Council is generally regarded as an 
intergovernmental institution, making it the focus of those 
who regard the member states as being in ultimate control 
of the integration process. Yet – in part precisely because 
member states have sought to maintain a close hand in the 
running of the integration process – the Council itself has 
become increasingly institutionalised. In the first years of 
the new millennium, the Council’s Secretary-General was 
also acting as the EU’s High Representative for Foreign 
Policy, and the Council Secretariat was becoming the hub 
of the EU’s foreign policy, military and internal security 
bodies. Thus there has been increasing emphasis on what is 
common rather than on what is intergovernmental in the 
work of the Council – reinforcing a trend that had already 
been identified at the beginning of the 1990s (Wessels 
1991). The Council may not (yet) be a supranational 
institution in its own right, but it certainly has moved on 
from being purely a site of decision-taking and the forum 
for bargaining among representatives of national 
governments for which it was originally conceived. 
 This chapter will examine the institutional 
evolution of the Council. In doing so it will look at the 
variety of institutional forms that together constitute the 
Council. The following sections discuss the politics of the 
Council as a meeting place of national and sectoral interests 
respectively. Given the expansion of the EU’s agenda and 
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the number of sectoral Councils, a special focus here will be 
the concerns about coherence and co-ordination in the 
Council’s work. The next section looks at the role of the 
Presidency – an important institutional device which was, in 
part, a response to the problem of co-ordination – before 
turning to the European Council, which has become an 
increasingly important part of any Presidency’s work 
programme. After this excursion into the Council’s 
‘superstructure’ follows a discussion of its ‘underbelly’ of 
committees and working groups, where much of the routine 
matter of Council decision-making takes place. A further 
section charts the role of the Council Secretariat, with 
particular emphasis on its gradual rise to institutional 
prominence. The conclusion assesses the increasing 
institutionalisation of intergovernmentalism and the issues 
that this raises for the future evolution of the Council, and 
of the EU in general. 
 
 
The Council of Ministers: institutionalising 
intergovernmentalism 
The Council is the main, formal point for the representation 
of national interests in the EU policy process. There are, of 
course, numerous ways in which member states influence 
EU business informally, whether this is through the 
lobbying of the Commission in the pre-proposal stage of the 
legislative process, the impact of domestic party hierarchies 
on voting in the European Parliament (EP) or the use of 
comitology committees to oversee the implementation of 
policies. But in a formal, constitutional sense, the Council 
provides for the systematic involvement of member state 
representatives in almost any aspect of European 
integration. 
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 Before going further in discussing the nature of the 
politics of the Council, it may be useful to distinguish 
between three different levels on which this interest 
representation occurs: 
• Ministerial level: ministers from all member states 
meeting in the composition of different sectoral 
Councils. 
 • Heads of State and Government level: prime 
ministers and/or presidents meeting as the European 
Council (while this is not a formal decision-making 
body in the Council structure, it is so closely 
associated with the work of the Council that it 
ought to be included here). 
 • Administrative level: national officials and/or 
experts meeting in committees and working groups. 
 
While subsequent sections will look at the latter two of 
these categories, this section will concentrate on the role 
played by ministers in the Council. Nevertheless, it is 
important to recognise from the outset that the work of the 
Council is embedded within this wider institutional 
structure. 
 Ministers from all member states attend Council 
meetings in order to take decisions on the legislative 
proposals from the European Commission or amendments 
proposed by the EP. As implied above, they do so in a wide 
range of different sectoral Councils. What was initially the 
preserve of foreign ministers soon involved also ministers 
of agriculture and, with the widening of the EU’s 
competences, an ever-wider range of ministers, which in the 
case of the more federal EU member states, can also include 
ministers from the regional level. By the mid-1990s the 
number of sectoral Councils had mushroomed to more than 
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20, roughly matching the number and designation of 
Commission Directorate-Generals or EP Committees. 
However, as co-ordination of such a growing number of 
Council formations was getting too difficult, a reform of the 
Council, agreed at Seville in 2002, reduced this to nine 
configurations in which the Council can meet.  
 Member states have two rather different, even 
opposing, rationales for representing their interests in the 
Council: on the one hand, individual governments will seek 
to see their policy preferences realised in decisions about 
EU policies, if necessary (and possible) against the 
opposition of other governments. In this respect one can 
distinguish between various ‘cleavages’ separating national 
governments (Hix 1999), including the Left/Right split, 
differences about the speed and reach of European 
integration and, with respect to the EU budget, the divide 
between net-contributors and net-recipients. In addition, 
there has been frequent reference to the division between 
small and large Member States, but this has been a dividing 
line more in the context of intergovernmental conferences 
than in legislative decision-making in the Council. 
 On the other hand, the Council also serves the 
collectivity of governments to advance a common interest 
in the intergovernmental aspects of European integration. 
This refers less to the substance of policy, and more to the 
structure of the Union and to questions like inter-
institutional relations and the use of decision-making 
procedures. Even in this area, though, there is scope for 
disagreement among national positions, since some member 
states, in particular some of the smaller ones, may prefer 
more supranational solutions (like a strengthened role of the 
European Commission) to the more intergovernmentalist 
positions of others. Much of the defence of member states’ 
structural interests takes place in the European Council and 
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in Intergovernmental Conferences, but it also plays a part in 
routine policy-making. This has contributed to some of the 
particularities of the EU system of governance like the 
decentralised implementation of policies, the creation of 
independent agencies or the growth of comitology. 
 When looking at the politics of the Council, much 
depends on the decision-making procedure at force in any 
given area. The main distinction here is between 
‘unanimity’ and ‘qualified majority vote’ (QMV). 
Unanimity requires a decision to be taken without 
opposition from any member states. In other words, a single 
member state can block a decision, which is why unanimity 
is the decisional mechanism applied to policy areas or 
issues which are sensitive and where some member state 
would not accept to be overruled. 
The application of QMV, on the other hand, provides 
opportunities for coalition-building, confrontations between 
different camps and decision-taking against the votes of one 
or more member states, as long as the required majority 
agrees. The majority is ‘qualified’, because it is more than 
the simple or absolute majority of member states. Instead, 
in areas in which QMV applies, each member state has a 
weighted vote recognising its relative size. In 2005, the 
qualified majority therefore required not only the majority 
of Member States, i.e. at least 13 out of 25 states, to be in 
favour. 
 In addition, the weighted votes of these states have 
to constitute at least 232 votes out of a total of 321. States’ 
voting weights range from 29 for the four larger member 
states to 3 for Malta. 
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 Germany, France, Italy, United Kingdom 29 
 Spain, Poland 27 
 Netherlands 13 
 Belgium, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, 
Portugal 
12 
 Austria, Sweden 10 
 Denmark, Ireland, Lithuania, Slovakia, Finland 7 
 Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Luxembourg, Slovenia 4 
 Malta 3 
 TOTAL 321 
Table 1: Votes per Member State in the Council of Ministers 
(February 2005). When Romania and Bulgaria join the EU in 
2007 they will have 14 and 10 votes respectively, raising the total 
number of votes to 345.  
 
This also goes to show that Council votes are hardly 
proportional to the population size of the member states: 
proportionality would give Germany 200 times – rather than 
10 times – as much weight as Malta, to point just to the 
most obvious discrepancy. 
 In an effort to counter-balance this lack of 
proportionality, the Nice Treaty introduced a further 
condition for achieving QMV – the population criteria. A 
Member State may ask for a confirmation that the Member 
States in favour of a decision represent at least 62 per cent 
of the total population of the EU. This additional 
‘population element’ to Council voting privileges larger 
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member states over smaller ones further, but it benefits 
Germany, with more than a quarter of the current EU 
population, in particular. 
 QMV is of fundamental significance for the EU for 
a number of reasons. It constitutes the departure from the 
principle of ‘one state, one vote’ which characterises the 
nature of decision-making in traditional intergovernmental 
institutions. More important still is the acceptance of 
member states that legally binding decisions can be taken 
against their will, which is what giving up the national veto 
implies. That is why QMV can be seen as one of the 
defining features of the European Union. But it is also for 
this reason that the application of QMV has been highly 
controversial. While it had been written into the Rome 
Treaties, it was challenged by President de Gaulle when 
what he saw as core interests of France were being 
threatened by the integration process. Temporarily 
suspended by the ‘Luxemburg Compromise’ in 1966, the 
non-application of QMV has been blamed for its part in the 
decades of ‘eurosclerosis’ that followed. But QMV 
survived, not only in terms of a gradual return to the actual 
treaty provisions, but also through the expansion of its 
application in every instance of treaty reform since the 
Single European Act. 
 With the increased use of QMV, the weighting of 
votes has become more important, both in terms of member 
states’ individual votes and in terms of the threshold for the 
achievement of a qualified majority. The matter is 
particularly thorny in the context of enlargements, as the 
arrival of new member states inevitably opens the issues of 
the relative weights not only of the new members, but also 
of the existing ones. This had already been a bone of 
contention in the preparation for previous enlargements and 
was only resolved through the so-called Ioannina 
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compromise, in March 1994 – just before the EFTA 
enlargement (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997). 
 The issue of Council voting weights has required a 
more fundamental reform in view of the eastward expansion 
of the EU, the pressure for re-weighting had become strong, 
especially from the larger member states (Best 2000). It had 
been a on the agenda of the IGCs preparing the Amsterdam, 
Nice and Constitutional Treaties, and on every occasion it 
proved to be a highly contentious issues. Both the Nice 
Treaty and the negotiation of the  Constitutional Treaty 
almost failed on this obstacle. The re-weighting of the votes 
for the Member States was one of the issues that led to the 
failure of the Brussels European Council in December 
2003, and a solution was only possible under the subsequent 
Irish Presidency in the first half of 2004. The Constitutional 
Treaty provided for a simplified 'double majority' system 
which requires the support of at least 55 per cent of 
Member States (at least 15) representing at least 65 per cent 
of the total EU population, though it remains doubtful 
whether this provision will come into force in this way, 
given the problems that have arisen in the course of 
ratification. Under the same Treaty, the use of QMV and 
co-decision procedure would have become the default 
mechanism for EU decision-making, calling it the 'ordinary 
legislative procedure', though unanimity would still remain 
for significant exceptions from this rule. 
 The high-profile battles among state leaders about 
issue of voting weights in the Council in the last instances 
of treaty reform betray somewhat the limited use that 
Member States actually make of majority voting. In fact, 
there is a strong tendency among states to act consensually, 
rather than seeking to achieve results through partisan 
voting. According to recent research, more than 80 per cent 
of Council decisions are taken consensually, and in some 
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years the figure is as high as 97 per cent (Heisenberg 2005). 
Thus, the vast majority of decisions – many more than 
would be formally required – are taken by consensus.  
In an apparent paradox, the introduction and expansion of 
QMV has supported this tendency. Under QMV the 
dynamic of decision-making is a desire by all states to be 
either among the winning majority or among the blocking 
minority. However, if it is impossible to construct a 
blocking minority, states, even when they have misgivings 
about the proposed legislation, will rather seek to join the 
majority, in return for amendments, rather than be 'left out 
in the cold' of a losing minority. And in the same vein, the 
states holding a qualified majority will usually continue to 
negotiate to reach a consensus rather than outvote a number 
of countries, in the knowledge that in future instances of 
legislative decision-making they may be at the receiving 
end.  
 Consensualism in the Council is also a reaction to 
the particular nature of EU policy-making more generally. 
In a system of decentralised implementation, with the EU 
institutions relying to a large extent on national parliaments 
to transpose EU laws, on national authorities to implement 
these and national courts to adjudicate on the basis of them, 
the wisdom of taking decisions against certain Member 
States when their subsequent co-operation is required, may 
be doubtful. Instead, more efficient implementation may be 
gained by negotiating their agreement to the legislative act, 
and thus to be more certain of compliance later. In other 
words, efficiency losses in decision-making are expected to 
be outweighed by efficiency gains in implementation.  
 Consensualism in Council decision-making can 
thus be explained in terms of the rational interests of the 
Member States, even, and perhaps especially, under 
conditions of QMV. But over time it has also become part 
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of the culture of negotiation in the Council (Heisenberg 
2005). The development towards consensual decision-
making is in part also a reaction to the way in which the 
structure of the Council forces Member States to represent 
their interests along sectoral lines, thus creating the 
bureaucratic politics discussed in the following section. 
 
 
Beyond interstate relations: bureaucratic politics in 
the Council 
The debates about re-weighting of votes and the extension 
of QMV reflect the expectation that the politics of the 
Council pitch member states against member states. Given 
the nature of the Council as the main forum for the 
representation of member state interests, that is justified. 
But the politics of the Council go beyond the confrontation 
between different member state positions. Indeed, the 
development of the Council – the expansion in the number 
of sectoral Councils – is a powerful illustration of the way 
in which the concept of ‘national interest’ needs to be 
unpacked when studying the politics of the European 
Union. Looking at the relationship between the various 
Councils reveals the differences in opinion not just 
between, but also within countries. 
 As mentioned above, the initial Council was 
composed of foreign ministers, whose meeting is termed the 
General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC). 
As the extension of Community competences has 
progressed, other Councils dealing with more specialised 
matters have been created. After the Seville reforms of 2002 
there are nine Council configurations. 
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General Affairs and External Relations  
Economic and Financial Affairs  
Cooperation in the fields of Justice and Home Affairs 
(JHA)  
Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer 
Affairs  
Competitiveness  
Transport, Telecommunications and Energy  
Agriculture and Fisheries  
Environment  
Education, Youth and Culture  
Table 2: The different configurations of the Council of Ministers 
(February 2005) 
  
 The more prominent among these are the 
Agriculture Council, the ECOFIN Council and the 
Competitiveness Council (comprising the previous Internal 
Market, Industry and Research Councils). While the Seville 
reforms have nominally reduced the number of 
configurations, they leave open the opportunity for Member 
States to meet in different compositions, bringing together 
ministers with different portfolios on different days – a 
development that in itself may generate new challenges of 
internal co-ordination.  
 Each of these Councils brings together the ministers 
who have domestic competence in the respective area. The 
frequency of their meetings differs according to the volume 
of EU decision-making in that sector. For example, foreign 
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ministers or agriculture ministers hold monthly meetings, 
whereas employment ministers meet only four times a year. 
 The sectoral Councils provide a forum for the 
representation of diverse national interests in their 
respective areas, but they also have a wider significance as 
an arena for the socialisation of ministers who share a 
common interest in the management of the sector for which 
they are responsible domestically. This is a major departure 
from domestic politics, where meetings at ministerial level 
– usually in the cabinet – will pitch the ministers from 
different departments against one another. In a domestic 
cabinet meeting, the positions of, say, the transport, 
environment and budget ministers are bound to reflect the 
different sectoral and bureaucratic interests at play. The 
emergence of such interdepartmental differences would be 
expected from a bureaucratic politics perspective (Peters 
1992). 
 In the Council, sectoral ministers, who ‘at home’ 
have to fight lonely battles in cabinet meetings, will find 
themselves in the company of colleagues from the other 
member states with often similar experiences from their 
domestic background. In addition, they all will share the 
knowledge of the subject-matter, are used to the lobbying 
from organised interests in the field and are familiar with 
the political and administrative problems in the area. It is on 
the basis of such a common background, that they meet in 
the context of the Council. If the right conditions are 
present, an esprit de corps may grow among them – 
participation in, for example, the Agriculture Council, will 
emphasise identification as the UK Agriculture Secretary as 
well as the UK Agriculture Secretary. In that sense, the 
Council fulfils a function not only in terms of the 
representation of national interests, but also in terms of the 
creation of transnational policy communities at the highest 
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political level. This ‘reverse dynamic’ is even stronger at 
lower administrative levels, where bureaucratic interaction 
is more frequent, and where much of the routine decision-
making takes place – a subject to which we will return 
below. 
 The development of a transnational sense of 
community in the Council will depend on numerous factors, 
including the length of time individual ministers spend in 
their jobs, the frequency and intensity of their meetings, the 
contentiousness of issues under discussion and the 
antagonism of domestically determined positions to be 
represented (Egeberg 1999). Socialisation is actively 
encouraged through the increasingly frequent recourse to 
‘informal’ Councils – Council meetings which are 
organised by, and held in, the country holding the 
Presidency, rather than in the usual meeting rooms in 
Brussels or Luxembourg. It is a practice that originated 
among foreign ministers, who started in the mid-1970s to 
hold ‘Gymnich-type meetings’ in the context of European 
Political Co-operation. Foreign ministers extended this 
practice, first to the General Affairs Council, and 
subsequently to other configurations. . The rationale for 
holding such meetings, which are limited to five per 
Presidency, is the expectation that a meeting conducted in 
an informal atmosphere and without the pressure to take 
routine decisions permits a more relaxed discussion of the 
broader strategic issues and the general direction of policy. 
Initially conceived as meetings without a set agenda, they 
now provide an opportunity to address a specific issue in 
greater depth (Council of the European Union 1999). Often 
informal Councils conclude by espousing a certain vision 
for the development of EU policy in a given area. 
 The point to be made here is that the Council has to 
be regarded as more than simply the meeting place of 
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national interests. It is also the meeting place of different 
sectoral and bureaucratic interests and thus exposes the 
complexity – and potential contradictions – subsumed by 
the concept of a ‘national interest’ (Lewis 2000). But if 
individual Councils do develop an esprit de corps, dividing 
lines between the various Councils are likely to emerge, in 
line with the observation about domestic bureaucratic 
politics made above. In institutional terms this means that 
there is also the potential for internal fragmentation and that 
co-ordination across the various sectoral Councils becomes 
an issue (Lipsius 1995). It is in this respect that the role of 
the GAERC Council has been elevated, so that it stands 
above the sectoral Councils. If issues cannot be resolved, 
they can be referred to the GAERC, though the crowded 
agenda there means that the potential for the resolution of 
the often highly technical issues of other Councils may be 
limited (Lipsius 1995). There are other mechanisms for co-
ordinating the activity of the sprawling complex of 
Councils. These include the Presidency, the European 
Council, the work of preparatory committees, in particular 
the Committee of Permanent Representatives, and the 
Council Secretariat. The following sections will look in 
more detail at the role these institutions play in the structure 
of the Council. 
 
 
Member states as agenda-setters: the role of the 
Presidency 
The Council’s position as the key legislative institution of 
the Union implies a reactive role: it has to respond to the 
proposals made by the Commission and, increasingly, to the 
amendments proposed by the Parliament. That is why 
traditionally the Commission rather than the Council is 
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regarded as the agenda-setter in the EU policy process. But 
there are a number of ways in which national governments 
have sought to regain control of, or at least play a part in, 
the setting of the Union’s agenda. The most important 
mechanisms to be discussed here are developments linked 
to the Council: the EU Presidency and the European 
Council. 
 The Presidency started off as a seemingly 
functional innovation in the Council: to share among 
national administrations the task of organising Council 
business and chairing the various ministerial meetings and 
working groups (Westlake 1995). Every six months, one 
member state takes over this role, and ministers and 
officials chair any of the meetings that are convened during 
that period. Apart from allowing individual meetings at any 
level to run more smoothly, this also facilitates the 
continuity of negotiation and decision-making over time. 
The institution of the Presidency also permits a greater 
degree of both horizontal co-ordination (across the various 
sectoral Councils) and vertical co-ordination (between 
meetings of ministers, permanent representatives and 
national officials). The growing number of sectoral 
Councils is one reason why the Presidency has become 
more important over time: as more EU business is being 
debated and decided in a larger number of fora, there is 
greater potential for inconsistency and therefore greater 
demand for effective co-ordination (Wallace 1985). 
 Yet the Presidency is anything but an innocent 
functional creation. The institution of the Presidency is 
political not only because it affects the relationship between 
the individual member state, the collectivity of states and 
the EU institutions, but also because it is closely linked to 
the management of the EU’s external affairs – arguably a 
key area of ‘high politics’, and one from which member 
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states have long sought to exclude the more supranational 
institutions. Starting in the 1970s with the establishment of 
European Political Co-ordination and now in the context of 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the Presidency is 
responsible for the external representation of the EU’s 
foreign policy positions. This is a delicate task, given the 
increasing visibility of the EU in world politics, and 
considering that it requires the state in question to handle 
foreign policy in a manner that is different from the 
execution of its national foreign policy. Both the nature of 
the issues, and the way in which these are handled, will be 
different from that country’s conventional national foreign 
policy. 
 The nature of European foreign policy means that 
there is bound to be a tension between, on the one hand, the 
need to respond quickly to issues or crises as they happen, 
and, on the other, to maintain a process of inclusive 
consultation with all member states. Similar demands are 
present in other policy areas, putting great pressure on the 
government holding the Presidency. Therefore the 
Presidency not only constitutes a substantial administrative 
responsibility, but also involves high political profile and 
carries with it the accompanying risks and opportunities. 
 For these reasons of political balance and 
administrative efficiency, changes to the Presidency system 
have been discussed since the Nice Treaty, both in the 
context of the internal Council reforms agreed at Seville in 
2002, and in the Convention on the Future of Europe. There 
had been plans in the Convention to create Team 
Presidency, but in the end the 2003-4 IGC chose the more 
traditional method of individual member states holding the 
Presidency for six months on the basis equal rotation. 
However, a declaration attached to the Treaty foresees a 
decision by the European Council that would create 
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‘groups’ of three member states that would jointly organise 
and co-ordinate their subsequent presidencies. 
 Thus the Constitutional Treaty, if ratified, would 
not formally change the current practice of the rotating 
Presidency. However, in addition to laying the foundations 
for the team presidency concept, it does provide for 
important changes, such as the European Council President 
(chairing the European Council) and the EU foreign affairs 
ministers (chairing the GAERC) which would have a major 
impact on the nature of the Presidency.  
 The change that was agreed in the Seville reforms 
and is currently in practice is that of the two forthcoming 
Presidencies co-ordinating their plans each December by 
adopting an annual operational programme. This has led the 
two countries who each year hold the Presidency for six 
month to work closely together, not only in terms of 
agenda-setting and legislative planning, but also in terms of 
organisational and logistical terms. In a way, this is a move 
towards informally achieving something that the idea of the 
Team Presidency was supposed to deliver: Member States 
working together and sharing the administrative burden 
while providing the Union with greater stability and 
continuity in its overall direction. 
 The establishment of a rotating Presidency among 
member states also reaffirms the role of national 
governments in the EU structure. In fact, in terms of the 
distinction of different types of interest representation made 
earlier, it emphasises the role of the individual country 
rather than the collectivity of member states. In that sense, 
the Presidency has become an important, albeit limited, 
counterweight to the loss of national autonomy in the EU 
generally, and in the Council in particular. Holding the 
Presidency permits the respective national government to 
prioritise certain issues during its term and to manage the 
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agenda accordingly. For example, if the country holding the 
agenda is a southern or northern member state, it may want 
to push a specific geographical concern such as, 
respectively, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership or the 
Northern Dimension. On the other hand, if the country 
holding the Presidency is a net contributor to the EU’s 
budget, then it has a stronger interest in privileging budget 
reform in the setting of the agenda. However, as the above 
discussion of the need for co-operation among subsequent 
Presidencies by adopting annual programmes demonstrates, 
with internal reforms and after enlargement, the constraints 
for any individual Presidency have grown enormously. If 
the cost of the Presidency has always been the 
administrative work-load, and the gain the ability to shape 
EU decision-making, then in recent years the costs have 
increased and the gains diminished.  
 Shaping the EU’s agenda is also difficult for any 
Presidency because this agenda is influenced by numerous 
factors outside the control of individual actors. Some of 
these are structurally or externally determined, especially 
since much of EU business is now conducted in the form of 
multi-annual programmes. This is true both for spending 
programmes like the structural funds and for regulatory 
programmes, for example in environmental or social policy. 
When such programmes need to be renegotiated, any 
Presidency will have to address these accordingly during its 
term. Developments that are ‘external’ to the EU, for 
example the need to respond to the changes in Central and 
Eastern Europe through an accession strategy, will also 
impose themselves on the agenda of any country holding 
the Presidency. Other member states or actors like the 
Commission or foreign countries will also raise issues that 
the Presidency may be unable to ignore. Crucially, the 
Presidency is expected to act as an honest broker with 
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regard to issues raised by other member states and will have 
to take these into account when constructing the agenda. 
 It is only within these limitations that the 
Presidency can emphasise – rather than impose – its own 
priorities in the setting of the agenda. In fact, the Presidency 
is very much a double-edged sword, precisely because of 
these limitations and the requirement to appear as an 
objective keeper of the common good (Wallace 1993). A 
Presidency which is seen to be abusing its agenda-setting 
role and its chairmanship in the pursuit of its own national 
interest will be ineffectual, and it may even be that it is 
easier to defend a certain position or push a specific interest 
when not holding the Presidency. In any case, holding the 
Presidency requires the member state in question to strike a 
fine balance between, on the one hand, the pursuit of a 
national agenda – which may have built up over a 
considerable period of time – and, on the other hand, the 
necessities of effective decision-making and agenda-
management – which may override the national interest. 
 Beyond the rational calculation of interests, the 
Presidency also performs a powerful symbolic function: it 
confers upon the incumbent country a special role which 
permits the government to emphasise its specific 
understanding of the goals and the direction of the 
integration process. The Presidency unifies the European 
and the national identity of the state, enabling the 
government to pursue a discourse (and perhaps a European 
policy) which may at other times prove elusive. For 
domestic consumption, the image of a country holding the 
Presidency removes the potentially antagonistic perception 
which often regards the state as pitched against an external 
‘Europe’. In its place governments seek to put the image of 
a country that, while asserting its role and identity within 
the Union, works for the common good – an imagery that is 
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accompanied by symbols, logos and slogans specifically 
designed for the occasion. In a wider sense, the Presidency 
also serves as a powerful symbol externally that European 
integration is driven by states, rather than being a process 
happening to them. 
 The term of the Presidency begins formally with the 
identification of a number of key themes at the outset of the 
term. These themes are part of a communication to the 
Council, European Parliament and the Commission – and 
the wider public – in the first week of the term, and form 
the basis of a more detailed work programme involving the 
various sectoral Councils over the coming six months. In 
addition to the prepared programme, the Presidency will be 
expected to lead the EU response to unexpected 
developments and crises, whether these are internal to the 
EU or part of its foreign policy. An effective Presidency 
therefore needs both a clear vision of what it seeks to 
achieve during its term and an ability to respond rapidly to 
the changing political circumstances of the day. Again, 
there is a balance to be struck between strong leadership 
and intensive consultation in order to ensure that all 
member states agree to, comply with and, if necessary, 
contribute to the policy that emerges from the deliberations 
in the Council. 
 In practical terms, the Presidency raises substantial 
resource issues for the country concerned. Setting the 
agenda and co-ordinating EU business across the range of 
sectoral Councils and administrative levels requires much 
preparation before, and constant attention during, the term. 
The greatest part of the pressure will be on the relevant 
sections in foreign ministries, prime ministers’ offices and 
any other ministries that would usually perform a co-
ordinating role in the domestic EU process. Staff in these 
departments will now be required also to relate regularly 
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and systematically to their counterparts in other member 
states. Also the EU sections in sectoral ministries will be 
affected by their country holding the Presidency, as they 
will have to co-ordinate the discussions or negotiations with 
regard to dossiers falling into their area of competence.  
 The member state’s Permanent Representation in 
Brussels will probably witness the greatest change to its 
volume of work – Perm Reps regularly double their staff 
numbers in the run-up and during the period of the 
Presidency, given the additional workload they have to cope 
with. One significant resource issue is the need to chair 
meetings of working groups, committees of Councils in 
Brussels: given that these meetings number in the hundreds 
over  
the term of any Presidency and imply preparation as well as 
physical presence, there is much demand on staff time at 
both ministerial and official level as well as a greater 
reliance on the assistance of the Council Secretariat (see 
below). 
 The resources of any country are stretched by the 
demands of the Presidency, but this has been an issue 
particularly for the smaller member states. For them, the 
combination of greater political responsibility and 
extraordinary demands on resources are especially 
challenging. On the other hand, more used to compromising 
national positions in the context of EU negotiations, smaller 
countries are more likely to avoid the temptation of 
overlaying the formal responsibilities of the Presidency 
with their own political priorities – something which has 
been a more obvious problem for the larger member states. 
In either case, the size of a member state matters for the 
conduct of the Presidency, both in terms of the resources of 
the administration and in terms of the political weight of the 
incumbent. That is one reason why in the determination of 
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the sequence of countries holding the Presidency there has 
been a departure from the simple alphabetical rule that was 
in place until the accession of Spain and Portugal. A new 
sequence has been specifically written into the Treaty, in 
order to ensure a balance between larger and smaller 
member states (Westlake 1995). In late 2004 the Council 
decided on a Presidency calendar stretching to 2020 and 
including not only all the new Member States, but also the 
future Member States of Bulgaria and Romania.  
 
Year January-June July-December 
2005 Luxembourg United Kingdom 
2006 Austria Finland 
2007 Germany Portugal 
2008 Slovenia  France 
2009 Czech Republic Sweden 
2010 Spain Belgium 
2011 Hungary Poland 
2012 Denmark Cyprus 
2013 Ireland Lithuania 
2014 Greece Italy 
2015 Latvia Luxembourg 
2016 Netherlands Slovakia 
2017 Malta United Kingdom 
2018 Estonia Bulgaria 
2019 Austria Romania 
2020 Finland  
Table 3: Calendar of Presidencies as agreed by the Council of 
Ministers on 13 December 2004 
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Leadership from the top? The evolution of the 
European Council 
It is also the responsibility of the Presidency to organise 
regular meetings of the Heads of State and Government. 
Above, reference has already been made to informal 
Council meetings, but the Presidency is also responsible for 
running ministerial meetings with representatives of third 
countries, for example from the accession countries, or 
landmark conferences on topical aspects of the integration 
process. But the ‘highlight’ of any Presidency is the 
organisation of a summit meeting that originally was not 
contained in the founding treaties but has become one of the 
pivotal institutions of the EU: the European Council. What 
began in the 1970s first as extraordinary summits of prime 
ministers eventually became normalised as regular meetings 
of heads of state and government, hosted by the Presidency. 
With the passage of the Single European Act in 1985 the 
new institution, by then recognised as the European 
Council, was formally incorporated into the Treaty. At least 
twice a year, the European Council brings together the 
heads of state and of government – i.e. all prime ministers 
and the presidents of France and Finland – as well as the 
President of the Commission. While the European Council 
does not have a formal role in the legislative process (that is 
a change that would have come with the ratification of the 
Constitutional Treaty), it plays an important part in the 
wider decision-making process of the Union. 
 Each Presidency usually holds two European 
Council meeting throughout its term. These meetings 
usually take place in March (which is earmarked as a 
regular review of the Lisbon Strategy), in June, in October 
and in December. Due to the inherent significance of a 
meeting at the highest political level, the European Council 
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functions as a stocktaking exercise for the Presidency – an 
opportunity for decision-makers as well as observers to see 
how much progress has been achieved with respect to the 
Presidency’s work programme. Beyond stocktaking, the 
European Council has become a focal point of the decision-
making process. Particularly in cases where there has been 
deadlock in the sectoral Council, and where the foreign 
ministers in the GAERC Council have been equally unable 
to reach agreement. In this situation, the European Council 
can function as the arbiter of the last resort. In order to be 
more proactive about future planning and giving direction 
to the work of the Union, the European Council has decided 
to adopt a 'multiannual strategic programme'. The first of 
these was agreed in December 2003 by the six countries 
holding the Presidency in 2004-2006 (Council 2003). 
 In contrast to the ministerial Council meetings, 
which have become routine matters in the EU policy 
process, the European Council remains a high profile event 
that can concentrate the minds of the decision-makers. The 
Presidency, in particular, will want to see their European 
Council meeting regarded as a success – which means 
prime ministers need to be seen taking decisions on the 
major issues. It is because of this particular dynamic of the 
European Council that it has on occasion given fresh 
impetus to specific issues or to the integration process at 
large. Especially with respect to the ‘big issues’, such as 
budget reform or enlargement, the European Council, rather 
than the Council of Ministers, has been the forum in which 
landmark decisions have been taken (Bulmer and Wessels 
1987). Decision-making in the European Council has 
always required a consensus among member states. 
 This is an interesting reversal of roles, since critics 
originally expected the European Council to be the more 
conservative player in the integration process (Sasse 1975; 
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Wessels 1980). The initial expectation was that the meeting 
of heads of state and government would reassert national 
interests and reign in ministers who, in the course of 
frequent meetings in the Council, had been socialised into 
compromising too quickly domestically agreed positions in 
the search of EU-wide agreement. This may well be the 
case in certain instances, but the European Council has also 
seen vested sectoral interests being overridden at the highest 
political level. After all, it is at this level that package deals 
and trade-offs, these quintessential features of EU policy-
making, are best constructed. And as it has become more 
difficult to strike such deals in the fragmented world of 
ministerial Councils, the European Council has increasingly 
performed this role. 
 In the 1990s, there has been a marked increase in 
the frequency of treaty reform, with three major revisions of 
the founding treaties contained in the Maastricht (1992), 
Amsterdam (1997) and Nice (2000) Treaties. Each of these 
treaties takes its name from the place at which the 
respective European Council met in order to take the final 
decisions and to sign the final act. This symbolises the 
significance of the Presidency for running – and concluding 
– the negotiation of Treaty reform. IGCs are mainly 
conducted at the level of senior officials representing the 
member states in weekly meetings, with participation also 
from the Commission and the European Parliament. There 
are regular meetings also of foreign ministers in order to 
provide political guidance, and any European Council 
meeting held during an IGC constitutes a forum to review 
the state of the negotiations. The European Council meeting 
which is to conclude the IGC and agree the draft treaty will 
largely be taken over by the need to reach agreement on the 
last remaining – often most controversial – aspects of that 
round of treaty reform. 
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 The Presidency and the European Council are key 
institutions in the European Union: they reaffirm the role of 
individual countries and of the highest political level in the 
integration progress. As such, they have proved to be an 
integral part of a Euro-polity that is being constructed with, 
and by – not against – the member states. In practical terms, 
they both constitute mechanisms for co-ordination across 
the various areas of EU activity and provide the political 
leadership that may otherwise be missing in a Union of 25 
and more member states. And they offer opportunities for 
national governments, and for the collectivity of states, to 
influence the setting of the EU’s agenda and to maintain 
control over the direction of EU policy. In that sense, they 
are aspects of the institutional structure which assists 
member states to balance the agenda-setting powers of the 
supranational institutions, in particular those of the 
European Commission. 
 The Constitutional Treaty took the actorness of the 
European Council one step further by introducing the post 
of President of the European Council. This role of this new 
President would be to work towards greater cohesion and 
dynamism in the European Council, and represent the EU 
internally and externally. One has to wonder to what extent 
this post will be more than a symbolic role, given that there 
may be little to do for the President in-between European 
Councils, and given also that the function of external 
representation should not prejudice the powers of another 
post to be newly created, that of the EU Foreign Minister 
(which is discussed below). But what may be a frustrating 
position for the individual performing it, still shows that the 
Member States seek institutional solutions to achieve 
greater unity and facilitate collective decision-making 
among themselves – intergovernmentalism in the EU is 
getting ever more institutionalised.  
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Administrative integration: the committees and 
working groups of the Council 
The Council’s relationship with the Commission is often 
characterised as one of rivalry, with the Commission 
pushing for further integration, with the Council holding 
back and providing member states with a mechanism to 
hold the Commission in check. In reality, the situation is 
more complex, not only because the European Parliament is 
an increasingly potent player in a tripartite relationship, but 
also because both the Commission and the Council are 
internally more differentiated than these one-dimensional 
images suggest (Christiansen 2001). Chapter 5 in this 
volume demonstrates the degree to which 
intergovernmental dynamics impinge on the work of the 
Commission (Christiansen 2005). The reverse can be said 
of the Council, where we can witness an accelerating trend 
towards a greater degree of institutionalisation. 
 The previous sections have emphasised the fluidity 
of Council business, with different ministers meeting in 
different places, guided by a Presidency that changes hands 
every six months. But the Council is a central institution of 
the European Union, with a physical presence in Brussels, 
an expanding number of permanent staff and a certain 
capacity for independent action. The building blocks of this 
institutionalisation of intergovernmentalism are, on the one 
hand, the structure of committee and working groups which 
do the preparatory work for the ministerial meetings, and, 
on the other hand, the Council Secretariat, which provides 
organisational, logistical and legal backup for the meetings 
of ministers and officials. This section and the next will 
look at each of these aspects of institutionalised 
intergovernmentalism in turn. 
 The institution ‘Council of Ministers’ extends well 
beyond the regular meetings of ministers. In fact, much of 
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the legislative decision-making of the Council is done in 
committees and working groups which ‘prepare’ the 
ministerial meetings. With the expansion of the number of 
ministerial Councils, the number of committees and 
working groups had also grown exponentially, as there are 
numerous specialised committees and working groups 
working for each individual Council. The number of such 
committees and working groups had risen to about 250 in 
the 1990s, but has since then been reduced in line with the 
reduction of Council configurations agreed in Seville. 
 It is at this administrative level that the bulk of the 
routine work of the Council is done. Council working 
groups are the first port of call for Commission proposals 
and, if applicable, EP amendments. Here, national officials 
who are familiar with the technical detail of the measure in 
question vet Commission proposals, EP amendments and 
the various opinions of representatives emerging in the 
meeting with a view to their respective domestic 
preferences. 
 At the heart of the Council’s committee structure 
stands COREPER, the standing committee of permanent 
representatives. Its members are the member states’ 
“ambassadors” (or their deputies) to the EU, heading their 
countries’ permanent representations in Brussels. As such, 
they fulfil a dual role which perfectly characterises the 
function of the Council’s committee structure as the ‘hinge’ 
between member state and European Union more generally 
(Christiansen and Kirchner 2000). Permanent 
representatives are an important part of the individual 
countries’ system of interest representation as well as being 
an integral part of the EU’s decision-making process. 
Wearing the ‘national hat’, permanent representatives are 
gatekeepers of information and interests, working across the 
range of issues and regularly committing their member state 
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to decisions in the process. Wearing their ‘EU hat’, they 
help to co-ordinate the work of the sectoral Councils and of 
more specialised working groups by preparing the agendas 
of Council and of European Council meetings (de Zwann 
1995). Indeed, permanent representatives help to keep the 
agendas of ministers free for sensitive questions or the 
debate of politically contested issues, as COREPER itself 
takes decisions on matters which are considered routine 
business or on which member states can more easily find 
agreement. 
 COREPER stands at the top of a hierarchy of the 
numerous committees which form part of the Council of 
Ministers (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997). In fact, a 
distinction needs to be made between the committee of 
permanent representatives, who meet as COREPER II, and 
the meeting of their deputies, which is known as COREPER 
I. In addition, there are a number of specialised committees 
– for example, the Standing Committee on Agriculture or 
the Political and Security Committee –which consist of 
senior officials from the ministries in the member states. 
Like the two COREPERs, these committees receive their 
workload from working groups made up of officials or 
experts from national or regional administrations, who have 
been evaluating and searching for agreement on the detailed 
policy proposals issued by the Commission. Within the 
allotted period, the working groups or specialised 
committees either reach agreement on the measure in 
question or else notify the permanent representatives of the 
need for further discussions. It is at this stage that 
administrative issues start to be overtaken by political 
considerations (Westlake 1995). 
 As items move up through the Council hierarchy, 
from working group to COREPER and eventually to 
ministerial meetings, they are being designated as either ‘A’ 
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or ‘B’ points (or, in the case of COREPER, ‘I’ and ‘II’ 
points) on the agendas of the respective meetings. An ‘A’ 
point implies that the issue has been settled at a lower level, 
and it will usually be passed as a matter of course at the 
higher level, with no further discussion required. Ministers, 
when meeting in the Council, will therefore concentrate on 
the ‘B’ points of the agenda, indicating the – much smaller 
– number of items on which officials or permanent 
representatives have not been able to reach agreement in 
their preparatory meetings. It is worth emphasising that the 
bulk of Council decisions is effectively agreed here: 
according to estimates, some 70-80 per cent of all decisions 
made in the Council are already prepared in COREPER or 
in the Council working groups, and then only formally 
taken by the Ministers through the 'A' points procedure.  
 A look at the committee structure of the Council 
demonstrates the degree of ‘administrative interaction’ 
between national and European levels (Wessels 1990). 
Every month, Council working groups and committees 
bring together thousands of officials from the ministries and 
regulatory authorities of the member states in Brussels. 
Here they interact not only with representatives from other 
member states, but also with officials from the Commission 
and the Council Secretariat who also participate in their 
meetings. In addition, they are likely to be the object of 
attention from lobbyists and organised interests who will 
seek to influence the decision-making process in one or the 
other direction. The volume and the intensity of these 
bureaucratic interactions has a number of significant 
consequences for European governance. First, it does 
establish a strong and permanent presence of member state 
administrations at the European level. This deserves 
emphasis, also because frequent references to the ‘Brussels 
bureaucracy’ in the media and in the political debate tend to 
imply that the corridors in Brussels are only populated by 
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Commission officials. This is obviously misleading, as the 
number of national officials travelling to, or living in, 
Brussels in order to attend Council, committee and working 
group meetings is probably greater that the number of A-
level officials in the Commission. 
 Second, in terms of the decision-making process, it 
is important to recognise administrative interaction in the 
Council as a two-way process. Interests are channelled from 
the national to the European level, but in the process 
officials are also becoming aware of the positions taken by 
other countries and will communicate these back to their 
superiors ‘at home’. On the one hand, there are 
opportunities here for genuine problem-solving and the 
search for best practice, making the Council’s committee 
structure an important site for the transnational integration 
of member state administrations (Lewis 2000). On the other 
hand, the participants in working group meetings will 
recognise the limits of any emerging consensus and – if 
politically acceptable – will adjust their negotiating position 
accordingly. At times, this can mean that negotiators, rather 
than receiving orders from the national capital as to what 
position they should take, end up telling their masters what 
position in a shifting debate they can take. Researchers have 
also pointed to the resistance by officials in the working 
groups - those who have the technical expertise in a given 
area – to hand over issues for decision-making to 
generalists such as the diplomats in COREPER. There, 
package deals linking issues from otherwise separate arenas 
– the staple diet of COREPER - may compromise the 
detailed technical work that has already gone into the 
deliberation of a particular proposal. The dynamic of this 
interaction between specialists and generalists contributes to 
proposals often spending long periods of deliberation in 
working groups, and a high share of them (eventually) 
being resolved there. 
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 Often the nature of deliberations in Council 
working groups is characterised as 'technical' rather than 
'political', and of course it is the case that here we have 
meetings of technical experts, usually attachés from the 
member states' permanent representations, rather than 
political office-holders. However, it would be simplistic to 
convey the impression that the issues under discussion may 
not be political – as the events such as the BSE crisis have 
demonstrated, even highly technical issues have the 
potential to turn into major political controversies. Instead 
one can look at the way in which issues are discussed, 
deliberated and negotiated in the working groups in terms 
of processes of politicisatisation and de-politicisation 
(Smith et al.2005). Depending on instructions, political 
sensitivities and dynamics in the negotiations, issues 
emerge from the Council working groups as 'political' (i.e. 
in need to be resolved at higher levels) or 'technical' (i.e. 
they can be resolved by technical experts). 
 The recognition of the nature of the Council as an 
arena for two-way exchange, rather than a site of one-
directional representation of national interests, is related to 
a further point about socialisation. This was already 
mentioned in the context of ministerial Councils. If 
anything, this dynamic effect of frequent interaction in 
transnational meetings is even more important at the 
administrative level. With party politics and media attention 
(normally) taken out of the equation, officials can 
concentrate on the technical necessities of the issue at hand. 
They will have to work within the confines of a politically 
circumscribed negotiating space, but within these limits 
there is much potential for collegiality and group dynamics. 
This includes not only the potential development of a 
common identity or the growth of an epistemic community, 
but also the opportunity for individual participants to 
influence the proceedings based on their knowledge, the 
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strength of their argument or negotiating skills rather than 
purely on the political weight of their member state (Lewis 
1998). That is why it is justified to look for the 
supranational rather than only the intergovernmental 
features in the system of Council working groups (Beyers 
and Dierckx 1998). 
 
 
Towards ‘actorness’: the elevation of the Council 
Secretariat and the Secretary-General 
Administrative interaction within the structure of the 
Council already demonstrates the difficulty in clearly 
distinguishing between supranational and intergovernmental 
dynamics of the European institutions. The picture becomes 
even more blurred if the Secretariat-General of the Council 
is entered into the equation. Here we have an institution 
whose original purpose was simply the logistical assistance 
of regular meetings of ministers and officials from the 
member states, but which has gone a long way towards 
developing into a political institution in its own right. 
 The core function of the Secretariat-General 
remains the support of the meetings of working groups, 
committees and ministers in the Council. This ranges from 
the provision of meeting space, via the taking of minutes 
and dissemination of agendas, supporting papers and 
minutes, to assistance through legal advice and research 
services. The Secretariat is the institutional memory of the 
Council, and as such is the ultimate guide to working 
methods, internal procedures and past practice. It is the 
legal and procedural know-how, in particular, which has 
helped the Secretariat to become a distinct player in the 
Council. In advising member states on the procedures by 
which decisions are taken, and on legal questions arising 
 125
from the drafting of legislation, the Secretariat makes an 
important, albeit hidden, contribution to the decision-
making process (Beach 2004; Christiansen 2002). 
 Beyond assistance to the Council generally, the 
Secretariat works in particular for, and with, the Presidency. 
In the preparation of meetings, but in particular in the 
drafting of joint opinions or legal documents afterwards, the 
Secretariat will assist the Presidency (Sherrington 2000). It 
is here that demands on the administrative resources of the 
member states, especially of smaller countries, are being 
counterbalanced by administrative support from the 
Secretariat. In such cases, when the member state holding 
the Presidency relies heavily on the services of the 
Secretariat, the two operate closely together, with the 
Secretariat rather than the national capital taking on an 
influential role in drafting minutes, agendas and legislation. 
 The Secretariat’s role of assisting the Presidency 
with legal and procedural advice before, during and after 
meetings of national representatives is of political 
significance in the context of any important decision taken 
in the Council, but even more so in the course of an 
Intergovernmental Conference (Christiansen and Jørgensen 
1998). Given the legal implications of any treaty change 
and the complexity of the existing constitutional 
arrangements, the expertise present in the Secretariat’s legal 
service provides it with an important role in the process of 
negotiations (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997). 
Crucially, though, it depends on the attitude of the 
Presidency whether that potential is being realised or not: a 
strong Presidency with clear goals and an ability to manage 
the demands of the role effectively may not defer to the 
Secretariat’s opinions. A weaker Presidency, on the other 
hand, may leave much of the work – and the opportunity to 
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influence the direction of negotiations – in the hands of 
Secretariat officials. 
 If the Secretariat has a role in the EU’s decision-
making process, it may be worth asking what its interests 
are. A simple answer would point to the institutional 
interests of the Council, as the Secretariat is bound to 
benefit, or suffer, from any change in the Council’s 
institutional standing. But the Secretariat’s attitude to 
institutional reform may differ from one issue to another, 
and would also depend on (the nationality of) the officials 
involved. In general, though, it makes most sense to look at 
the Secretariat in relation to the European Commission. In 
the past, both institutions have been keen to take over wider 
responsibilities as the competences of the EU were being 
enlarged. 
 Against this background, the Secretariat has been 
remarkably successful to gain an executive role in the more 
intergovernmental policy areas of the Union, and in 
particular with respect to the development of the EU’s 
common foreign, security and defence policies (Presidency 
of the European Union 1999). In doing so, the Secretariat 
has acquired new competences in representing the EU 
abroad. The European Commission, whose responsibilities 
in areas such as trade, development and humanitarian aid 
make it an important player in the management of the 
Union’s external relations, is ‘fully associated’ with the 
CFSP. Through its President, the Commission also 
represents the EU at G8 summit meetings of major 
industrial powers. But the central institutions of EU 
diplomacy are now firmly located in the Secretariat, turning 
it into a new actor in the conduct of the EU’s external 
relations. 
 The process began with the EPC Secretariat, which 
had been established outside the existing institutional 
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framework of the Community, being integrated into the 
Council Secretariat through the Maastricht Treaty. After the 
addition of a ‘Policy Planning Unit’, the Secretariat also 
contains ‘task forces’ on the different geographical areas of 
CFSP activity as well as a Situation Centre for crisis 
management. Also attached to the Secretariat are the EU’s 
observer mission in the former Yugoslavia and the growing 
number of Special Envoys appointed to co-ordinate EU 
policy to troubled regions like South-Eastern Europe, the 
Middle East and the African Central Lakes region. 
 Compared to the foreign policy machinery of states, 
this is still a very small administration, but through co-
operation with the member states’ diplomatic services and 
the Commission’s network of representations in third 
countries there would be growing potential for effective 
joint action (Financial Times 2000). For much of its history, 
there has been a search for ‘actorness’ in the 
intergovernmental nature of CFSP, and the use of the 
Secretariat as the home of an emerging EU foreign policy 
bureaucracy is one answer to this aspiration. A further, far-
reaching step has been the creation of the post of High 
Representative of the CFSP through the Amsterdam Treaty. 
This role of ‘Mr CFSP’ (or, as the case may be, ‘Ms CFSP’) 
has been added to the existing post of the Secretary-
General, who heads the Secretariat. 
 Past Secretaries-General of the Council Secretariat 
were senior diplomats in one of the member states before 
taking up their job in Brussels, but the political significance 
of the post experienced a quantum leap with the 
appointment, in 1999, of Javier Solana. Before joining the 
Secretariat, Solana had been Foreign Minister in Spain and 
Secretary-General of NATO, and as such is regarded as a 
political ‘heavyweight’. His responsibilities were further 
extended when, later in 1999, he was also appointed as 
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Secretary-General of the Western European Union, 
signalling the strengthening links and the partial merger of 
this organisation with the Council. Solana’s seniority 
together with his experience in foreign affairs and defence 
matters adds substantially to the actorness of the CFSP: 
now there is a central authority to communicate common 
positions, negotiate on the EU’s behalf with third countries 
and oversee the growing number of EU missions and 
interventions in crisis regions. Nevertheless, the emphasis 
in judging the significance of this new post must be on the 
potential for enhancing the EU’s foreign policy capabilities. 
Much still depends on the political will among member 
states – often lacking in the past – to agree to common 
positions and subsequently to comply with these. 
 Javier Solana’s experience as NATO Secretary-
General is significant also in the context of efforts to 
develop a dedicated EU role in defence matters. For 
decades, the ‘security’ aspect of CFSP had been treated 
sensitively in order to ensure that military issues would not 
appear on the agenda of the EU. This was in response both 
to internal constraints – the sensitivities of neutral or non-
aligned member states – as well as to external relationships 
– the desire among most EU members to maintain a strong 
link with the USA in the framework of NATO. But in the 
late 1990s, in response to an Anglo-French initiative and in 
the wake of the Kosovo war, consensus was emerging 
among member states that the EU ought to have a military 
capability to conduct so-called ‘Petersberg tasks’ – military 
intervention in crisis areas for the purposes of peace-
keeping, peace-enforcement or humanitarian assistance. 
The Helsinki Council in December 1999 spelt out the vision 
and the needs of such a military dimension of the EU. It 
implies not only the designation of up to 120,000 troops in 
the member states for use in EU-led operations, but also the 
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build-up of military expertise in the EU’s central 
institutions (Presidency of the European Union 1999). 
 In order to achieve this, a number of political and 
military bodies have been convened within the Council 
(Presidency of the European Union 2000). One new body, 
the Political and Security Committee, generally know by its 
French acronym COPS, is at the pinnacle of this 
development, bringing together the Political Directors of the 
national foreign ministries. Since 2001 COPS has replaced 
the previous Political Committee (PoCo) and now oversees 
not only the work of the CFSP working groups, but is also 
the body exercising political control over the EU Military 
Staff and EU Military Committee (Duke 2005). A further 
addition to the expanding security structures has come with 
the appointment, in the wake of the March 2003 Madrid 
bombings, of an EU Counter-terrorism Co-ordinator. The 
creation of a European External Action service, in effect 
giving the EU it's own full-blown diplomatic service by 
bringing together parts of the Commission and the Council 
Secretariat departments, strengthened through seconded 
officials from the member states, will be another quantum 
leap in this process. Even though the creation of this service 
is foreseen in the Constitutional Treaty, it is one aspect of it 
which may be realised in some form even without the 
ratification of the Treaty.  
 The emergence of the Council Secretariat as a 
political institution and the transformation of the Secretary-
General into a significant player in the development of 
CFSP could be expected to exacerbate existing rivalries 
with the Commission, given that institution’s own role in 
the area of external relations. In this context it is worth 
mentioning that the relationship between Chris Patten, the 
EU Commissioner for External Relations in the Prodi 
Commission, and Javier Solana has, on the whole, been co-
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operative. Clearly, in the search for a coherent and effective 
conduct of the EU’s foreign relations, encompassing 
external economic relations, humanitarian aid, CFSP and 
military intervention, co-operation between Commission 
and Council – both Secretariat and foreign ministers – is 
more important than ever. Their mutual dependence in 
managing the EU’s external relations is encouraging and 
points to a stronger foreign policy partnership between 
Council Secretariat and Commission in the future – not 
quite the result that was to be expected from the long-
standing efforts of member states to keep foreign policy 
matters out of the hands of supranational institutions. 
 In some ways, the idea contained in the 
Constitutional Treaty to create the post of an EU Minister 
for Foreign Affairs is an interesting solution to this issue. It 
dodges the issue whether it should be either Commission or 
Council Secretariat that has control over the resources in the 
external relations field. Instead continuing with the current 
practice that the Commission stays in charge of those 
foreign policy instruments that are more economic, trade-
related and budgetary, and the Council Secretariat 
responsible for the more traditional diplomatic, security and 
military aspects, the Treaty proposed to square the circle by 
making a single individual – the new foreign affairs 
'minister' – responsible for both. He or she (in fact it has 
already been decided that Javier Solana will be promoted to 
the job when it comes into existence) will then chair the 
GAERC Council, head the CFSP and security bodies in the 
Council structure, but also be Vice-President of the 
Commission. Such a solution certainly provides for easier 
recognition of who is in charge of EU foreign policy, but it 
may cause difficulties in establishing how the holder of this 
new post relates to the Presidents of the Commission and 
the European Council.  
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Conclusions 
The Council of Ministers operates on a number of different 
levels, and is embedded within a wider context of 
intergovernmental institutions. Its role remains central to 
European governance as the key channel for the 
representation of national and sectoral interests from the 
member states to the European Union. Interest 
representation has become more complex as the number of 
member states has grown, the range of issues has expanded 
and the negotiations involve questions of greater technical 
detail. In response to these developments, the number of 
sectoral Councils has multiplied and an extensive network 
of committees and working groups has evolved around the 
original meeting of foreign ministers which remains at the 
heart of the Council structure. 
 The expansion of competences and the growing 
number of arenas for deliberation in turn require greater co-
ordination of Council business. In this respect, the 
Presidency and the European Council have become more 
important, but beyond co-ordination they have also 
provided welcome opportunities for member states to regain 
the initiative and a greater degree of control over the 
integration process. 
 But, as this chapter has sought to show, the 
evolution of the Council is also marked by some 
unexpected and arguably unintended consequences. 
Negotiations among ministers and officials is not just a one-
way street of interest representation: frequent meetings and 
continuous deliberation among member state 
representatives also provide an environment for policy-
learning, cultural exchange, socialisation and even the 
transformation of allegiances. As such, the Council 
structure constitutes an important site for the establishment 
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or growth of policy networks and other channels of interest 
representation which cut across the member states. 
 Most recently, the Council Secretariat has 
witnessed a boost, as new foreign policy and military bodies 
have been created and its head who is already the EU’s 
High Representative for the CFSP, is designated as the 
future EU Minister for Foreign Affairs. The combined 
effect of these developments is that the Secretariat is being 
recognised as the core of the EU’s ambitions in the 
diplomatic and security field. If these ambitions are being 
turned into reality, the Secretariat and the High 
Representative stand much to gain, but, given the past 
record of the EU in this field, there is also a case for 
caution. These are still very early days in the long-term 
endeavour to provide the EU with effective institutions for 
foreign policy and military intervention. From an 
institutional point of view it remains to be seen, in 
particular, whether the relationship between the Council 
Secretariat and the Commission evolves as one of 
partnership or rivalry in the management of the Union’s 
external relations. In this context we have to see the 
proposal contained in the Constitutional Treaty, of a 
European foreign minister that would have had a crucial 
role in managing the external relations of both the Council 
and the Commission 
 The strengthening of the Secretariat illustrates the 
trend towards a greater degree of institutionalisation in the 
Council more generally. It demonstrates the dilemma 
national governments face as they ask the EU to perform 
additional tasks while also seeking to maintain close control 
over their execution. It may be that, by transferring powers 
to the Secretariat and the committee structure, governments 
have prevented the Commission from gaining further 
powers. Yet, in the process the Council itself has become 
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more of a supranational body and the conglomerate of 
institutions now involved in the making of EU policy has 
become ever more difficult to hold to account. 
 In the early years of the new century, 
institutionalised intergovernmentalism has found new ways 
of responding to the dilemmas and challenges of European 
governance. The reality of enlargement, which has added 
several new challenges to the work of the Council (Bayer 
2005), and the potential implementation of the reforms 
foreseen in the Constitutional Treaty, should that be ratified, 
will interact with this long-term trend towards greater 
institutionalisation.  Internal changes such as the reduction 
of the national veto and the external challenges of an 
enlarged European Union will test the effectiveness and the 
legitimacy of these institutions. There may be testing times 
ahead, but the experience so far shows that member states 
are willing and able to adapt the Council to the changing 
demands of its environment. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Tensions of European 
governance: 
politicised bureaucracy and multiple 
accountability in the European 
Commission 
If the process of European integration has created an entity 
that is "less than a federation, [but] more than a regime" 
(Wallace, 1983), this is due to the set of novel institutions it 
has spawned. These institutions are different from state 
institutions: they operate in a political space in which 
institutions can neither rely on a common identity nor on 
claims to territorial sovereignty. Yet, European institutions 
are also distinct from the institutions of international 
organisations in having the capacity and the legitimacy to act 
relatively independently of Member States’ assent. It is, 
above all, this distinction from traditional institutional forms 
that sets the politics of the European Union apart from both 
international relations and domestic politics. It is also the 
reason why the merit of studying the operation of European 
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institutions lies in their wider significance for the 
understanding of the European project as a whole. 
 In this article institutional structures are viewed as 
the conceptual ‘middle-ground’ - between micro- and macro-
levels of analysis - of integration. More specifically, 
European institutions provide the link between specific 
policy-networks and the overall evolution of the European 
Union. Taking such a perspective we are faced with, on the 
one hand, an extensive and detailed research agenda on 
European policy-making in its diversity of sectors and stages, 
and, on the other hand, a still unresolved debate about the 
general dynamics of the integration project. In this context, 
neo-institutional perspectives on European integration as 
recently advanced by some scholars (Bulmer, 1994, Cram, 
1994, Peterson, 1995; Pierson, 1996) have a important utility: 
European institutions are studied not just with a view to their 
individual functioning, but also, and particularly, in order to 
develop a more systematic link between the insights of 
policy-analysis and of integration theory.  
 Together with the development of theoretical 
perspectives on institutional change, the past few years have 
also seen a marked rise in the empirical attention given to EU 
institutions. This is particularly true with regard to the 
European Commission (Edwards and Spence, 1994; 
Dehousse and Majone, 1994; Philip Morris Institute, 1995; 
Drake, 1995; Egeberg, 1995; George, 1995; Nugent, 1995; 
Ross, 1994; Cram, 1994; Grant, 1995; Cini, 1995; 
Mendrinou, 1996). This recent wave of writings on the 
Commission is ample evidence that the criticism made by 
Edwards and Spence, namely that "given its importance in 
the integration process ..., there has been a surprising dearth 
of academic or other study of the European Commission" 
(Edwards and Spence, 1994; p.1), is widely shared and being 
addressed. 
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A neo-institutionalist perspective on the European 
Commission  
The past decade has witnessed the formulation of such a 
"new institutionalist" research programme (see Evans et al., 
1985; March and Olsen, 1984; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; 
Thelen and Steinmo, 1991). As has been pointed out, this 
renewed attention to organisational factors in political life 
has taken very different forms (Koelble, 1995). More 
specifically, both reflectivist and rationalist strands of 
institutionalist thinking regarding politics and society have 
developed (Cammack, 1992). 
 These are ‘new’ perspectives in so far as they 
conceive institutions not simply as formal arrangements 
carrying out assigned functions in political, social or 
economic life, but are treated as reflections on the 
development of societal value systems and tensions within 
them. In other words, institutions exist in close relationship to 
the society, effectively linking the actions of individuals 
within their ambit to wider social processes. Such an 
understanding of institutions as mediators between individual 
action and structural foundations makes them a crucial arena 
for social change. 
 One way of operationalising such a neo-
institutionalist perspective is by focussing on the way in 
which "institutionalised contradiction" has become 
politicised (Friedland and Alford, 1992). Neo-
institutionalism, by searching for such instances of 
institutionalised contradiction and analysing their 
politicisation, seeks to study dynamic change - which is, after 
all, also the perennial puzzle of European integration. 
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 The European Union has had to accommodate a 
number of fundamental contradictions. Elsewhere dilemmas 
such as "uniformity v. diversity" (Stein, 1986) and 
"independence v. accountability" (Majone, 1994a) have been 
identified. Here two basic tensions of the integration process 
will be conceptualised. Their institutional expression links 
the internal dynamics of the Commission to the larger 
integration project. These tensions can be visualised as 
vertical and horizontal axes of a conceptual space within 
which the European Union as well as individual institutions 
can be located. 
  
 
Figure 1 Inherent tensions of European governance 
 
 The horizontal dimension - to be called here 
‘institutional accountability’ - describes the conflict between 
Member State control and direct accountability of the 
European institutions to the citizens at the other. The 
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European project attempts to deal with this conflict through a 
hybrid organisation and a number of federal-type 
arrangements. The result for the Commission, a system of 
"multiple accountability", is the subject of second half of this 
article. 
 Another dimension of institutionalised contradiction 
ought not to be confused with this. This is the conflict not 
between collective and individual interests among the 
Union’s membership, but the tension between the political 
and legal nature(s) of the Union system (Weiler, 1991). This 
tension has also been a major factor in the Commission’s 
evolution (Coombes, 1970). On this second, vertical axis, the 
one extreme can thus be called ‘politics’, i.e. the nature of 
decision-making as an open-ended and largely unstructured 
process, whereas the other extreme is ‘bureaucracy’, i.e. the 
presence of a rigid, rule-bound and hierarchical environment 
for political action. This dimension is termed here ‘decisional 
rigidity’. 
 If these two dimensions of conflict are combined in 
the above fashion, four broad organisational categories can 
be distinguished. The graph below illustrates how these two 
dimensions operate within the Commission, and what labels 
can be put to the organisational logics they produce: 
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 Organisational Logics 
within the European 
Commission 
 Institutional Accountability 
  "Diplomacy" "Democracy" 
Decisional 
Rigidity 
"Bureaucracy" International 
Secretariat 
Public 
Administration 
 "Politics" Independent 
Agency 
Cabinet 
Figure 2 Organisational Logics within the European Commission 
 
 Both dimensions describe inherent conflicts of the 
European project. They are inherent in the sense that without 
their presence the European project would not be what it is: 
as far as the horizontal, ‘supranational-Member State’ 
dimension is concerned, integration is neither expected to 
remain a solely intergovernmental affair, nor to lead to a 
state-like integrated structure. On the vertical axis, the Union 
institutions are neither solely political nor solely bureaucratic 
bodies - features of both organisational logics are present. 
The tension between collective and individual state interests, 
on the one hand, and the tension between open-ended, 
‘political’ bargaining and a system of formal and informal 
rules are permanent features of the integration process. The 
very fact that there is no perspective for the resolution of 
these conflicts is what makes the European Union so 
distinctive. Continuous tension - sometimes captured in the 
"unity in diversity" slogan - is part of the very identity of an 
institutionalised Europe. 
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Decision rigidity: The Commission between 
politicisation and bureaucratisation 
It is a common reflex to view the Commission as a 
bureaucracy. In many ways, of course, the Commission does 
fulfil functions and appropriates roles comparable to 
bureaucracies in domestic systems. Regularly, the 
Commission acts as the extension of national bureaucracies. 
Indeed, the Commission has for many in Europe become 
synonymous with the very concept of ‘bureaucracy’. But to 
treat the Commission, without as just another bureaucracy 
either disregards its exceptional circumstances or else implies 
a departure from established definitions of ‘bureaucracy’.  
 To retain analytical value, ‘bureaucracy’ must 
involve, at the very minimum, aspirations towards rule-
orientation and -coherence, hierarchical organisation, 
functional specialization, the development of standard 
operating procedures (SOPs). Such a definition in the 
Weberian tradition follows Pollit, who also notes that 
[e]mpirically, it makes more sense to write of 
degrees of bureaucratization rather then to impose a 
‘black-and-white, ‘is a bureaucracy/isn’t a 
bureaucracy’ dichotomy." (Pollit, 1988: 159-160). 
  
In this light, the Commission ought to be seen as more or less 
bureaucratic. The above parameters are therefore understood, 
not as final denominators, but merely as yardsticks for 
empirical analysis. This might seem obvious, but simply not 
starting with the ex ante assumption that the Commission is a 
bureaucracy is already a departure from the way in which the 
Commission is conventionally regarded. 
 What detracts from the bureaucratic element in the 
Commission’s activity - what makes the Commission "less 
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bureaucratic" than other bureaux - is the nature of continuous 
bargaining in the Union. The major fields of Commission 
activity - proposing legislation and supervising the 
implementation of decisions - are highly politicised tasks. In 
the EU systems, policies are not only subject to the extensive 
deliberations in the legislative phase, but are also bound to be 
re-negotiated when it comes to their implementation in 
different national contexts. In this system the Commission is 
a ‘politicised bureaucracy’, faced with a dilemma between its 
duty to develop and apply common rules and continuous 
political pressure for deviation. 
 This dilemma is with any bureaucracy, national or 
international. But the nature of much of the Commission’s 
work - the overarching regulatory function it fulfils for the 
European Union, the large degree of symbolism that is often 
involved in EU decision-making, the continuing process of 
expansion of the EU’s institutional framework, the ongoing 
process of ‘constitutional reform’ - has meant that numerous 
political forces take exceptional interest in the internal 
proceedings of the Commission. Having to manage the 
resultant clash between pervasive political interests and the 
rigidities of the acquis communautaire is what makes the 
Commission a such a special type of public administration. 
  There are a number of ways in which the issue of 
bureaucratisation v. politicisation of the Union can be 
tackled. A historical account, for example, would have little 
difficulty in identify different phases of the Commission’s 
development. The more bureaucratic phase of the ‘planner’ 
Monnet, followed by the more political self-perception of the 
Commission under the ‘diplomat’ Hallstein. The end of 
Hallstein’s reign saw a return to the bureaucratic nature of 
Commission activity, until Jacques Delors introduced new 
"leadership" and politicised the work of the Commission 
significantly (Drake, 1995; Ludlow, 1991). And the 
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European Parliament’s cautious response to the new Santer 
Commission and its 1995 programme (Jacobs, 1995) 
indicates the MEPs fear that there might be, in the phase of 
retrenchment after Delors’ departure, a reversion to the 
bureaucratic mode. But, as Ludlow has pointed out, at least 
among the Commissioners, "there is a strong trend towards 
the appointment of politicians" (Ludlow, 1991: 89). 
 Even such a brief and cursory glance at the 
Commission’s history indicates a number of salient points: 
there is not necessarily a linear development towards a more 
‘political’, or alternatively, a more ‘bureaucratic’ 
Commission. There are, clearly, bound to be radical shifts in 
the way the Commission’s role is seen as more political or 
more bureaucratic, and these changes over time are responses 
to internal as well as external impulses. At the same time it 
should be noted that there is always a degree of 
bureaucratisation and of politicisation in the Commission’s 
work. The historical account of changing modes must 
therefore be seen as a change of emphasis rather than a 
complete switch: an indication that the internal ‘equation’ of 
political and bureaucratic forces has been reshuffled.  
 
 
Inter-departmental conflicts: The case of state aid 
control and regional policy 
The notion of "bureaucratic politics" is distinct from what we 
have called "politicised bureaucracy". The concept of 
bureaucratic politics has been employed in foreign policy 
analysis (Allison, 1971), comparative politics (Downs, 1967) 
and in previous studies of the Union (Peters, 1992). The 
focus of ‘bureaucratic politics’ studies is on competition and 
conflict between different administrative agencies or 
departments. 
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 Notwithstanding this distinction, politicisation in the 
Commission may well express itself in a pattern of 
‘bureaucratic politics’. Inter-departmental conflict in the 
Commission is usually being related to the conflict between 
sectoral interests that the respective DGs are seen to 
represent. Conflicts of sectoral interests within the 
Commission are, as a matter of course, to be expected. Yet, 
in line with the above argument about the general 
pervasiveness of bureaucracy-political tensions within the 
Commission, it is worth asking whether inter-departmental 
disputes can also result from different DGs finding 
distinctive answers to this dilemma. The assumption here is 
that one DG might find itself in more of a ‘bureaucratic’ 
mode of operation, and another more towards the ‘political’ 
end of the spectrum. As a consequence, when two such DGs 
have to cooperate on a matter of Union policy (as is 
frequently the case), they will find themselves at 
loggerheads. 
 A case study will illustrate this point. The dispute 
over the control of state aids policy has seen a major 
confrontation between DGs IV (competition policy) and XVI 
(regional policies). From the late 1980s, DG XVI began 
quarrelling with DG IV about the control of national regional 
policies (Wishlade, 1993; 1994). This dispute, and the need 
to resolve the differences, originated from both DGs serving 
notices to local, regional and national authorities that were 
diametrically opposed to one another. DG XVI would 
announce that a certain region qualified for Community aid 
from the structural funds, whereas DG IV would inform the 
same addressee that the granting of national or regional aid 
for the same area was prohibited. Regions were thus facing 
the absurd situation in which they were receiving state aid 
from the Community, but were being banned by the 
Community to grant such aid themselves. Wishlade’s 
research has shown that this dispute affected more than 13 
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per cent of the Union’s population. 5.7 per cent of the EU 
population - the equivalent of the entire population of the 
Netherlands - were then in areas that received support from 
the structural funds, but were not - according to DG IV - 
eligible for national regional aid (Wishlade, 1993). More 
recent data suggests that these inconsistencies are not being 
resolved (Marques, 1994) - indeed, since then enlargement 
has most likely contributed to a widening of the gap in area 
coverage. 
 DG IV has developed an active policy of evaluating 
national regional policies and frequently questioning sections 
of the national plans submitted to it. The legal framework for 
this was essentially a number of articles in the Rome Treaty 
and the accumulated case law of Commission and Court of 
Justice decisions. In other words, it was an area of 
Commission policy that was relatively flexible, and a change 
in Commission policy did not necessarily require support 
from the Council. The general thrust of the Single Act and 
the 1992 programme further empowered the Commission to 
pursue a pro-active role (Ehlermann, 1994; McGowan and 
Wilks, 1995). One legal observer has noted that in this 
development  
the Commission combines, not only within the 
competition division, but within individual officials, 
the role of prosecutor and judge...[this] has left the 
Commission the master of its own procedural 
destiny (Brent, 1995). 
  
In the context of the argument here this means that in the late 
1980s and up to the present the pattern of decision-making in 
the general field of competition policy has become less 
bound by the application of rules than by political bargaining. 
The practice in the field of merger control, which accounts 
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for a significant part of the extension of competition policy in 
this period, was for DG IV to prepare a dossier which would 
then voted upon by the collegiate of Commissioner’s. This 
process meant that decisions would be taken under political 
considerations rather than according to any objective criteria 
that might have been applied. ‘Political’ here stands for a 
number of things: left-right politics among Commissioners, 
different national positions (frequently mergers are seen as 
‘national’ issues, since often ‘national’ champions are 
involved), and beyond this the general notion that decision-
making is allowed, indeed supposed, to be subjective - 
looking at each case on its own merit - rather than objective - 
applying a common rule anonymously. Value-orientations, 
interests and resources are bound to guide the decision-
makers, Criticism and charges of political interference has 
been rife. 
 Yet, the point here is not to criticise or question the 
politicised nature of Commission policy in this field. Rather, 
it ought to be recognized that this pattern of decision-making 
differs significantly from that of other parts of the 
Commission’s administration. In the present context we need 
to look at the way in which DG XVI has performed its 
functions in the same period. With the reform of the 
structural funds, which came soon after the ratification of the 
Single Act the Commission enlarged its role in the field of 
regional policy. The extent of this reform has been amply 
discussed elsewhere (Marks, 1992). Crucially, the structural 
fund reform has been marked by the passage of a rather high 
number of directives and regulations - a dense network of 
rules and stipulations that has had the effect of embedding 
DG XVI in a relatively structured relationship with 
administrative bodies on a multitude of territorial levels. 
Indeed, the very nature of the reform was to foreclose the 
freedom of action of national governments by way of 
instituting administrative procedures, regulations and multi-
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annual programming. As a matter of course, this new system, 
once established, would also foreclose the Commission’s 
freedom of action. Essentially, with the reform of the 
structural funds the Commission adopted the role of a 
"guardian of rules and procedures" as much as that of a "big 
spender".  
 The difference, in terms of organisational reflexes, 
between DG IV and DG XVI ought to be clear. Both 
enlarged their roles significantly after the SEA, and both 
increased their relative weight, vis-à-vis the national 
authorities as well as within the Commission itself. But the 
growth of DG IV was based on doing away with rules, on 
opening up the decision-making to political considerations. 
The growth of DG XVI, by contrast, was based on the 
opposite: the creation of new rules, the definition of objective 
criteria and of agreed priorities for Union action, the 
imposition of procedures, and the closing of decision-making 
to political considerations. 
 In other words, DG IV has been socialized into a 
more ‘political’ and DG XVI into a more ‘bureaucratic’ 
mode of decision-making. Accepting that departmental 
action is at least in part guided by such general and 
underlying trends to its decision-processes, it is little 
surprising that in the 1990s DG IV and DG XVI should find 
it difficult to agree on a common approach to the control of 
state aids. Indeed, it can be seen as a paradigmatic case of the 
clash between the ‘political’ and the ‘bureaucratic’ 
organizational modes present in the Commission. 
 Doubtlessly numerous examples of this kind can be 
found. Not all will boil down to differing organisational 
logics of the relevant departments. In some cases micro- or 
macro-perspectives will retain their independent explanatory 
power: for example, the idiosyncrasy of individual decision-
makers or the capture of administrative units by specific 
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interests often results in interdepartmental conflicts. Ross 
(1994) provides ample evidence of this happening. Internal 
conflict in the Commission is therefore not always an 
instance of institutionalized contradiction. But clearly, 
examining inter-departmental conflict it is one way of 
identifying tensions between different organisational logics. 
 
 
Collegiality, hierarchy and the role of cabinets  
If the above discussion of inter-departmental struggles can be 
seen as the horizontal expression of the problem of decisional 
rigidity in the Commission, then there is also the incidence of 
vertical conflict of this kind. In a way, this is the most 
immediate and obvious case of politics v. bureaucracy in the 
Commission. The ‘political level’ of the Commission - the 
collegiate comprising the President, the two Vice-Presidents 
and the other, currently 17, "Members of the Commission" - 
and the ‘bureaucratic’ body of the Commission’s 15,000 
officials are practically two different institutions: in domestic 
systems one would quite naturally distinguish between the 
cabinet - providing executive government and political 
leadership in the political system - and the civil servants in 
the ministries - providing the administrative support 
necessary to prepare and carry out cabinet decisions. In the 
EU system, such a distinction between cabinet and 
administration is not that easily made, in part because the 
Council is, after all, a collectivity of ministers that would not 
want to see the Commission encroach on its status. If 
anything, collective leadership is provided by the "dual 
presidency" of Commission President and Council 
Presidency. Apart from this feature there is essentially no 
clearly definable cabinet or executive government in the EU 
system. 
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 As a result of this distinctive situation, the institution 
"Commission" stands for two quite different ‘creatures’: on 
the one hand, the collegiate of Commissioners, who are 
politicians, and, on the other, an organization staffed by civil 
servants, who constitute the core of the EU’s bureaucracy. 
This fusion of ‘the political’ and ‘the bureaucratic’ in the 
very nature of the Commission is what lies at the heart of 
much of the difficulty in dealing with "Commission 
decisions" or "Commission policy". It is not as easy as in 
domestic systems to identify whether Commission activity 
stems from decisions made in the political domain - by the 
Commissioners - or whether it results from standard 
administrative responses generated by civil servants. In 
domestic systems, for example, there is the distinction 
between statutory measures, cabinet decisions and legislative 
acts, indicating the institutional level at which a policy is 
made. In the EU system, the distinction between 
"regulations", "directives" and "decisions" is not a helpful 
guide, as each of these can be issued by Commission, by the 
Council or by the Union’s institutions collectively. 
 Within the Commission, the political-bureaucratic 
interface is managed by the cabinets, the personal staff of 
each of the Commissioners. They are responsible for 
monitoring, on behalf of their Commissioner, the activity of 
the other departments in the Commission (Ludlow, 1991: 93-
94; Nugent, 1995b: 89). In this way, cabinets are performing 
a crucial function in preparing the weekly Commission 
meetings and facilitating the principle of collegiality - the 
shared responsibility Commissioners undertake for the 
activity of the institution as a whole. Cabinets, in enabling 
individual Commissioners to control developments outside 
their own department, are contributing to horizontal 
integration within the political domain of the Commission, 
allowing it to function like a national cabinet. 
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 This is complementary to the work of the secretariat-
general, which, under the responsibility of the Commission 
President, is charged with ensuring the overall consistency of 
the Commission’s output. Yet these two institutions, the 
secretariat-general and the cabinet structure, are in a 
complementary as well as competitive relationship. As a 
result, there are two circuits of horizontal coordination inside 
the Commission: both the chefs de cabinet and the Director-
Generals and Secretary-General meet once a week to 
coordinate Commission policy - an arrangement which can 
also contribute to the development of different agendas, thus 
amplifying the political-administrative split within the 
Commission.  
 Cabinets are also gate-keepers to the 
Commissioner’s desk. As such they constitute the link 
between the bureaucratic Commission and the political 
Commission. In this role, they ideally provide the 
Commissioner with information regarding the state of affairs 
in the various DGs under her or his responsibility as well as 
communicating the political decisions made to the officials 
within the DGs (Donnelly and Ritchie, 1994). As was 
mentioned earlier, this is a sensitive task. Within individual 
DGs there is often little appreciation of the work done in 
other DGs. The frequent change of Commissioner and their 
cabinets, together with the continuity of the staff on the 
administrative level, contributes further to the lack of 
integration between these two domains. 
 Thus there are occasional allegations from DG 
officials that cabinet members mismanage this sensitive gate-
keeping function. Top-down, this might mean that cabinet 
members send instructions to, or ask files from, individual 
desk officers, neglecting the hierarchical organization of the 
DG and consequently ignoring the director-general, division 
heads, etc. Bottom-up, this would stand for cabinet members 
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blocking access for desk-officers and Director-Generals to 
the Commissioner, filtering out matters which they consider 
politically unwarranted. Such occasional charges of ‘political 
interference’ in the work of DGs is another example about 
the way in which principles of administrative hierarchy and 
political agenda-setting conflict within the Commission. 
What this demonstrates, at any rate, is the crucial role that 
cabinets perform at the interface of the political and the 
bureaucratic logics inside the Commission. 
 
 
Member State influence, nationality and Comitology 
As indicated at the outset, the Commission is faced with a 
second dimension of internal contradiction, that of having to 
account to two rather distinct sets of interests. In the Union’s 
legislative process, this means Council and Parliament. But, 
in a wider sense, these institutions stand for the Member 
States and for the citizens of the Union, respectively. These 
are ultimately the ‘constituents’ holding the Commission to 
account. 
 The representation of Member States’ interests in the 
EU system is not confined to the national representations, 
COREPER and Council of Ministers. Member State 
influence is pervasive in other institutions as well. Within the 
Commission, an obvious sign for this is each Member State 
having ‘its’ Commissioner(s). Their role is essentially 
twofold: on top of their official, sectoral responsibilities they 
also function as the most senior link between the 
Commission and the respective national political circuit. 
Usually, they are members - and appointees - of the major 
parties in their Member State and continue some involvement 
with national politics after becoming Commissioners. 
Frequent trips to speak before (and perhaps to lecture) 
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national audiences are common. Again, the metaphor of gate-
keeping is perhaps most useful: Commissioners are an easy 
and efficient way for the Commission to maintain a link with 
Member State governments and domestic political systems. 
They will know what legislative proposals are politically 
acceptable in national capitals, while at the same time being 
in an ideal position to communicate to elites on the national 
circuit the requirements of efficient European policy-making. 
 Yet the unwritten rule that Commissioners also 
represent Member States - and, by association, Member 
States’ interests - inside the Commission is only the tip of an 
iceberg of Member State influence inside this supposedly 
supranational institution. We can look only briefly at a few 
examples of the way in which the Commission is also an 
intergovernmental body. On the individual level, for instance, 
most Commission officials are not just nationals of one of the 
Member States, but also come from an education, 
administration and political system that is profoundly 
national in orientation. Those entering the Commission with 
a genuinly European educational formation, like those 
coming from the College of Europe, the European Institute of 
Public Administration or the European University Institute, 
are in a small albeit growing minority. Research on the 
international organisations indicates the gulf between the 
theory of a "neutral" international civil service 
(Hammarskjöld, 1962) and the pervasiveness of national 
identity (Wilterdink, 1990) among the staff of international 
organisations, even though there this identification tends to 
be lower than in the wider public. In the end, there is a gulf 
between "the myth and the reality" of an international civil 
service (Weiss, 1982). 
 There is little empirical work on the identification 
and socialization of Commission staff, but what there is 
confirms the perspective of inherent tension that is advanced 
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here. On the one hand, Commission officials are ‘special’ for 
a number of structural reasons associated with the institution: 
[T]he Commission’s officials’ typical motivational structure 
is quite different from that of the average national 
government official...  
[T]he Commission recruits from people who are 
highly motivated, risk-oriented, polyglot, 
cosmopolitan, open-minded and innovative...From 
the beginnings in the 1960s to the present, it has 
indeed been officials of a special type who chose to 
leave the relative security of their national 
administrations to go to Brussels to do there a well-
paid but extremely challenging job. These people 
mutually stabilize their motivational structures with 
a distinct esprit de corps" (Eichener, 1992). 
  
On the other hand, there remains the link with national 
administrative cultures and systems, something which has 
been the subject of a number of recent studies (Egeberg, 
1995; Bellier, 1995; Christoph, 1993). Egeberg, for 
examples, finds that 60 per cent of respondents in the 
Commission state nationality as important for network-
building. Considering how important policy-networks are the 
making of European public policy (Richardson 1996), this 
finding - in what is usually considered a supranational 
institution - is remarkable, even if only 23 per cent of 
respondents consider nationality as guiding their decisions. 
Nationality still matters, if only to a limited and perhaps 
declining extent - this is the credo of such investigations. 
Even though the Commission is a modern, progressive and 
innovative organisation, its staff maintains allegiance to 
national identities and the routines of cultural and linguistic 
affinity.  
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 Such national identifications on the individual level, 
among Commissioners and officials alike, sometimes 
become institutionalized in units, divisions and even whole 
DGs. Senior Commission appointments, for example, have 
always been made on the basis of national ‘quotas’, a 
practice - referred to by insiders as "parachuting" - so 
pervasive that in 1993 even the European Court was 
provoked into action on this matter (Nugent, 1995b: 90). 
There are also frequent allegations that one or the other DG 
has been "captured" by a Member State. Returning to the 
case of competition policy, for example, it is interesting to 
note that in the past decades DG IV has had German 
Director-Generals. (West) Germany’s specific interest in a 
European dimension to competition policy was demonstrated 
by the fact that the Bundestag passed the major pieces of 
domestic German anti-trust legislation on the same day on 
which it ratified the Rome Treaties. Subsequently, it has been 
recognised within the Commission and beyond that 
competition policy has been a special interest of the Federal 
Republic. There is also the familiar complaint - in particular 
from the UK - that the Commission on the whole is based on 
a francophone blueprint of administrative organisation, and 
that this disadvantages applicants or entrants from Member 
States with different administrative cultures. This charge 
relates neatly to the view that the whole Union was initially 
designed like a "French garden" (Holm, forthcoming). 
 Further structural conditions contribute to the 
phenomena of ‘quasi-intergovernmentalism’ within the 
Commission. Much of the above concerned fonctionaires, i.e. 
officials with lifetime employment guarantee, pension rights, 
special access to the European Court, etc. - in other words, 
people receiving an exceptional treatment that ought to 
enhance their sense of allegiance with the European project. 
But the Commission services also consist of a large share of 
non-permanent employees - temporaires, stagiaires, and, 
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crucially, national civil servants under secondment to the 
European institutions - many of whom are returning to, or 
entering into, national administrative systems after their time 
in Brussels. Clearly this has detrimental effects on their 
identification with the European project and, as a corollary, 
on the way in which the Commission as a whole can 
understand itself as a European civil service. 
  Again, hard data is lacking on the pattern of 
secondment, but it seems safe to suggest that the share of 
Commission staff that is not permanently employed is 
analytically significant. Seconded staff are fulfilling a double 
role in bringing national administrative expertise into the 
Commission, and communicating European processes back 
to their home systems. The crucial question for our purposes 
here is whether they generate more to the ‘Europeaness’ of 
national systems - the "going native in Brussels" syndrome - 
than they contribute to the ‘quasi-intergovernmentalism’ of 
the Commission services - constituting a "fifth column". 
What effects this situation has on the Commission can only - 
and ought to - be determined empirically. Clearly we are 
dealing with a reciprocal relationship which does not leave 
the Commission untouched. It is fair to assume that such 
linkages to officials’ national ‘constituency extend beyond 
the purely administrative realm into the network of policy 
communities - involving scientific experts and interest 
groups as well as national officials - which are so important 
in the agenda-setting stage of European policy-making 
(Richardson, 1995). 
 Finally, the "Brussels Eurocracy" is not just the 
Commission as such, but also the intricate system of 
advisory, regulatory and preparatory committees that 
surround the Commission. These are generally made up of 
‘national experts’ in a number of highly specialized fields of 
policy-making as well as Commission staff. These 
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committees are explicitly meant to safeguard Member State 
interests in those phases of the Union’s policy process which 
are traditionally the core of Commission competence, namely 
the drafting of legislative proposals, the implementation of 
policy and the enforcement of compliance. These spheres of 
public policy-making lie outside the reach of the Council of 
Ministers, but rising awareness of the significance of agenda-
setting and implementation has meant that Member States 
have sought to regain direct influence in these matters. As a 
result, there has been the exorbitant growth of a network of 
thousands of committees of national and Commission 
officials - the structure that has come to be called comitology. 
These committees are not the ‘ornaments’ that their 
counterparts sometimes are in domestic administrative or 
parliamentary systems often are; their power in the making of 
European policy is real (Eichener, 1992; Joerges, 1994; 
Buitendijk and van Schendelen, 1995). 
 Arguably, it is the density and the extent of this 
intermeshing transnational committee structure which lies at 
the heart of the accountability problem of the European 
Union. The dilemma here is that while comitology structures 
aim at making the Commission more accountable to national 
governments, the complexity and the lack of transparency 
comitology makes it immensely difficult for ‘European 
government’ to account to citizens. 
 The above pointers to patterns of Member State 
influence in the Commission’s political and administrative 
system - nationality, secondment and comitology - should not 
be understood as a critique of national ‘meddling’ in a 
supranational institution. The absence of comprehensive data 
prevents, in any case, a judgement on this matter. The 
argument here is simply that - to the degree to which the 
European project on the whole maintains aspects of 
intergovernmentalism - the Commission’s organisational 
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development also reflects the need of being accountable to 
national governments and the collective interests of the 
Member States. Ludlow has discussed the Commission’s 
future in terms of legitimacy and efficiency (Ludlow, 1991). 
In the light of the above discussion, we can see that the 
Commission’s ‘quasi-intergovernmentalism’ is also a 
response to legitimacy and efficiency problems. The absence 
of a broader public identification with the European project 
(Smith, 1992) as well as the need to manage indirect policy-
implementation and to combat non-compliance (Somsen, 
1995; Mendrinou, 1996) compel the Commission to remain 
sensitive to Member State interests. 
 
 
Multiple accountability: The Commission between 
states and citizens 
Much of the above is unbalanced, emphasising the degree to 
which the Commission is an intergovernmental organisation. 
This one-sided account was intended to redress the balance 
with respect to a body of literature which regularly treats the 
Commission as a purely supranational organisation. 
Therefore, the account of Member State influences in the 
Commission is given here only to show that the Commission 
also exhibits intergovernmental traits. In a similar vein, yet in 
the opposite direction, Wessels has convincingly argued for a 
recognition of the supranational nature of the Council of 
Ministers (Wessels, 1991). 
 The Commission does, of course, have strong 
supranational features. This is demonstrated by its ‘special 
relationship’ with the European Parliament, which has 
become much more salient in the period since the SEA 
(Westlake, 1994) and which has climaxed in the 
parliamentary hearings of prospective Commissioners that 
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were held before their investiture in January 1995 (Jacobs, 
1995). 
 But the Commission has also spent much time and 
energy in recent years trying to by-pass national governments 
and to reach out directly to the groups and sectors that are 
specifically concerned about Union legislation. Meetings 
between Commissioners, Commission officials and 
interested parties (firms, professional associations, trade 
unions, local and regional governments, lobbyists, political 
parties, pressure groups, etc.) have mushroomed (Donnelly, 
1993). In some cases -  the European Round Table of 
Industrialists, the European Environmental Forum and the 
Committee of the Regions are prime examples - the 
Commission’s regularised contacts with ‘third parties’ have 
even become formally institutionalised. As a result, the 
Commission has gained the institutional standing of a 
"broker": access to specialised knowledge present within 
domestic systems combined with the ability to gauge the 
political acceptability of legislative proposals independently 
of national governments (Mazey and Richardson, 1994). In 
this manner, using its close relations with these intermediary 
bodies, the Commission has also attempted to closer to move 
closer to the citizen. 
 After Maastricht, when during the difficult 
ratification process it become clear that the functional nature 
of the European project of the 1980s had disregarded the 
need for popular support, all EU institutions sought remedies 
to the democratic deficit. In the run-up to the 1996 
Intergovernmental Conference, the Reflection Group has 
concerned itself at length with ways of making the Union 
more accountable to the citizens of the Union (Council 
Presidency, 1995). 
 The Commission, in particular, felt the need to 
respond to criticisms about technocratic governance. An 
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elaborate programme of greater openness, transparency and 
subsidiarity has been the result (European Commission, 
1992a; European Commission, 1993; European Commission, 
1994b). Part of this debate are proposals for the introduction 
of an ‘Administrative Procedures Act’ - similar to US 
practice - which would provide firms and individuals with 
greater certainty about the Commission’s administrative 
responses. (Dehousse et al., 1992). The same holds true for 
attempts to structure the access of outside interest 
representations vis-à-vis the Commission (European 
Commission, 1992b). 
 All this goes to show that the development of a 
direct Commission-public relationship is in full swing. The 
various channels - European Parliament, intermediary social 
groups and organisations, access to, and certainty about, 
administrative procedures within the Commission - are 
combined attempts at making the Commission more 
accountable to citizens. But, as the discussion of comitology 
has emphasised, this is not an easy process, and the 
Commission still has a long way to go before citizens will be 
able, in any meaningful way, to hold it to account. 
 In practice, we see very often how the Commission 
is still torn by contradictory reflexes. In some instances, it 
resorts to ‘diplomatic’ responses (vide the difference in 
Commission and EP reactions to the recent French nuclear 
test series in the Pacific). In other cases the response is to 
search for dialogue with social groups and other domestic 
actors, and in yet other fields the Commission actively seeks 
closer relations with national administrations. With respect to 
the latter, the general tendency towards administrative 
convergence in EU Europe (Burnham and Maor, 1995) as 
well as the learning curve of actors involved in multi-level 
cooperation makes this an ever more normal working 
relationship. 
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 The Commission of the 1990s, whatever other 
problems it might face, is clearly wedged between, on the 
one side, the assurances and commitments it has to give 
national governments and, on the other, the need to respond 
to the wider debate about its public accountability. In this 
context, it is no little irony that as a fall-out of the Maastricht 
Treaty’s negative reception in the ratification stage, the 
Commission had to respond to the specific requests from 
national governments while at the same time having to 
address public complaints about the ‘democratic deficit’. 
This is ironic because, as this article has tried to show, the 
aims of increased recognition of national interests and an 
extension of democratic procedures are largely contradictory. 
Forcing the Commission to respond simultaneously to both 
means to amplify the institutionalized contradictions it has to 
resolve. 
 One attempt at addressing, if not resolving, this 
particular contradiction has been the subsidiarity agenda. 
Pushing subsidiarity has made it possible for the Commission 
to be seen as appeasing both Member State concerns about 
the apparently uncontrollable growth of Union regulation 
(Dehousse, 1994) and the perception among the wider public 
that the Union politics have lost touch with people’s 
concerns. Consequently, the Commission has been keen to 
appear as active in reducing the number proposals for 
European legislation (European Commission, 1994b). 
Apparently, for a Commission faced with the contradictory 
nature of multiple accountability in the post-Maastricht 
phase, subsidiarity has a utility that is much beyond its 
limited inherent value (Dehousse, 1992; Christiansen, 1997). 
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Conclusion 
This article has sought to demonstrate how a focus on 
institutionalized contradiction, based on a neo-institutionalist 
approach to EU politics, brings salient features of the 
European Commission to the fore. The very fact that most of 
these appear under-researched is an indication that the model 
developed here points us in interesting directions. Issues like 
the origins of interdepartmental conflicts, the role of 
cabinets, the extent and the effects of seconded employment, 
the salience of nationality, the pattern of comitology and the 
provision of administrative transparency are being addressed 
by recent or ongoing research projects. The answers 
produced by these empirical projects will provide important 
clues to an improved understanding of the past and future 
development of the Commission. 
 Towards this purpose, the article has mapped out the 
complexity of the Commission, trying to steer away from 
simplistic notions about its "role" or "function". At the very 
least it has been shown that it makes little sense to look at the 
Commission through static institutional models. By contrast, 
a variety of contradictory organisational logics - 
‘bureaucratic’, ‘political’, ‘diplomatic’, ‘democratic’ - are at 
work within the Commission. To identify and classify these 
is the value of a neo-institutionalist approach. If this article 
has indicated how a neo-institutionalist research agenda on 
the European Commission ought to look like, then future 
empirical research will have to investigate in greater depth 
the specific issues that have come to the fore. 
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Chapter 5 
 
The General Secretariat of the 
Council of Ministers∗ 
Influence does not equal formal powers. The European 
Union is rich in examples of institutions which, in the 
absence of formal powers, nevertheless manage to bring 
significant influence to bear on the policy-making process. 
Often they do so through a direct link to organised interests, 
the ability to generate public debate and the resultant impact 
on the policy-agenda of the European Union. The 
Commission is, of course, the prime example of an 
institution that has significant influence over the EU’s 
policy-process through its ability to set the agenda, even 
though it lacks in most policy-areas the formal powers to 
ultimately take decisions. 
One might say that these examples demonstrate that, 
under certain conditions – for example in the absence of 
                                                          
∗ This article is in part based on interviews conducted with officials 
in the Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, the European 
Commission and the permanent representations of some member states. 
The author is grateful to those officials who have provided insights and 
information into the work of the Council Secretariat. 
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formal powers or when interests do not have direct, 
institutional or informal access to the decision-making 
bodies – influence may be a consequence of an institution’s 
ability to ‘make noise’ - to bring certain issues to the 
attention of organised interests, the political press or the 
wider public generally, and to rely on any public pressure 
arising to influence the institutions formally taking decisions 
in the desired manner. It is a strategy with uncertain 
effectiveness, depending as it does on a number of degrees 
of separation: Will organised interests or the wider public 
actually react in the anticipated (and desired manner)? Will 
the issue be covered by the media? Will ‘public pressure’ be 
sufficient to influence the legislative process, or can it be 
ignored by the decision-making institutions? 
Such questions are amplified in the case of the European 
Union, where formal decision-making takes place in arenas 
which are often regarded as being distant from the citizen, 
and where any public pressure is refracted through the prism 
of (at least) fifteen different national publics, communicative 
spaces and political cultures,. However, despite (and 
sometimes because of) these peculiarities of the EU system, 
‘making noise’ remains an option for influencing decision-
making in the European Union, and one that is used 
frequently by different political actors, with varying degrees 
of success.  
Against this background of the political potential of 
‘noise’, the General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers is 
an oddity: while it lacks formal decision-making powers, its 
officials have eschewed ‘noise’ and despite (or because of?) 
that stratggy developed an important role in different areas 
of EU policy-making. To the extent to which the Council 
Secretariat influences EU policy-making, it is a distinctly 
quiet influence. This makes the Council Secretariat a very 
interesting case in this volume’s analysis of ‘unelected 
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legislators’: not only does the Secretariat constitute a prime 
case of the ‘unseen hand’, but it is also a case of the ‘hushed 
voice’. Rather than seeking the high-profile exposure of 
media campaigns, frequent speeches and the like, the 
Council Secretariat has relied on working in the background 
and giving direct advice to ministers, ambassadors and other 
member state representatives. 
This article seeks to shed some light on what is 
generally a not very well-illuminated corner of the EU’s 
institutional architecture. After a general overview of the 
Council Secretariat’s role in the EU, it looks in greater detail 
at its involvement in the ordinary, first pillar policy-process, 
the process of treaty reform and decision-making in CFSP. 
A concluding section then examines the current and future 
challenges facing the Council Secretariat in the light of its 
recent development.  
 
 
The Council Secretariat: From Administrative 
Obscurity to Institutional Fame 
The Council’s General Secretariat may not be an institution 
in the formal sense of the EU treaties, but it is quickly 
becoming a key player in the institutionalisation of European 
governance. Its long-standing role has been that of providing 
the Council of Ministers with central administrative 
services1. It facilitates the meetings taking place within the 
                                                          
1 For a general discussion of the organisation and the role of the 
Council of Ministers see M.Westlake The Council of the European Union 
(London: Catermill, 1995), F.Hayes-Renshaw and H.Wallace The Council 
of Ministers (London: Macmillan, 1997); .P.Sherrington The Council of 
Ministers - Political Authority in the European Union (London: Pinter, 
2000)), and T.Christiansen ‘The Council of Ministers: The Politics of 
Institutionalised Intergovernmentalism’, in J.J.Richardson (ed.), The 
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ambit of the Council, in other words the meetings of the 
various sectoral councils, but also of key committees and the 
myriad of sub-committees and working groups which 
prepare the decision-making of Coreper and ministerial 
councils2. 
There are thousands such meetings in the EU’s 
legislative cycle, and managing the mere logistical exercise 
of providing meetings rooms, printing and disseminating 
documents, maintaining meeting schedules and providing 
interpreting, minute-taking and other support services is no 
mean feat. At one level, the Council Secretariat constitutes a 
"dignified conference centre", as one participant has called 
it. However, it is clearly much more than that. While 
servicing Council meetings has always been a core task, it is 
neither the purely technical activity it may appear to be at 
first sight, nor is it the only responsibility of the Secretariat. 
In fact, the ‘support’ of the Council includes highly political 
matters. These include providing legal and political advice to 
the Council generally, and to the Presidency in particular; 
legal representation of the Council in cases before the 
European Court of Justice; assisting the Presidency in the 
taking of minutes in Council meetings, the setting of 
meeting agendas and the running of meetings; helping of 
Commission and Presidency in the search for compromise in 
Council decision-making; maintaining regular relations with 
                                                                                                            
European Union - Power and Policy-making (2nd ed.) (London: 
Routledge, 2001), pp.135-154. 
2  These include, for example, the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (COREPER), the Political Committee (political directors 
of national foreign ministries, the Article 36 Committee (the former K4 
Committee) (meetings of senior justice and home affairs officials), the 
‘Article 133 Committee’ (member state representatives shadowing the 
Commission’s conduct of international trade negotiations). 
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the Commission and the European Parliament in joint 
management of the legislative process. 
This involvement of the Council Secretariat does not 
just apply to the day-to-day policy process of the European 
Union, but also to the running of European Council meetings 
and the - increasingly frequent - revision of the treaties 
through Intergovernmental Conferences. Just as with 
secondary legislation, the Council, The European Council 
and the Presidency also rely on the legal, administrative and 
political expertise of the Council Secretariat when it comes 
to the making of primary EU law. The IGC’s ‘conference 
secretariat’ is staffed by the Council Secretariat and provides 
essentially the same services to the IGC as it does to the 
Council proper.  
The potential, indirect influence of the Council 
Secretariat in the legislative and treaty reform processes has 
always been a feature of its role in the EU’s institutional 
structure. More recently, the acquisition of substantial 
executive responsibilities has fundamentally changed the 
nature of the Secretariat. From being essentially a small 
bureau providing logistical support, legal opinion and 
political advice, developments in the areas of justice and 
home affairs, and, in particular, foreign and security policy 
and have turned the Secretariat into a sizeable, executive 
agency in its own right. 
The past decade has witnessed an unprecendented 
growth of the Council Secretariat as it acquired new tasks, 
responsibilities and resources. This included the take-over of 
three, previously independent secretariats. As a result of the 
Maastricht Treaty the ‘EPC secretariat’ which had been 
established in the 1980s to facilitate liaison between national 
foreign ministries as part of the European Community’s 
European Political Co-operation – the fore-runner of the 
CFSP – was integrated into the Council Secretariat. The so-
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called Schengen Secretariat dealing with the exchange of 
information in the area of asylum and immigration policies 
of the Member States was incorporated after the ratification 
of the Amsterdam Treaty. Most recently, parts of the 
responsibilities of the secretariat of the Western European 
Union – the defence alliance of the European NATO 
members – were taken over by the Council Secretariat. In 
addition, there has been the creation of a CFSP planning unit 
and of the EU military staff. Most significantly, the 
responsibilities of ‘High Representative for the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy’ have been added to the post of 
Secretary-General. The fact that, with the appointment of 
former Spanish foreign minister and Secretary-General of 
NATO Javier Solana, the first holder of this position was not 
an administrative, but a senior political appointment 
demonstrates the step-change which has taken place in the 
Secretariat. The day-to-day running of the Council 
Secretariat has therefore been left to the Deputy Secretary 
General, a post currently held by the former French 
Permanent Representative, Pierre de Boissieu3. Both Solana 
and de Boissieu have demonstrated the potential 
independence of their positions by making public statements 
that have been highly critical of Member States4. 
As a result of these developments, there has been a 
substantial growth in the numbers of staff working in the 
Council Secretariat, much greater diversity in terms of the 
sectoral policies covered and an increase in the share of 
seconded national officials as part of the overall workforce. 
                                                          
3. See European Voice (1999c) ‘Master of his brief’, 9 December 
1999 and European Voice (2000a) ‘De Boissieu’s surprise intervention’, 
30 March 2000 for details of his career and political influence.  
4.  See Financial Times (2002) ‘Solana attacks decision-makers’, 
12 March 2002 and European Voice (2000b) ‘Top official attacks the way 
governments conduct EU business’, 6 April 2000 
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This in turn, and in line with the iron laws of administration, 
has required greater attention to issues of internal 
governance. The arrival of staff from what were previously 
different organisations (in particular the Schengen 
Secretariat, the EPC Secretariat, and, most recently, the 
WEU Secretariat) did cause some ripples in an 
administration that had remained largely unchanged for 
decades5. Integration across the different types of staff - 
permanent and seconded; legal, diplomatic and military - is 
proving difficult. 
This brief overview of the responsibilities of the 
Council Secretariat indicates that it plays a limited, but 
central, role in the current phase of the EU’s evolution. 
Beyond its traditional contribution to the search for 
compromise agreement in the legislative process, it is also at 
the heart of the proceedings in treaty reform and at the 
forefront of the evolution of the Union’s foreign, security 
and military policies. The subsequent sections will briefly 
elaborate on these three key responsibilities of the Council 
Secretariat. While looking across these different areas, it 
may be useful to keep in mind that ‘influence’, in the way it 
is understood here, relates to the capacity of Council 
Secretariat staff to have an impact on EU decision-making. 
This concerns first andf foremost the legislative process, but 
also includes a recognition of the relevamce of ‘soft law’ in 
the European Union, and thus on the degree of influence the 
Council Secretariat has had on that. This latter aspect of the 
Secretariat’s influence is particularly pertinent with respect 
to the second and third pillars, while the former clearly 
                                                          
5. See, for example, European Voice (2000c) ‘Shake-up of staff 
causes friction in institutions’, 12 October 2000, European Voice (1999a) 
Staff dispute risks delaying EU reform’, 1 April 1999 and European Voice 
(1997) ‘Senior official criticised over recruitment’, 20 March 1997 
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matters most in the context of the legislative process in the 
first pillar. 
 
 
Quiet influence: the Council Secretariat’s role in the 
EU Policy Process 
The Council Secretariat’s role of assisting the Presidency 
and providing legal and other assistance advice facilitate the 
influencing of Council decisions, albeit in a subtle way and 
within a narrow policy-space. On the whole, the Secretariat 
is limited to reacting to the policy-proposals and the wider 
agenda emanating from the Member States and the 
Commission. If and when it has tried to drive a certain 
agenda itself, success has been limited. However, once 
proposals or draft legislation enters ‘the house’, as it were, 
the Secretariat does have opportunities for political 
influence. 
Any such influence depends on numerous factors. 
An important one is the relationship between the Secretariat 
and the Presidency of the day. Different models have been 
experienced in this respect, but the common practice 
(especially for the smaller Member States) is to leave much 
of the organisation of Council business in Brussels, and 
therefore in the hands of the Council Secretariat staff. With a 
Presidency usually concentrating on a small number of pet-
projects, the management of the vast majority of Council 
business remains the task of Secretariat. This provides 
opportunities, for example, to prioritise certain agenda-items 
over others or to suggest changes to proposals in the light of 
legal opinion. 
It is important to recognise that such influence 
occurs within the confines of what a Presidency as well as 
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the member states generally, permit. There is therefore no 
platform for radical changes, but rather for tinkering with the 
detailed and complex matter of policy-proposals and draft 
directives. Then again, in much of what the European Union 
is engaged in, the devil is in the detail, and even minor 
changes of wording in legislative texts can have significant 
political implications6. However, if a Presidency decides to 
‘take over’ micro-management of the EU’s policy-agenda 
then the influence of the Secretariat is curtailed. But this is a 
strategy which insiders consider to lead to less than optimal 
results7. 
Given the way in which the nature of the Presidency 
determines to a large extent the Council Secretariat’s 
opportunities for influence in the policy-process, it is 
necessary to expand a little on this. As many observers and 
practitioners have recognised, the six-monthly term of any 
Presidency is actually very short - too short to properly 
engage with the detailed policy-agenda across the whole 
range of Union policies and provide consistent leadership in 
the decision-making process. The consequences of this state 
of affairs are, first, periods at the beginning of each 
Presidency when the Member State in question is still 
feeling its way in many of the areas of EU policy and, 
second, inconsistencies across the policy-areas depending on 
each Presidencies priorities and preferences. In other words, 
it is not just the choices made by each individual Presidency, 
but also the structural feature of charging a rotating, short-
term Presidency with important leadership tasks in the 
                                                          
6. See European Voice (2000d), ‘A calculated summit for Chirac’s 
man’, 21 December 2000, for an illustration of the potential influence of  
Council Secretariat officials 
7. See M,.Gray and A.Stubb  ‘The Treaty of Nice’, in W.Wessels 
and G.Wiessala (ed.), JCMS Annual Review (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001). 
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Council that governs the influence of the permanent 
Secretariat. 
Another important qualification in discussing the 
Council Secretariat’s influence is the need to cultivate 
relationships with the EU’s more openly ‘political’ actors, 
whether this is the European Commission, Coreper or 
individual member states. The Commission, in particular, is 
a candidate for close co-operation in the policy-process. 
Council (and therefore Council Secretariat) and Commission 
are often regarded as rivals, but in fact there are frequent 
occasions where their relationship is better characterised as a 
division of labour8.  
When legislative proposals reach the Council 
working groups, the Commission often finds itself in a 
contradictory position. On the one hand it seeks to advance 
its own proposal, on the other hand it expected to mediate 
between differing views in among the member states. 
However, the Council Secretariat, in ‘advising’ the 
Presidency on how to run a particular meeting, may be in a 
much better position to mediate different positions and to 
assist the search for a compromise. Thus, mediation and 
search for compromise can be greatly assisted by the co-
operation and the exchange of information on the positions 
taken by national delegations between Commission and 
Council Secretariat staff. 
In this context one should also bear in mind the need 
for Commission and Council to co-operate with respect to 
the Union’s comitology structures. In areas where Member 
                                                          
8. For an examination of the evolving relationship between 
Commission and Council Secretariat, see T.Christiansen ‘Inter-
institutional Relations and Intra-institutional Politics in the EU: Towards 
coherent governance?’,  Journal of European Public Policy  , Vol.8, No.5, 
(2001), pp.747-769. 
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States delegate executive responsibility to the Commission, 
committees are the chosen method to supervise the 
Commission’s execution of these delegated powers. In an 
area such as trade, where the Commission is negotiating 
multilateral agreements on behalf of the Union, the Council 
issues the negotiating mandate and monitors the 
Commission’s conduct through a specially convened 
committee (Art. 133 committee). Formally it is again the 
Presidency that takes the lead in shadowing the Commission, 
but effectively it may often be the task of Council Secretariat 
staff to monitor the Commission and brief the Council on the 
progress of negotiations. 
In sum, the Council Secretariat does have a distinct, 
albeit limited, role in the EU legislative process. Its 
influence in first pillar matters is dependent on the space 
provided by the Presidency, the tactical alliances which can 
be struck in the context of particular committee, Council or 
European Council meetings and the nature of the legislative 
proposals on which deliberations in the Council are based.  
 
 
The Council Secretariat and EU Treaty Reform: 
Institutionalising Constitutional Politics 
The making of secondary EU legislation takes place in a 
highly institutionalised context. Treaty revision, on the other 
hand, is traditionally seen as rather unstructured, an occasion 
for Member States to confront one another with conflicting 
views about the future development of the integration 
process, and the eventual achievement of agreement on 
treaty reform as a result of intense bargaining. While this 
view of treaty reform is not necessarily wrong, it does only 
provide a partial perspective on this feature of European 
integration. Treaty reform has over the past two decades 
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become a permanent feature of the integration process. It is 
not a rare occasion to revise the treaty, nor even a series of 
events, but a quasi-constant process of constitutionalisation 
where each instance of treaty reform already provides the 
starting point for the next. It is also a process which has 
become increasingly institutionalised, with numerous rules 
being laid down as to the working methods of negotiating 
treaty reform. The latter is a development in which the 
Council Secretariat has had no small part9. 
Arguably the most important aspect of the Council 
Secretariat’s role in IGCs is the provision of legal advice to 
the conference generally, and to the Presidency in particular. 
The Council Secretariat’s legal service is designated at the 
legal service of the conference, thus gaining a privileged 
position, if not a monopoly, with regard to the interpretation 
of new or revised legal articles being discussed. This puts 
the legal staff of the Council Secretariat in a crucial position: 
in the absence of recourse to judicial review of individual 
aspects of the negotiation results, the ‘legal advice’ of the 
Council’s legal service on proposals for draft articles is 
authoritative and can therefore constitute a constraint on the 
possibilities for treaty reform. 
The Council Secretariat’s acquisition of this role as 
the provider of legal advice to the IGC may seem like a 
‘natural’ choice of governments, but matters are probably 
less innocent than that, given that such decisions concerning 
organisational detail are drafted by the Council Secretariat 
itself. The SEA IGC, convened under the influence of 
Delors’ preferences for a negotiation format, was assisted by 
a legal service that included the legal advisers of both 
                                                          
9. For a discussion of the role of the Council Secretariat in the 
process of EU treaty reform, see T.Christiansen,  ‘The Role of 
Supranational Institutions in EU Treaty Reform’,  Journal of European 
Public Policy, Vol.9, No.1 (2001), pp.33-53.  
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Commission and Council Secretariat. By the time of the next 
IGC, the Council Secretariat was made solely responsible for 
legal advice, and this has remained the practice ever since.  
The capacity of the Council Secretariat to intervene 
in the negotiations - if requested - through the provision of 
legal advice stands alongside the more general, and 
substantive, advice the Council Secretariat staff can, and 
does, provide in the negotiations. Such an ability to provide 
advice, and the willingness of the Presidency and the other 
delegations to accept it, is derived from two aspects of the 
Secretariat’s involvement in IGCs. First, the Council 
Secretariat acts as the institutional memory of the 
conference. As the official record-keeper of the conference, 
the Secretariat has easy access to past discussions, 
documents and papers, and can use these, as appropriate, in 
order to influence ongoing negotiations.  
A second, related, point concerns the personal 
experience of the Secretariat staff involved in the IGC 
negotiations. In contrast to the situation in member states, 
where political change and administrative turnover in 
foreign offices tend to change the composition of national 
delegations, the staff in the Council Secretariat unit 
responsible - the ‘Directorate for General Political 
Questions’ - has experienced greater continuity and therefore 
possesses greater personal knowledge of the past IGC 
record. Possessing both the institutional record of, and the 
personal insights into, these intricate and complex matters 
provides Council Secretariat staff with a valuable resource in 
the negotiations.  
However, statements about the potential influence of 
the Council Secretariat have to be qualified on a number of 
counts. First, the opportunities arising for the Secretariat 
staff to influence the negotiations lie predominantly in fine-
tuning the detail of treaty revisions, not in the decisions 
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about the broad outlines of treaty reform. That is one reason 
why the involvement of the Council Secretariat has hardly 
reached the public limelight. Nevertheless, such influence in 
legal detail may have significant political impact and 
deserves to be addressed systematically in research on treaty 
reform. 
A second, more important qualification concerns the 
Secretariat’s relationship with the Presidency which, as 
already noted in the previous section, is a flexible one. Much 
of what has been said above regarding the significance of the 
Council Secretariat’s role in drafting agendas and meetings, 
providing legal and other advice and fine-tuning the detail of 
negotiations crucially depends on the permissiveness of the 
Presidency to provide such opportunities for influence. That 
is why, ultimately, we can only speak of potential influence 
of the Secretariat. Formally, the Secretariat is charged with 
assisting the Presidency, and its influence is realised if and 
when a Presidency does indeed rely on the assistance which 
the Secretariat can offer. 
In the past, this is what Presidencies have usually 
done, though there are also noteworthy exceptions. Until the 
French Presidency in the second half of 2000, any period of 
IGC negotiations had been presided over by one of the 
smaller states, and these generally welcome the assistance 
which the Council Secretariat can provide, given the 
pressure on a country’s resources during the Presidency. On 
that basis, the detail of IGC negotiations have usually been 
managed in ‘Brussels’, i.e. in close co-operation between the 
Permanent Representation of the member state holding the 
Presidency and the staff of the Council Secretariat. This co-
operation routinely stretches to the first draft of the minutes 
of meetings, the conclusions of ministerial and European 
Council meetings or even draft treaties being written in the 
Council Secretariat. Given the significance which is usually 
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attached the role of the Presidency in steering the IGC, this 
‘behind the scenes’ influence of the Council Secretariat is 
remarkable. 
With the adoption of a convention method to 
prepare the 2004 IGC, it might be asked what such additions 
to the treaty reform process hold in store for the Council 
Secretariat. One might assume that a greater degree of 
openness would diminish the role of the Secretariat, and 
therefore also its potential for influence. However, the 
experience of the Fundamental Rights Charter Convention 
seems to suggest otherwise. Here, again, the Council 
Secretariat, providing the Convention’s secretariat and legal 
service turned out to be an influential player in the 
proceedings. Indeed, one could argue that because of the 
higher number of participants, the greater choice of options, 
and the absence of the Presidency as pivotal player, a future 
convention may require more, rather than less, input and 
‘assistance’ from the Council Secretariat. 
With respect to the Convention preparing the 2004 
IGC, the waters are further muddied by the fact that the 
Convention Secretariat is staffed not only by the Council 
Secretariat, but also by the European Commission and the 
European Parliament. The Laeken Presidency Conclusions 
state that the Convention "Praesidium will be assisted by a 
Convention Secretariat, to be provided by the General 
Secretariat of the Council, which may incorporate 
Commission and European Parliament experts." It will be 
interesting to observe the co-operation between the three 
institutions in the running of the convention. So far, the 
drafting I which the Secretariat has assisted, in particular the 
work on the Convention’s budget and the draft constitutional 
treaty published in October 2002, – and the media reaction 
to it – has demonstrated that it is more than merely a 
technical task. 
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The introduction of a convention is widely seen as a 
response to the inefficiencies of the IGC method. Already it 
is obvious that the convention method is rich in institutional 
innovations: for example, it is the first time that national 
MPs and representatives of non-member states participate 
directly in the revision of the treaty. Building on the 
experience, and the precedent,  of the Fundamental Rights 
Convention, it does promise a new departure in the 
institutionalisation of the treaty reform process. At the same 
time, its influence over the subsequent IGC proper will be 
resisted by Member States. In this context, many of the 
institutional choices to be made by the Convention 
Praesidium may turn out to have a much wider, long-lasting 
and ultimately constitutional significance. The Council 
Secretariat, in advising and assisting the Praesidium10, will 
closely involved in the making of these choices, placing it at 
the heart of the EU’s constitutional politics of the next few 
years. 
 
 
                                                          
10 . The website of the Convention states that the “Convention and 
the Praesidium are supported by a Secretariat, which is headed by its 
Secretary-General, Sir John Kerr, former head of the British Diplomatic 
Service. The Secretariat provides assistance to all members of the 
Convention on all aspects of the Convention’s work, in particular by 
preparing discussion documents for the Convention, drafting reflection 
papers, and drawing up syntheses of the debates. It also assists the 
Chairman, the two Vice-Chairmen, and the "Praesidium". In addition, the 
Secretariat is responsible for the logistic and practical arrangements of the 
Convention, and is entrusted with organising the activities of the Forum. 
Its members are drawn primarily from the General Secretariat of the 
Council, but include also experts from the European Commission and 
European Parliament Secretariat, as well as members seconded from 
outside the institutions.” See http://european-convention.eu.int/ 
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Out of the Shadows: The Council Secretariat and 
EU Foreign and Security Policy 
With respect to the first pillar policy-process and the treaty 
reform process, the Council Secretariat’s responsibilities and 
opportunities for influence are rather similar, despite the 
fundamentally different context within which its work takes 
place. With respect to the second pillar of EU policy-
making, however, the Council Secretariat is an entirely 
different animal. While it is true that in CFSP matters the 
staff of the Council Secretariat is formally still ‘advising’ 
and ‘assisting’ the Presidency, and that much of the work 
also here concerns the running of committees (in particular 
the Political Committee and its sub-committees), in practice 
the Council Secretariat has developed into a quasi-executive 
agency making policy in its own right. 
The acquisition of these powers has been gradual, 
but the speed of these changes accelerated in the course of 
the 1990s. Member States, concerned to achieve greater 
coherence in their efforts to co-operate in foreign policy 
matters, sought to improve the institutional underpinnings of 
foreign policy-making. At the same time, they were loath to 
give the Commission additional powers in this field, an 
option theoretically open to them, and one that is still being 
advocated by the Commission itself.  
Member States squared the circle by building up 
foreign policy structures in the Council Secretariat rather 
than relying on those (e.g. the External Relations DG) 
already present in the Commission. The EPC secretariat, 
created in 1986 outside the Community structure, was 
incorporated into the Council Secretariat after the Maastricht 
Treaty. This followed the acknowledgement that foreign 
policy was a responsibility of the Union, and that Union 
institutions needed to be involved in it. The treaty states that 
the Commission is ‘fully associated’ with CFSP, but the 
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centre of gravity in this respect is clearly in the Council of 
Ministers. 
Once this basic decision was taken, institutional 
growth quickly set, fuelled by the wars in Bosnia and 
Kosovo which implied further pressure on the EU to create 
the institutional capability to address foreign crises swiftly 
and concertedly. At the end of the 1990s, this institutional 
architecture was indeed transformed, with Javier Solana 
serving as a decidedly pro-active and high-profile High 
Representative, supported by a Policy Unit (initially 
designated as an ‘Early Warning and Policy Planning Unit’). 
The Council has also appointed a number of special envoys 
to represent the EU in crisis areas such as Afghanistan, the 
Middle East and the African Great Lakes region. 
The most recent and far-reaching development has been the 
creation of military structures in the Council Secretariat. As 
part of establishing a distinct EU defence capability, the 
Council Secretariat has taken over significant parts of the 
WEU secretariat (with Javier Solana also acting as WEU 
Secretary-General), the creation of a new committee 
structure (Political and Security Committee, Military 
Committee) and the establishment of the EU’s own Military 
Staff. The latter is headed by a German general, deputised 
by a British general, acting as the Director-General of the 
EU Military Staff, attached to the private office of Javier 
Solana. In this case, as with most of the appointments in the 
new posts in the area of CFSP and Military Staff have been 
filled with officials seconded from national foreign and 
defence ministries. This increase in the incidence of 
secondment adds a further dimension to the impact these 
developments have had on the Council Secretariat11. 
                                                          
11. See J.Trondal, The 'Parallel Administration' of the European 
Commission National Officials in European Clothes?, ARENA Working 
Papers WP 01/25 (Oslo: ARENA, 2001) for a discussion of secondment in 
the EU. 
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Foreign and defence policy may not primarily be 
about legislation. In most cases, diplomacy aims to regulate 
behaviour through declaratory acts rather than through law. 
In fact, the most frequently-used instruments in CFSP are 
‘CFSP statements’ which are usually issued by the 
Presidency on behalf of the Council. There are about 200 
such statements annually, and clearly the almost daily 
issuing of such statements requires co-ordination across 
national positions as well as an awareness of the EU’s case 
history with respect to particular countries or issues which 
are the object of CFSP statements. The need for ‘advice’ 
from the CFSP case officers in the Council Secretariat does 
have an important role to play, in particular given the 
significance of the actual wording of statements in a 
diplomatic context. 
Diplomatic statements or declarations are issued not 
just from the Presidency, but also from the CFSP machinery 
directly. Above all, the speeches, statements and 
interventions made by Javier Solana himself are part of the 
overall diplomatic output of the European Union, and their 
impact in third countries may be the same, if not greater, 
than the formal Presidency statements. And beyond formal 
statements, the HR and his CFSP staff make policy in their 
dealings with third countries, interpreting and implementing 
common positions agreed upon by the Member States. 
However, while the Council Secretariat may be 
quite close to the process of drafting and issuing statements 
and decisions, it often finds itself rather distant from the 
‘ground’, i.e. the third countries which may be the object of 
the Union’s attention. In this respect, the absence of direct 
access to diplomatic missions is a short-coming which is 
keenly felt in the Council Secretariat. The fact that Member 
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States as well as the Commission have delegations in most 
countries provides them with privileged access to 
information required for effective action, and in this respect 
the Council Secretariat relies on assistance and co-operation 
- not always forthcoming - from these other actors. 
There is a legislative angle to the CFSP. In fact, there is a 
long list of ‘legislative acts’ in the area of CFSP, including 
decisions such as those on the appointments of special EU 
representatives, the sending of monitoring missions, the 
imposition of economic or other sanctions, and the like. The 
CFSP has produced hundreds such acts since 1993, a trend 
facilitated by the possibility of using qualified majority vote 
under the umbrella of previously agreed ‘common strategies’ 
of which there are currently three (relations with Russia, 
Ukraine and the Mediterranean, respectively). 
It may be worth recalling at this stage that the earlier 
assessment of the Council Secretariat’s main influence in 
policy-making in the first pillar and in treaty reform was 
reactive - it could only bring its influence to bear on 
decisions which other actors (in particular the Commission) 
had brought onto the agenda. With respect to the second 
pillar, that feature is also very different, in that proposals or 
recommendations for policy may come from a number of 
actors, including from the High Representative himself - a 
feature of the institutional structure of which Javier Solana 
has made frequent use. 
Much of the history of foreign policy co-ordination 
in the EU has been about the search for a distinct ‘actorness’ 
of the EU in the international sphere. Having largely 
achieved this aim in the trade sphere, it is still lacking a 
similar, distinct identity in the foreign and security field. But 
significant advances have been made in this respect over the 
past decade, and the institutional resources available for 
common EU action in the foreign policy are now much more 
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favourable towards this long-standing goal of European 
integration. If a perception of ‘actorness’ is still lacking, in 
particular with respect to major global crises (vide the image 
of disunity with regard to the stabilisation force for 
Afghanistan resulting from the Laeken summit) it is due to 
the lack of substantive agreement among national 
governments and the absence of political will to achieve 
such agreement rather than the lack of institutional 
resources. What is evident from the status quo of the 
decision-making in the CFSP field is that a perception of EU 
actorness, if and when it does emerge, will centre around the 
work of the High Representative, the Policy Unit and other 
parts of the Council Secretariat.  
The Council Secretariat’s activity in the CFSP area 
is further complicated by two particular issues. First, there is 
the need – indeed the demand of the treaty – to maintain 
coherence between the different pillars of EU policy-
making. This a challenge as the achievement of such 
coherence requires not only the management of linkages 
between first pillar matters (in particular trade, development 
and competition policies) and second pillar matters in the 
foreign policy and security field, but also the close co-
ordination of activities between the European Commission 
and the Council Secretariat, given their shared 
responsibilities in the second pillar12. 
A second, but related, problem concerns the issue of 
transparency, or, as many would argue, the lack of it. The 
Council of Ministers is, together with the other EU 
institutions, formally committed to an agenda about the 
                                                          
12. See C.Tietje, ‘The Concept of Coherence in the Treaty on 
European Union and the Common Foreign and Security Policy’,  
European Foreign Affairs Review , Vol.2, No.2 (1997) pp.211-233, for a 
discussion of the implications of coherence in the making of CSFP.  
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achievement of greater transparency13. However, the Council 
has been repeatedly criticised – by the European Parliament 
and the European Ombudsman as well as by other bodies – 
about its tardiness in implementing more ambitious rules of 
procedure which would facilitate greater transparency14. 
However, just as there are calls for greater transparency, 
there is also the need for greater secrecy as the Council 
Secretariat – its staff and its offices – accumulates 
increasingly sensitive tasks in the security and defence field. 
The Council Secretariat’s lack of procedures, facilities and 
resources has led to problems in the past15 - a situation that 
has driven Javier Solana to actively pursue the development 
of an internal security reform of the Secretariat. This 
involves both the relocation of staff occupied with sensitive 
tasks to a new, secure building outside the main Justus 
Lipsius Building as well as the creation of a classification 
regime for secret EU documents16. This so-called ‘Solana 
Decision’ brought the Council of Ministers in line with the 
current practice in NATO, but it does fly in the face of the 
wider transparency agenda. As such, it proved to be a highly 
controversial measure, leading to protests form civil rights 
groups as well as to legal disputed with the European 
Parliament and with the minority of Member States which 
                                                          
13. See General Secretariat of the Council of the EU Basic Texts on 
Transparency concerning the activities of the Council of the EU (Brussels: 
2000). 
14. See, for example, European Voice (2001f) ‘MEP’s set for Court 
fight over ‘illegal’ Council security rules’, 5 July 2001; and European 
Voice  (1996) ‘Secrecy report - sorry, it’s secret’, 3 October 1996. 
15. See, for example, The Guardian ‘Security lapses in Brussels HQ 
cast doubt on EU defence plans’, 19 February 2000. 
16.  Council of the European Union Decision of the Secretary-
General of the Council/High Representative for the CFSP on measures for 
the protection of information applicable to the General Secretariat of the 
Council (2000/C 239/01) (Brussels). 
 185
opposed this measure17. The conflicting demands of 
transparency and secrecy – and the wider aims of achieving 
greater legitimacy in the eyes of the European citizens on the 
one hand, and greater credibility in the eyes of the defence 
community in Europe and in the US – are an important and 
continuing strain on the institutional integrity of the Council 
Secretariat. 
The Union’s rapidly expanding agenda in the area of 
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) has also presented the 
Council Secretariat with new challenges. In addition to 
problems similar to the second pillar - incorporating new 
staff and administrative cultures, developing and expertise in 
new policy-areas – there has also been a particular 
challenge: the provision in the Amsterdam Treaty giving 
Member State governments the right to initiate legislative 
proposals. Governments seeking to make use of this power 
quickly discovered the need to involve a central authority in 
the drafting of such proposals, given their lack of experience 
in this field. Thus also in this respect the Council Secretariat 
has had to develop new skills in terms of co-ordinating 
different member state positions and assisting individual 
governments to advance their legislative projects. This in 
turn has required co-operation with the Commission’s DG 
for JHA, especially since the Commission is gradually 
taking over sole responsibility for proposing legislation in 
this field.  
 
 
 
                                                          
17.  See the contributions to the Statewatch ‘Secret Europe’ website 
on http://www.statewatch.org/secreteurope.html 
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Conclusion 
The preceding sections have demonstrated the degree to 
which the Council Secretariat has been at the heart of some 
of the key developments in the past decade. The Secretariat 
is playing an increasingly important role in the mediation of 
different member state positions in the Council, and in the 
running of the wider, inter-institutional process in the EU’s 
legislative process. In doing so, it relies on important 
resources to which other actors only limited access: legal 
expertise in the highly complex and technical area of EU 
legislation; the bureaucratic memory of past decisions and 
proposals, which may provide precedents for or against new 
legislative or administrative initiatives; the membership of 
its staff in the Brussels-centred informal policy-networks; 
and the privileged access Secretariat staff possesses vis-à-vis 
the Presidency. 
These factors are complemented by some of the 
structural features of EU governance in which the work of 
the Council Secretariat is embedded. These include the 
permanency of its presence in the many fora of deliberation 
and decision-making within the Council structure, especially 
against the background of a rotating Presidency presenting 
the Council Secretariat staff with new and often 
inexperienced ‘customers’ every semester. Another is the 
privileged position it enjoys in terms of providing 
deliberation ministers or national officials with legal advice. 
After decades of institutional stasis, some of these 
arrangements have come under closer scrutiny, and some 
have actually been changed. For example, the decision at the 
Nice European Council to discontinue the past practice of 
staging European Council meetings in the country holding 
the Presidency and instead have European Council meetings 
at a permanent location in Brussels. It was one of the last-
minute decisions at Nice (and one of which apparently not 
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even all heads of state present were aware) and has widely 
been interpreted as a trade-off to appease Belgium for its 
loss voting power parity vis-à-vis the Netherlands. This 
development is, however, also in the interest of the Council 
Secretariat as it provides further impetus to a shift of 
decision-making from national capitals to the centre. The 
impact of a departure from the practice of the rotating 
Presidency, as it is now being discussed among member 
states, is uncertain. 
As we have seen, the Presidency has provided the 
Council Secretariat with an important opportunity structure, 
creating a constant sequence of national ministers and 
officials who are dependent on the advice from, and 
guidance by, the Council Secretariat. However, there are 
now suggestions that the format of the Presidency will have 
to change and that the operation of the Council be 
streamlined18. It is difficult to see how the Presidency, which 
has occupied such a central place in the history of the EU, 
could be replaced. If the powers of setting the Council’s 
agenda and chairing its meetings were to be handed over to 
the Secretary-General, this would constitute a further boost 
to his (or hers), and the institution’s, importance in the EU’s 
legislative process. However, other solutions which would 
rely on more systematic presence of member state 
representatives - such a permanent Council of European 
ministers - would have the opposite effect. The same is true 
for some of the ideas which are currently being discussed in 
the context of the Future of Europe debate: the further 
reduction in the number of sectoral councils, greater 
transparency in ministerial councils and the 
‘democratisation’ of the treaty reform process. All of these 
                                                          
18.  See for example European Voice (2002) ‘Closing time may be 
near for the presidency merry-go-round’, 24 January 2002 and Financial 
Times ‘Blair and Schröder join forces on EU reform’, 24 February 2002. 
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threaten the privileged position the Council Secretariat has 
occupied in the past. 
The debates on a European Constitution which have 
been conducted within the Convention have special 
relevance here for the future development of the Council 
Secretariat. the old schism between intergovernmental and 
supranational solutions to the dilemmas posed by European 
integration are increasingly expressed in terms of greater 
powers to either the Commission or the Council Secretariat, 
with the latter appearing to gain the upper hand. 
Increasingly, there seems to be consensus among most 
Convention members that the Council Secretariat rather than 
the Commission needs to be strengthened and can constitute 
a more reliable actor at the European level. In the process, 
‘intergovernmentalism’ is being re-defined: rather than 
denoting the interaction among governments, it is 
increasingly understood as executive responsibility residing 
with the Council Secretariat. 
The twist in this context is the evolving discourse 
about the creation of a President of the European Council, 
which would replace the rotating Presidency and give 
greater visibility to the Union, externally and internally. 
Presumably this would be political appointment at the 
highest level – a Javier Solana Plus – and would imply a 
term of office of 2 ½ -5 years. This is an idea pushed, in 
particular, by the French and British governments while it is 
widely seen as an attack on the standing of the Commission 
President, and thus is opposed by the smaller member states 
and the Commission itself.  
While the outcome of this debate is not at all 
conclusive, the impact of such changes on the Council 
Secretariat is an interesting question. At first sight the 
creation of such a new post would seem to imply a further 
strengthening of the Council Secretariat’s grip on power. 
 189
However, at second sight one can see how such institutional 
innovations may work against the influence of the Council. 
Earlier the point was made that the actual input of the 
Secretariat relied to a large extent on the need of the 
Presidency for advice, which in term was the result of the 
short term and frequent change in the Presidency.  
The creation of more permanent structures – the 
European Council President and the appointment of 
individual presidents also for the sectoral councils – would 
thus limit the influence that officials in the Council 
Secretariat would have over the legislative process. In the 
end, the question would be whether those holding a Council 
Presidency of longer duration would become part of the 
Council machinery or remain essentially senior politicians 
drawn from – and essentially remaining within – national 
political cultures and hierarchies. For the time being, this is 
an open question, but one whose resolution clearly will have 
a major impact on the way the Council Secretariat operates 
and relates to other institutions. 
But short of such drastic changes, the EU is already 
in the midst of important reforms occurring at a number of 
levels: the debate about the nature of European governance 
in the wake of the Commission’s White Paper on the subject, 
the reform of the Council’s working methods which had 
been prepared by Javier Solana for the Seville European 
Council19 and the wider agenda of the Convention preparing 
the IGC 2004. Each of these is bound to have a major impact 
on the role of the Council Secretariat. This statement, in 
itself, is testimony to the heightened role the Secretariat has 
gained in the course of European integration during the 
                                                          
19. This review of the Council operating procedures is based on the 
earlier Trumpf-Piris report: Secretary-General of the Council of the EU 
(1999) Operation of the Council with an Enlarged Union in Prospect 
(Brussels: 1999). 
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1990s and early 2000s. But rather than being merely the 
object of reform, the Council Secretariat is a subject in the 
ongoing reform negotiations. The Council of Secretariat has 
moved out of the shadows to become a recognized player in 
the EU’s legislative and treaty reform processes. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Intra-institutional politics and 
inter-institutional relations in 
the EU 
As part of the ‘post-Nice process’, a variety of issues 
relating to the institutional and constitutional evolution of 
the European Union now receive greater attention. One of 
these is the question of coherence in European governance. 
‘Coherent governance’, however, is not a very well-defined 
concept, and different interpretations are possible. Briefly 
mapping the field, a number of distinctions may be offered 
here: first, we can conceive of ‘coherence’ in terms of the 
systemic outputs, i.e. the way in which the substance of 
different policies generated by the EU form part of a 
coherent whole. Alternatively, we can regard ‘coherence’ in 
terms of the institutional process by which policies are 
made, i.e. in terms of the degree to which institution(s) 
operate a coherent and well-co-ordinated process of 
deliberation and decision-making. This article focuses on 
the latter which in the following is termed ‘institutional 
coherence’. 
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 A further distinction can be made in terms of the 
pursuit of inter-level, inter-institutional and intra-
institutional coherence. In other words, the issue of 
coherence can be examined along these three dimensions: 
first, at the inter-institutional level, in particular in terms of 
the coherence (or lack of coherence) of Commission and 
Council Secretariat activities. Second, in terms of the 
relations between actors on different levels, in particular 
with regard to the congruity (or otherwise) of national 
policies and of EU policies. Finally, a further issue of 
coherence arises in terms of the internal, or intra-
institutional, coherence of either of these institutions, given 
the possibility for internal fragmentation (see figure 1 
below): 
Dimension Focus 
Inter-level coherence Relations between EU-level institutions and national authorities 
Inter-institutional 
coherence Relations among EU institutions 
Intra-institutional 
coherence Internal politics of EU institutions 
Figure 1 Dimensions of ‘institutional coherence’ in European 
governance 
 
This article concentrates on the operation of the European 
Commission and the General Secretariat of the Council of 
Ministers20 along two of the dimensions mentioned above – 
                                                          
20 The Secretariat of the Council of Ministers is not formally 
recognised as an ‘institution’ of the EU in the Treaty. Instead, it is 
categorised as an organ of the Council, which is the actual institution. 
Nevertheless, the Secretariat is here regarded as an institution for the 
purposes of analysis since it does possess the required criteria. 
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the relations between the two institutions as well as the 
issue of the internal politics of the EU institutions. 
 In recent years, the EU has faced contradictory 
demands concerning its inter-institutional relations. On the 
one hand, there is concern about the ‘coherence’ or 
‘consistency’ of policy-making across the various levels 
and pillars of European governance. On the other hand, 
there are demands for greater clarity about the allocation of 
competence and the separation of powers in the European 
Union. Given the frequency of treaty reform since the early 
1990s – since when the EU has been involved in either the 
preparation, negotiation or ratification of a treaty change at 
any one point – the tensions between these conflicting 
demands has gradually increased. In the course of the 
current debate about the ‘Future of Europe’, meant to 
prepare the ground for the next Intergovernmental 
Conference (IGC) in 2004, the arguments for inter-
institutional coherence, on the one hand, and the allocation 
of tasks in line with the principle of separation of powers 
are meeting head-on.  
 The issue of coherence has become particularly 
pertinent as the Secretariat of the Council of Ministers has 
acquired substantial executive functions in the area of EU 
foreign and security policy (CFSP) and, to a lesser extent, in 
the area of police and justice affairs. The emergence of an 
executive role of the Council Secretariat means that the 
potential for fragmentation across EU institutions has 
increased, given the European Commission’s 
responsibilities for managing the Union’s external relations 
and aspects of internal security (Smith, 1994). In addition, 
there is increasing demand for greater co-operation 
between, and co-ordination of, the foreign policies of the 
member states and the management of the EU’s external 
relations by Commission and Council Secretariat. 
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 On the other side, among those looking for a clearer 
separation of powers (rather than institutional coherence), a 
similar, two-dimensional distinction is possible (as 
indicated in the figure below): on the one hand, there is the 
issue of the allocation of competences between the national 
and the European level – the question of 
Kompetenzabgrenzung between member states and the EU 
which, mainly due to German demands, constitutes one of 
the items on the agenda of the 2004 IGC (and therefore of 
the Future of Europe debate leading up to it). On the other 
hand, there is the issue of allocating tasks more clearly to 
the European institutions, in particular to the Commission 
and the Council Secretariat. Should this allocation of tasks 
be governed by the constitutional principle of the separation 
of powers, as demanded by some (Sozialdemokratische 
Partei Deutschlands, 2001; see also Leanarts, 1991), then 
the Commission would move further into the role of the EU 
executive – even turning into the ‘European government’ as 
envisaged by its supporters (Prodi, 2001). The Council of 
Ministers and its Secretariat, on the other hand, would share 
the legislative function with the European Parliament – 
becoming more explicitly the EU legislature’s ‘second 
chamber – while ceasing to chare the executive function 
with the Commission, as is the case now. 
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Coherence of 
European  
governance 
Separation of powers in 
European governance 
Inter-level 
relations 
Close co-operation 
between national 
authorities and EU 
institutions 
Clear delineation 
between the competences 
of the national and the 
EU level 
Inter-
institutional 
relations 
Close co-operation 
between Commission 
and Council Secretariat 
Clear delineation of tasks 
between Commission and 
Council Secretariat 
Figure 2 ‘Coherence’ and ‘Separation of Powers’ in the EU’s 
constitutional debate 
 
 In the following, we will therefore first examine the 
recent evolution in the internal politics of two of the EU’s 
main institutions, identifying instances of internal 
fragmentation and institutional coherence in the European 
Commission and the Council Secretariat. Subsequently, the 
focus will shift to the management of inter-institutional 
relations, with particular emphasis on the relations between 
Commission and Council Secretariat across a number of 
areas with shared responsibilities. Such a partial study of 
the incidence of coherence (or otherwise) in European 
governance, looking in turn at the internal politics and the 
inter-institutional relations of the EU institutions, does not 
constitute a comprehensive analysis of coherence in the 
Euro-polity. However, it does provide the basis for some 
tentative explanations concerning the presence or absence 
of coherence of European governance, which are discussed 
in the concluding section. 
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Internal politics of the EU institutions: Towards 
intra-institutional coherence? 
Commission, Council or Parliament are frequently regarded 
unitary actors. However, all three institutions – and indeed 
other important EU institutions such as the European Court 
of Justice or the European Central Bank – often face 
numerous internal divisions. Depending on their 
seriousness, such divisions may translate into fragmented 
policy-making and thus undermine the coherence of EU 
governance. 
 In examining the internal fragmentation of EU 
institutions, one may distinguish between generic issues 
applying to all EU institutions and those which are specific 
to individual institutions. Looking first at the more generic 
issues, two particular challenges to intra-institutional 
coherence can be identified. 
 First, all EU institutions have over the past decade 
been faced with substantial growth, and – in terms of 
achieving institutional coherence – size matters. More 
significantly, institutional growth has been rapid and 
diverse. On the one hand, the last enlargement has brought 
in three new member states, with the resultant expansion of 
staff numbers, budgetary revenues and disbursements and 
area coverage of EU policies. It has also brought in two 
additional official languages, implying an exponential rise 
in the number of language pairs for translation. Growth has 
also been a result of the expansion of competences acquired 
by the EU, resulting in the need for expertise in entirely 
new areas of activity such as military co-operation or justice 
and home affairs.  
 Second, partially as a result of these trends of 
institutional growth and policy-expansion, the specialisation 
of individual policy-makers has increased. The relevance of 
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policy-networks and policy-communities in the EU is 
widely recognised. Policy-networks, -communities and -
coalitions imply close links and even shared values among 
policy-makers from different institutional backgrounds with 
a common concern for a specific policy. From an 
institutional point of view, he presence of effective policy-
networks may, on occasion, advance a particular 
institution’s aims, but in the long run is bound to be 
detrimental to institutional coherence. As policy-making 
becomes more specialised – as it has in the EU during the 
1990s, a growing number of such networks makes it more 
difficult for individual institutions to manage internal co-
ordination and achieve coherence. 
 
Internal tension in the European Commission 
The problem of tensions within the European Commission 
is not a recent phenomena. Indeed, the very nature of the 
Commission – a single institution encompassing large and 
relatively self-contained Directorate-Generals (DGs) – is a 
recipe for fragmentation and internal tension. Due to the 
internal divisions running through it, authors have for some 
time regarded it as a ‘multi-organisation’ in which the 
policy-making of different administrative units creates 
different bureaucratic and organisational logics (Cram, 
1994). 
 Beyond these sectoral or ‘horizontal’ divisions 
within the Commission, there has also been a ‘vertical’ 
divide between the Commission’s political level – the 
college of Commissioners – and the administrative services 
(Christiansen, 1997). Organisational logics are distinct with 
respect to either of these levels. The college of 
Commissioners operates on the basis of non-hierarchical 
principles: despite the presence of President and two Vice-
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Presidents, Commissioners have equal votes in the college, 
Commission decisions are, if necessary, voted upon, and 
require a simple majority of Commissioners. Once the 
college has taken a decision, all members of the 
Commission are bound by it, and are expected to support a 
common position, irrespective of their individual vote. The 
Commission President, notwithstanding recent changes to 
his (or her) position (see below), is a primus inter pares 
who is also bound by these rules. The Commission’s 
administrative services in the DGs, on the other hand, are 
organised in a hierarchical manner, along the lines of public 
administration in domestic systems.   
 Against this background, the Commission –
arguably more than any other EU institution – has had to 
face the consequences of the above-mentioned trends of 
institutional growth, policy-expansion and policy-
complexity in the European Union. Growing size of, and 
greater specialisation within, the Commission have 
amplified the internal divisions, and both the fall of the 
Santer Commission and the first years of the Prodi 
Commission have demonstrated the weakness of internal 
cohesion. 
 The crisis preceding the forced resignation of the 
Santer Commission arose from allegations of 
mismanagement and fraud which were investigated by a 
Committee of Independent Experts appointed by the 
European Parliament. In its first report, the Committee 
identified the lack of communication between the 
Commission’s political and administrative levels as a key 
problem:  
9.3.4. The Committee found that the relationship 
between Commissioners and directors-general did 
not always meet this standard. The separation 
between the political responsibility of 
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Commissioners (for policy decisions) and the 
administrative responsibility of the director-general 
and the services (for the implementation of policy) 
should not be stretched too far. As stated above, it 
is the opinion of the Committee that 
Commissioners must continuously seek to be 
informed about the acts and omissions of the 
directorates-general for which they bear 
responsibility and that directors-general must keep 
their Commissioners informed of all major 
decisions they take or become aware of. This 
requirement of mutual information implies that 
Commissioners must be held to know what is going 
on in their services, at least at the level of the 
Director-General, and should bear responsibility for 
it. (Committee of Independent Experts, 1999). 
 
 Apparently, the collective responsibility of the 
college of Commissioners did not translate into the 
individual responsibility of Commissioners for the 
administrative services within their respective portfolios. 
Indeed, in a number of cases, Commissioners in the Santer 
Commission shared responsibility for a particular DG. Such 
structural flaws, together with the failings of individual 
Commissioners to exercise proper oversight over ‘their’ 
services, contributed to a state of affairs which the 
Committee described as “… a growing reluctance among 
the members of the hierarchy to acknowledge their 
responsibility. It is becoming difficult to find anyone who 
has even the slightest sense of responsibility.” (Committee 
of Independent Experts, 1999, para 9.4.25).  
 This diagnosis is testimony to the fundamental 
problems the Commission has had in seeking to achieve 
internal coherence, not only with regard to the horizontal 
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co-ordination of its policies, but also, and in particular, in 
terms of the vertical relationship between political and 
administrative spheres within the Commission. It also 
implied that the cabinets, who in addition to advising 
Commissioners have played a central role in co-ordinating 
policies horizontally and managing communications 
between Commissioners and their respective DGs 
(Donnelly and Ritchie, 1994), were overburdened with 
these tasks.  
 Against the background of the Committee’s 
criticisms, a number of reforms of the Commission since 
the appointment of Romano Prodi have sought to remedy 
these problems. In particular, three aspects of Commission 
reform can be examined in terms of their impact on 
institutional coherence: certain organisational changes made 
by President Prodi soon after his appointment, the ongoing 
reforms supervised by Reform Commissioner Neil 
Kinnock, and the changes to the office of the President 
resulting from the Nice Treaty. 
 First, one of Prodi’s responses to the ‘vertical 
divide’ between the political and the administrative level of 
the Commission was a seemingly simple one: 
Commissioners had to ‘move in’ with their services. Under 
Santer (as under Delors) Commissioners shared a single 
building, together with their cabinets and with key parts of 
the Secretariat-General. This arrangement facilitated the 
exchange between the various cabinets in the co-ordination 
of policies generally, and in preparation of the weekly 
meetings of the college, the chefs de cabinet and the deputy 
chefs. 
 However, the flipside of this coin was the physical 
distance between Commissioners and cabinets on the one 
hand, and the DGs on the other. Commissioners residing 
collectively in the Berlaymont, and later the Breydel, while 
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services have been scattered across a multitude of different 
locations across Brussels, added – practically as well as 
symbolically – to the perceived distance between political 
and administrative spheres of the Commission. The move of 
Commissioners from the Breydel headquarters to the 
separate buildings of their respective DGs – which required 
first a streamlining of services to ensure that each 
Commissioner actually has a DG – has demonstrated the 
dilemma faced by an institution that has to manage tension 
along two dimensions: just as communication between 
Commissioners and services may have become easier 
(though, for reasons discussed below, it may not), 
communication among Commissioners and, crucially, 
among cabinets has become significantly more difficult. 
Previously, meetings and informal conversations among 
members of different cabinets were a common part of the 
daily work routine as they could easily be arranged along 
the same corridor. Now, given that offices may be at the 
other end of town, meetings need to be organised in 
advance, and informal conversations have all but ceased. 
Consequently, horizontal co-ordination – not only crucial in 
terms of the coherence of the Commission’s policy-output, 
but also essential for ensuring the functioning of collegiate 
responsibility – has become more difficult and time-
consuming. As it happens, the relocation of Commissioners 
coincided with another Prodi reform: the reduction of 
cabinet staff to a maximum of six per Commissioner. 
Together, these changes add substantially to the workload 
of cabinets and limit the time and care spent on policy-co-
ordination. In other words, what has been gained in terms of 
coherence on one side (‘vertically’) has been paid for on the 
other side ( ‘horizontally’). 
 A second response to deal with the underlying 
problems leading to the crisis of the Santer Commission has 
been the launch of a broader, more long-term set of internal 
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reforms overseen by Vice-President Kinnock. This reform 
programme is underpinned by an administrative structure 
comprising the new office of a Reform Commission, a 
‘Group of Reform Commissioners’ and a Reform Task 
Force.  Its aims are, broadly speaking, to make the 
Commission more accountable, effective and cost-efficient 
(Metcalfe, 2000). The emphasis here is on matching staff 
resources with policy-priorities, revising financial 
regulations in order to make decisions about payments more 
accountable and transparent (Spence, 2000). In the course 
of the process, administrative reform in the Commission has 
become a major ‘policy’ in itself, and for the duration of the 
‘transition period’ – the time it takes to agree the details of 
these reforms, to re-locate staff and change internal 
procedures – it has a distinctly de-stabilising effect on 
Commission staff. 
 The Kinnock reforms aim squarely at the issue of 
‘responsibility’ (Cini, 2001) identified as a major failing by 
the independent experts. However, the reforms do not 
properly address the problem of the vertical divide between 
Commissioners and DGs. The reform programme addresses 
essentially the functioning of the administrative services 
rather the relationship between college and administrative 
service, or the functioning of the college itself. The reforms 
therefore do not address key issues which contributed to the 
downfall of the Santer Commission. Indeed, to some of the 
staff in the administrative services they are regarded as an 
exercise in ‘scape-goating’ – identifying the administration 
rather than the Commissioners as a liability for responsible 
and accountable public service in Europe. 
The Commissions staff unions have been critical of the 
Kinnock proposals, and the threat of a strike among 
Commission officials in the spring of 2001 could only be 
averted through a renegotiation of the reform package. 
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Generally, relations between Commissioners and senior 
officials have, if not worsened, certainly not improved, with 
frequent reports of friction between Commissioners or 
Commission President, on one side, and Director-Generals, 
on the other (European Voice, 2001a; 2001b; 2003c). 
 The preliminary observation at this point is 
therefore that over the past few years the internal tensions in 
the Commission have increased, both with regard to vertical 
and to horizontal relations. Consequently, we have to 
conclude that the foundations for the achievement of 
enhanced internal coherence have worsened in the 
aftermath of the Santer Crisis. At the very least, the reforms 
launched by Prodi and Kinnock have not substantially 
improved the opportunities for more coherent internal 
management of the Commission. Part of the problem here is 
that, as yet, no final point for these reforms can be 
identified – which is why it is impossible to make 
judgements about the ultimate effects (and ‘success’) of 
these reforms. However, this state of affairs in itself – the 
nature of  limited internal reform turning into a seemingly 
permanent programme of reform (and turmoil and 
uncertainty) – is destabilising for staff morale and 
detracting from internal coherence. 
 There has been, however, a third level of  reform 
which deserves a few comments. At the level of treaty 
change, Commission reform had been on the agenda at 
Amsterdam and again at Nice. At Nice, a number of 
changes to the operation of the Commission were agreed. 
The more important ones here concern the role of the 
President whose hands are to be strengthened vis-à-vis the 
individual Commissioners: in what was essentially a 
recognition of the state of affairs which Prodi and the 
European Parliament had already established de facto at the 
time of the current Commission’s investiture, according to 
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the new Art. 217 the President will be able to request that a 
Commissioner shall resign. He (or she) will also have the 
explicit power to decide on the internal organisation of the 
Commission and to allocate the responsibilities of the 
Commissioners, both at the time of appointment and 
throughout the term of the Commission.  
 This is not a departure from the principle of 
collegiality – indeed the college has to approve the 
President’s request for the resignation of Commissioners 
(Art.217 (4)) – but it should strengthen the President’s hand 
vis-à-vis individual Commissioners and in principle allows 
him to run the Commission with greater authority. The 
anticipated effect of these changes is a Commission in 
which individual Commissioners take greater responsibility 
for their respective portfolios and, should they fail to 
perform, can be sanctioned by the President. Thus it can be 
seen as a further attempt to improve the accountability of 
Commissioners and their responsibility in overseeing their 
services. However, at the time of writing the Nice Treaty is 
not yet ratified – indeed it has been rejected in the Irish 
Referendum in June 2001 – and even if and when it is, it 
may take time for these treaty changes to translate into 
actual authority for the President. For the time being, the 
difference in the leadership qualities of Delors, on the one 
hand, and of both Santer and Prodi, on the other, serves as a 
stark reminder that the formal rules are only part of the 
story, and that the authority of the office of President also 
depends on the individual occupying it (Drake, 1995; 
Peterson, 1999; 2000). 
 
Internal tension in the Council Secretariat 
The creation of the pillar structure at Maastricht, removing 
the Commission’s monopoly of initiative in important new 
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areas of EU competence empowered the Council 
Secretariat. Before and after Maastricht, a determined 
campaign by some member states as well as by the Council 
Secretariat has been to keep the institutionalisation of the 
policy out of the hands of the Commission. It has been a 
campaign that has had demonstrable success in that initially 
the EPC Secretariat was created outside the existing 
institutional structure rather than being added to the 
portfolio to the Commission. At Maastricht, this Secretariat 
was then merged with the Council Secretariat and at 
Amsterdam the new post of High Representative was 
created as an adjunct to the responsibilities of the Council 
Secretariat Secretary-General. Beyond the appointment of 
Javier Solana to this new post, an expansion of staff at the 
Council Secretariat was the result of these changes. A 
number of EU Special Envoys to certain crisis-regions 
across the globe are also based at the Council Secretariat. In 
a nutshell, the Council Secretariat has become the core of 
the evolving EU foreign policy machinery. 
 While it is possible at each instance of institutional 
reform to point to a certain alignment of member state 
positions on the institutionalisation of CFSP, it is 
nevertheless striking how this process has enhanced the 
institutional standing of the Council Secretariat. Assuming 
that Council Secretariat officials are involved in matters of 
treaty reform with inter alia  the interests of their own 
institution at heart – an assumption not too radical to make 
in the light of what we know from the study of bureaucratic 
politics and institutional analysis – then it is difficult  not to 
conclude that their objective has been achieved. 
 In addition to the changes resulting from the 
Amsterdam Treaty, there have been further developments 
since the decisions at the 1999 Cologne and Helsinki 
summits to provide the Union with a military dimension in 
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order to acquire a capability for humanitarian intervention – 
the so-called Petersberg tasks. The organisational changes 
required to build up this capability include the creation of 
new working groups in the Council – the Political and 
Security Committee and the EU Military Committee – and 
the building up a military staff component in the Council 
Secretariat. This process has been aided by the appointment 
of Solana as Secretary-General of the Western European 
Union and the partial transfer of tasks and resources from 
that organisation to the Council Secretariat (Presidency, 
2000). This whole process is continuing and somewhat 
open-ended since the precise nature of arrangements with 
NATO – the sharing of assets and the degree of autonomy 
of EU structures from NATO – remain subject to debate.  
 The Council Secretariat’s acquisition of an 
operational role in the management of CFSP and ESDP is a 
major departure from its traditional role in the EU’s 
institutional architecture. What needs to be emphasised at 
this point is that what at one level appears to have been a 
jewel in the crown of policy-making which has been 
snatched away from the Commission, has also proved to be 
a somewhat poisoned chalice. Gaining a role in CFSP has 
created certain tensions for the Council Secretariat which 
are not too unfamiliar for students of the European 
Commission. Indeed, the occurrence of certain institutional 
pathologies are strikingly similar to problems which we 
have seen in the Commission for some time, and on a larger 
scale. The problems arising from these changes can be 
summarised as follows: greater internal fragmentation, 
greater scarcity of resources, the co-existence of conflicting 
institutional cultures and logics within the same institution 
and greater demands on internal co-ordination.  
 As is implicit from what has been said so far, the 
‘old’ Council Secretariat has drawn its political influence 
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from working behind the scenes, away from the public 
limelight. Much of its influence is being executed 
indirectly, via the Presidency. Its organisational culture has 
been based on legalism – a comprehensive knowledge of 
EU law at all levels, its application and interpretation. The 
arrival of the a substantial number of officials working on 
foreign policy matters has added a contrasting dimension to 
this. Activity, if not activism, in foreign policy has 
heightened the profile of the Council Secretariat and turned 
the public spotlight on some of its activities – an unfamiliar 
and perhaps unwelcome development for the established 
bureaucracy. The increasing presence of military officers 
seconded from national forces to make up the new EU 
military staff has added further unease, given that it brings 
with it very different working methods.  
 The internal tensions resultant from these changes 
affect key aspects of the institutional life of the Council 
Secretariat. These can be summarised in the following 
table: 
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 ‘Old’ Secretariat ‘New’ Secretariat 
Administrative 
function 
Legislative 
drafting/ 
policy-advice 
Operational/ 
policy-management 
Substance of 
policy-making 
‘Bureaucratic’:  
Activities concern 
legalistic and 
rule-centred 
environment 
‘Diplomatic’:  
Activities concern 
relatively unregulated 
environment 
Degree of 
hierarchy in 
internal 
proceedings 
Relatively low:  
important role of 
informal networks 
Relatively high:  
need for formal 
command structures 
Degree of 
transparency of 
internal 
proceedings 
Traditionally low, 
but need to 
demonstrate 
greater openness 
Very low, with 
preparations to achieve 
greater secrecy 
Figure 3 Administrative differences between ‘old’ and ‘new’ 
parts of the Council Secretariat 
 
 Given the Council Secretariat has, in the past, been 
a comparatively small and cohesive institution, the presence 
of such different organisational logics within the institution 
are bound to create tensions. To name just one example: 
what may have been regarded, at first sight, as a minor 
disagreement about the degree of administrative 
transparency has already erupted as a major issue about the 
EU’s military effort to maintain secure communications 
which will ultimately require the move of military units to a 
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designated security HQ of the EU. This development 
constitutes a first physical split for the institution and 
further demonstrates the fragmentation – or incomplete 
integration – of the institution. This echoes the experience 
of the Commission where the location of DGs in separate 
buildings has reinforced intra-institutional boundaries. At 
the same time, the issue has raised the opposite concerns 
elsewhere, i.e. that the Council Secretariat is moving 
backwards on the issue of transparency, despite assurances 
to the contrary (General Secretariat, 2000). 
 Indeed, what we seem to be witnessing in the case 
of the Council Secretariat is the construction of two 
separate administrative structures which are only very 
loosely integrated at the top. One, the ‘new’ Council 
Secretariat, headed by the SG/HR for CFSP and consisting 
of the policy unit and the military staff. This part of the 
Council Secretariat is in rapid expansion and, given the 
uncertainties about the future direction of EU foreign, 
security and defence policy, in search of a clear role and 
identity. The ‘old’ Council Secretariat, on the other hand, 
headed by the Deputy Secretary-General and consists of the 
legal services and the sectoral DGs assisting the Presidency, 
the various Councils and working groups in first pillar 
matters. There is a fairly clear dividing line between the 
two, even though they are formally part of the same 
administration. 
 The way in which new structures have been added 
in a gradual manner, and the speed with which the 
institution has expanded, have raised demands for a reform 
which would deal with current or anticipated problems and 
inefficiencies of the Council’s structure and working 
practices. As a matter of fact these problems result not only 
from the addition of new responsibilities to the Council 
Secretariat but also from the fact that up till now – much 
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like the Commission – the Council Secretariat had never 
undergone any fundamental reform since its inception. And 
enlargement is bound to add further pressures and tensions 
to the Council’s and the Council Secretariat’s procedures 
and working practices. Arguably, enlargement will be a 
greater challenge to the Council than to any other of the EU 
institutions. 
 A first attempt to encourage the reform of the 
Council was made with the drafting of the so-called 
Trumpf-Piris report in 1999 which acknowledges some of 
the problems of the Council’s working methods, and the 
need for reform (Secretary-General, 1999). It did follow in 
the footsteps of demands for reform made outside the 
institution, but most of its recommendations were not 
followed up by positive responses from member states. A 
second report on Council reform will be presented by 
Secretary-General Solana to the European Council in the 
course of 2001. Beyond that, even more far-reaching 
reforms are set to be proposed at the Laeken European 
Council in December 2001 and implemented during the 
Spanish Presidency in 2002. 
 
Intra-institutional Politics: Towards coherent 
governance? 
Both Commission and Council face serious issues of 
internal fragmentation. In the case of the Commission, 
internal fragmentation, a long-standing and latent problem 
has more recently become an issue of institutional survival. 
Lack of coherence was a major contributing factor in the 
Santer Commission’s crisis. Subsequent and ongoing 
reforms have demonstrated the continuing challenge of 
achieving greater coherence in the Commission. The thrust 
of a range of internal reforms has been to achieve greater 
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vertical integration of Commission activities, and while in 
due course these changes may take effect in terms of a more 
coherent institution, they have served, in the short run, to 
amplify the problem.  
 The Council Secretariat, on the other hand, is in a 
period of fundamental change, facing a series of serious 
challenges and far-reaching reforms. Having made effective 
use of its resources in the past, the Council Secretariat has 
seen a period of rapid expansion and increasing political 
weight as a result. Yet, expansion has come at a price as 
internal fragmentation has increased: The Council 
Secretariat needs to find ways of reconciling differing 
organisational cultures and adapting to the spotlight of 
wider public attention that comes with the involvement in 
the politically highly sensitive areas of CFSP and ESDP. 
 The challenges and problems which the Council 
Secretariat has been facing are not altogether different from 
those which have confronted the Commission for some 
time. Institutional growth and expansion of competences, 
generally considered as signs of success, have left their 
mark on the institution and now threaten the maintenance of 
coherence, just as they have done in the Commission. The 
Council Secretariat may not have gone through the kind of 
crisis the Commission has been facing since 1999, but it is 
nevertheless in the grips of a need to reform and adapt to 
the changing circumstances of the time which is quite as 
serious as that of the Commission. 
 Over the 1990s, as the pace of European integration 
has picked up, the size of the Union increased and its range 
of policies expanded, the individual institutions have 
suffered the consequences of success. The have become 
larger and more unwieldy, while at the same time being 
assigned an ever-increasing range of tasks and 
responsibilities. As a consequence, greater efforts have been 
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necessary to achieve or maintain internal coherence, and in 
a number of instances, most notably in the case of the 
European Commission, the ‘cost’ of reduced coherence 
have become evident. However, as noted at the outset, the 
question of coherent governance of the EU implies the 
examination of inter-institutional relations as well as 
internal politics, before broader conclusions can be drawn. 
 
 
Relations between Commission and Council 
Secretariat:  Inter-institutional Coherence? 
The analysis of the Commission-Council Secretariat 
relationship will proceed in two steps: first, this section will 
identify a number of contexts in which the two institutions 
‘meet’ and which therefore provide arenas for interaction 
and thereby opportunities for the generation of either 
conflict or co-operation. Second, the following section will 
seek to conceptualise this relationship in a way that moves 
our understanding beyond traditional images of institutional 
rivalry, on the one hand, and the need for fusion in order to 
achieve coherence, on the other. 
 
Commission-Council Secretariat relations in the EU 
policy-process 
Commission and Council Secretariat co-operate on a 
regular basis in routine first pillar policy-making in the 
preparation and in the running of the multitude of meetings 
within the Council structure. Both institutions share an 
interest in the smooth running of the policy-process. An 
effective management of EU affairs can be expected to 
heighten the problem-solving capacity of the European 
level and will therefore assist the legitimacy of EU 
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institutions. Both Commission and Council Secretariat have 
therefore to gain from the successful passage of a directive, 
and to lose from a failure. Clearly not any agreement in the 
Council is a guarantee of effective policy-making, but on 
the whole a perception of purposeful action is seen to be 
more desirable than one of inactivity.  
 In terms of the substance of policy-proposals, 
Commission and Council Secretariat may, on occasion, 
have different interests, but beyond such differences both 
will be united by a common desire to influence dynamics in 
the meetings of Council working groups to achieve the 
required consensus or majority, as the case may be. The 
search for compromise in the Council requires efforts at 
mediation which involve both the Commission and the 
Council Secretariat in different ways (Fouilleux et al., 
2001). Both institutions have representatives in any meeting 
held under Council’s rules of procedure, i.e. from working 
groups and COREPER to the actual meetings of ministers. 
This, in itself, establishes a continuous presence by 
Commission officials in the proceedings of the Council and 
thereby ensures regular interaction with Council Secretariat 
staff.  
 The significance of Commission intervention at the 
decision-making stage in the policy-process, when 
proposals have formally left the Commission and are under 
deliberation in Council and EP, depends both on the policy-
area and the decision-making mechanism applicable in any 
given case. If decisions are to be taken by the co-decision 
procedure, for example, the Commission’s leverage is 
enhanced by its opportunity to change the proposal in the 
course of proceedings, in order to adapt it to the emergence 
of a relevant majority in the Council. Further co-operation 
between Commission and Council Secretariat (as well as 
Presidency and EP) is called for in the context of the 
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trialogue – the getting together of the three institutions in 
order to search for compromise once legislation has reached 
the conciliation phase of the co-decision procedure. In 
different circumstances, however, the role of the 
Commission may well be less prominent.  
 In any case, the influence the Commission can have 
in this process in mediating among different member state 
positions can be amplified by the Council Secretariat. The 
Council Secretariat, as explained above, has a role to play 
here too, but this will depend to a large extent on the 
readiness of the Presidency to rely on the services and the 
advice of the Council Secretariat. Different Presidencies 
handle this relationship in different ways. It is common 
practice, however, for a working relationship between all 
three parties – Presidency, Commission and Council 
Secretariat – to develop. This working relationship can 
extend to the detailed preparation of meetings, including the 
exchange of information regarding different national 
positions in the items on the agenda and the agreement on 
strategies to overcome opposition from one or the other 
member state delegation. 
 As far as the Commission and Council Secretariat 
are concerned, the co-operation in such situations can 
amount to a division of labour. The Commission’s 
contribution is of a more high profile nature, in a more 
formal search for common ground among member states, 
with the result of the exercise finding its way into the 
formal proposal. Once proposals have reached the Council, 
the Commission’s room for manoeuvre is limited, in part 
because it will feel bound by the fact that it has adopted its 
own institutional position on the issue in the College of 
Commissioners. At this stage, Council Secretariat staff (as 
well as the Presidency) can take over mediation efforts in a 
more subtle way, via the running of the meetings, the 
 215
drafting of minutes and position papers and the provision of 
legal advice. To the extent to which such strategies have 
been agreed in advance of any meeting, such a ‘division of 
labour’ between Commission and Council Secretariat can 
be highly effective, playing to the strengths of either 
institution. 
 As is evident, such a modus operandi relies only to 
a very minimal degree on formal rules of procedure or on 
treaty provisions. It really depends on personal contacts 
between the relevant DGs in Commission and Council 
Secretariat, and the extent to which the personalities on 
either side are willing and able to work together. As has 
been argued, institutional dynamics point towards co-
operation between officials from Commission and Council 
Secretariat, and only in rare cases will there be formal 
impediments to such co-operation. Yet whether it actually 
takes place depends on the specific actors concerned, and it 
is here that individual officials can make a difference for the 
better as well as for the worse. In any case, the emphasis in 
co-operation between Commission and Council Secretariat 
in routine policy-process is on informal contacts and, in a 
wider sense, the presence of networks which across the 
institutional divide. 
 
Commission-Council Secretariat relations in the treaty 
reform process 
The EU’s treaty reform process is, of course, distinct from 
routine, day-to-day policy-making. Yet there are also a 
number of parallels, and these extent to the co-operation 
between the Commission, Council Secretariat and 
Presidency in the search for consensus among member state 
positions in the course of an IGC. In fact, to mention these 
three institutions in the context of Intergovernmental 
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Conference may strike some as odd, but the participation of 
supranational institutions in the process of treaty reform is 
becoming increasingly recognised, thanks also to 
contributions from the actual participants of the proceedings 
(Dinan, 2000; Petite, 2000; Gray and Stubb, forthcoming; 
Christiansen and Jørgensen, 1998, Christiansen, 
forthcoming). 
 Obviously, the Commission is in a fundamentally 
altered position here, given that it does not posses the 
monopoly of initiative familiar from routine policy-making. 
Indeed, its participation in meetings is less of a right and 
more of an established practice. The Council Secretariat, on 
the other hand, is more empowered here than it may be in 
normal decision-making given that its staff, the legal 
service in particular, will be closely familiar with the 
subject-matter under discussion. Subject to the arrangement 
found with the Presidency, the Council Secretariat – acting 
as the Conference Secretariat – may have an influential role 
in the drafting of the treaty (Gray and Stubb, forthcoming; 
Stubb, forthcoming). 
 There is a greater propensity for issues under 
discussion in an IGC have a divisive effect on Commission-
Council Secretariat relations, since treaty changes are more 
likely to affect the institutional balance than is secondary 
legislation. This may constitute a barrier to co-operation, 
but there are still areas which constitute positive-sum games 
for the two institutions, and where both can benefit from the 
exchange of information about the likelihood of agreement 
being reached among member states, and the way of 
securing such agreement.  
 In terms of the dynamics of IGCs, two aspects 
deserve specific emphasis here. First, the legal nature of the 
subject matter places legal advice in an even more 
privileged position than it is in routine policy-making. 
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Given the rotation among countries holing the Presidency, 
the permanency of Council Secretariat’s and, to a lesser 
extent, the Commission’s legal service occupy a rather 
central position in the proceedings of an IGC. Second, the 
Commission, while not possessing a vote – and therefore no 
veto over any final outcome of the IGC – is nevertheless 
more than just a by-stander. The Commission’s opinion 
may have an integrative effect on the course of negotiations. 
In particular, the Presidency, in searching for a compromise 
solution, will be keen to have the Commission on side. A 
Presidency proposal which has support from the 
Commission has much greater legitimacy, and therefore 
chances of success, than one opposed by the Commission. 
 Despite the very different legal and political 
circumstances, the dynamic here may therefore be quite 
similar to the need for extensive, informal co-operation 
between Presidency, Commission and Council Secretariat 
in routine policy-making. The main proviso here is that 
there may be more numerous exceptions to this in areas 
where the institutional interests of Commission and Council 
Secretariat come into conflict. One such example – the 
institutionalisation of CFSP – will be discussed in some 
little more detail below. 
 
Commission-Council Secretariat relations in the 
management of the EU’s external relations 
Whereas in the legislative process and in the treaty reform 
process Commission and Council Secretariat have distinct 
responsibilities which lend themselves to informal co-
operation and division of labour arrangements, the situation 
is rather different in the area of external relations. Here 
there is much greater propensity for the two institutions to 
develop a competitive approach given the overlap in 
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responsibilities. Given the institutional dynamics involved 
in this area, the achievement of the treaty demand for 
coherence or consistency has been a growing concern 
(Tietje, 1997; Duke, 1999). 
 The treaty provides no clear division of 
competences, and there has been much debate about the 
potential for rivalry and conflict between the two 
institutions – and the two individuals Patten and Solana. 
Certainly, sensitivities and suspicions are detectable on 
either side. In the Council Secretariat, there is a perception 
that the Commission is defensive about the potential loss of 
influence in external relations as the Council Secretariat 
builds up its institutional strength in this respect. On the 
Commission’s side, concerns are being voiced about the 
dangers of duplication of tasks and expertise.  
 The appointment of Javier Solana and the changes 
in the Council Secretariat that went with it have ruffled 
feathers in the Council Secretariat as well as in the 
Commission. However, with Nice having come and gone 
without any change in these arrangements, there is a greater 
sense of acceptance of the new structures and a willingness 
to make them work. Initial inter-institutional friction related 
to the financing of second pillar operations (Monar, 1997) 
has been largely overcome A co-operative attitude has 
prevailed, both at the political level where Patten and 
Solana have struck up a collegial working relationship and 
at the official level where consultation and co-operation 
across institutional boundaries have become common place. 
 Commission-Council Secretariat co-operation here 
has some formal aspects, but is on the whole a question of 
informal contacts and ad hoc meetings to address specific 
issues. Given the nature of the policy-area, co-operation is 
to a large extent problem-driven rather than process-driven, 
and has been most intensive in cases of crisis, in particular 
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with respect to EU policy on the Balkans. Either side 
professes a recognition of mutual dependence between the 
institutions. The Commission acknowledges the formal 
competence of the Council Secretariat and the value of its 
direct links to member states’ foreign ministries – a link that 
is strengthened by a significant proportion of Council 
Secretariat officials in the CFSP area being seconded 
national diplomats. The Commission also appears to have 
given in to demands from the Council Secretariat that 
Solana be accorded a senior status in the diplomatic 
protocol to Commissioner Patten, even though this breaks 
with past inter-service convention. 
 The Council Secretariat, on the other hand, clearly 
accepts the expertise and the resources the Commission 
possesses in the area of external relations. The Commission 
controls the key instruments in gathering information and 
projecting EU influence abroad. The network of delegations 
across the globe, providing the Commission with direct 
information about the conditions ‘on the ground’ (Bruter, 
1999), are recognised as valuable by the Council Secretariat 
– as is the Commission’s co-operation in making these 
available to the Council Secretariat: an agreement among 
member states, Council Secretariat and Commission to 
provide the policy unit with regular despatches from 
national embassies or, in the case of the Commission, from 
its delegations has been fully implemented only by the 
Commission. Most importantly, there is a recognition in the 
Council Secretariat of its own lack of resources and the 
Commission’s relative wealth of them. Effective external 
action of the Union requires the use of instruments such as 
financial or technical assistance, humanitarian aid or 
economic sanctions. The Commission’s role in the control 
of access to them leading to a recognition in the Council 
Secretariat of the desirability of involving the Commission 
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in the planning and deliberation of integrated crisis 
management responses in the future. 
 Among the formal mechanisms of Commission-
Council Secretariat co-operation is the membership of 
representatives from both institutions in the new Troika 
created by the Amsterdam Treaty (and consisting also of a 
Presidency representative). The Troika is an instrument of 
external representation – it constitutes a joint EU delegation 
abroad and is, as such, not intended to provide a forum for 
internal EU co-operation. However, the Troika provides a 
regular meeting place for Commission and Council 
Secretariat and the preparation of any foreign mission of the 
Troika will therefore offer opportunities for policy-co-
ordination between the two institutions. 
 The second and arguably more regular and 
comprehensive contact between Commission and Council 
Secretariat is the Commission’s membership in Council 
working groups, much like in the first pillar. This includes 
the Political Committee and the new Political and Security 
Committee. The Commission’s role here will be different 
from that in the first pillar working groups as it lacks the 
monopoly of initiative in this context. But the 
Commission’s participation still allows for a two-way 
exchange of information and as such assists the co-
operation between the two institutions. 
 A sensitive point here seems to have been the 
extension of such co-operation into the military field, in 
particular given the opposition of some member states to 
the inclusion of the Commission in meetings of the new EU 
military committee. Due to these tensions the Commission 
has not, as yet, participated in any meeting of EUMC, but 
reserves the right to do so if its participation is called for in 
view of the specific agenda for individual meeting. But this 
seems more of a transitional problem as new military 
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structures are being created. The is no doubt on either side 
that, in the medium to long-term, the Commission’s 
participation in EU crisis response planning and execution 
is not only desirable but essential.  
Finally, among the formal mechanisms of co-operation is 
the mutual secondment of officials between the 
Commission’s DG EX and the Council’s Policy Unit. This 
affects only a limited number of officials and is regarded 
with some scepticism on either side, given the detrimental 
impact that secondment has on the prospects for promotion 
and compliance with staff regulation. Nevertheless, to the 
extent to which it is practised, secondment adds a valuable 
channel of communication between the two institutions. 
 This observation leads to the recognition of 
informal networks stretching across the institutional divide. 
Just as in other policy-areas, these are prominent in this 
area, and officials working in a specific area of CFSP will 
be in daily telephone and email contact with their 
counterparts in the Commission. Again, such contacts may 
be suffering from personality clashes, or may benefit from 
the chemistry among the officials involved. In general, 
though, they tend to be an effective means in order to 
overcome the formal distance between the institutions, and 
the difficult hierarchies involved on either side. 
 By way of conclusion of this section we can say 
that the Commission-Council Secretariat relationship has 
not been without its problems, something that was to be 
expected given the radical nature of the changes introduced 
by Amsterdam. On the whole, though, institutions and 
officials have coped comparatively well with the tensions 
built into the formal arrangements. A number of channels of 
communication have been opened up on different levels, 
and they provide scope for the regular exchange of 
information and the preparation of joint action in case of 
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crisis. But personal contacts rather than formal structures 
constitute the backbone of inter-institutional co-operation, 
particularly when Commission and Council Secretariat are 
required to react collectively and quickly to a crisis 
situation in the area of foreign policy field.  
 Given the joint responsibility for external relations, 
it is remarkable how limited the formal structures of policy-
co-ordination between Commission and Council Secretariat 
are, placing high demands on officials to network 
informally. At the highest level, this state of affairs has 
turned the spotlight on the personal relationship between 
Patten and Solana, highlighting the fact that the two are 
very different personalities who have, despite differences in 
political beliefs and in style, developed a professional and 
collegial relationship that has not witnessed any major crisis 
that would have been spelt ‘incoherent EU foreign policy’ 
to the outside world. In any case, on the basis of the 
information discussed here, the relationship between Patten 
and Solana, as the one between the Commission and the 
Council Secretariat in general, does not seem so 
problematic as to warrant the call from Commission 
President Prodi to merge the two jobs by creating a 
Commission Vice-President for foreign affairs – a demand 
that not only seems utopian in the context of current 
institutional developments, but may also have been counter-
productive in provoking a hostile reaction from the Council 
Secretariat (as well as from the member states). 
 
Inter-institutional relations: Towards coherent 
governance? 
So far, the story has been one of a structurally determined 
tension between two institutions which appears to be 
managed rather well, even be overcome, by the policy-
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makers involved. Officials have been developing collegial 
approaches to their work in areas of shared responsibility, 
and have overcome the lack of formal structures of co-
operation and co-ordination by resorting to informal 
networking. 
 Three concepts can be advanced in support of this 
argument that an ideational structure facilitates the co-
operation between Commission and Council Secretariat: 
first, a shared allegiance as civil servants of the EU, second, 
a experience in working within a common bureaucratic 
culture and, third, the presence of an epistemic community 
of experts in the highly technical matter of EU policy-
making. 
 The recognition of a shared allegiance concerns 
officials working in Brussels and who identify primarily as 
EU officials rather than Commission or Council Secretariat 
officials. In other words, a common allegiance to the EU 
may override more narrow institutional identities which 
may separate them. The development of such a shared 
allegiance among Commission and Council Secretariat staff 
lies in their participation in very similar daily routines and 
the presence of technical and legal expertise on important 
matters of EU politics in both institutions. The former, 
which could be termed the ‘Brusselsisation’ of EU officials, 
refers to the common experience of working in a multi-
lingual, multi-national working environment of an 
international institutions. At a more practical level, EU 
officials have to pass similar entry requirements and 
concours and are governed by the same staff regulations. 
 This observation is complemented by the 
recognition of the expertise which Commission and Council 
Secretariat staff share with respect to certain EU matters. 
This may not apply to all areas of their work, but to some 
which – it can be argued – are important to their 
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institutional self-perception (and therefore to the generation 
of a sense of shared allegiance). This concerns, in 
particular, the knowledge of the rules and procedures of EU 
decision-making, ranging from policy-making in the first 
pillar to the modalities of treaty reform in IGCs. In contrast 
to the substantive issues involved – on which the expertise 
of other actors in the policy-process is probably greater – 
both Commission and Council Secretariat, as managers of 
the process, have unrivalled knowledge not only of the 
technicalities of the process of decision-making, but also of 
the origins of the rules governing this process. 
 Finally, the effects of this ‘Brusselsisation’ – the 
exposure to similar work (and life) routines – and 
membership in such an epistemic community contribute to 
the generation of an allegiance to the EU and to the 
integration project. This shared allegiance, and the resultant 
promotion of a common identity as EU officials – in 
opposition to the partisan identities of Commission and 
Council Secretariat – provide the environment in which co-
operative action by individual actors can take place.  
 
 
Conclusion 
The present examination of internal politics in, and relations 
between, Commission and Council Secretariat has 
demonstrated the nature of this challenge over the past 
decade. Given that this is only a partial perspective on the 
wider issue of coherence in the Euro-polity, only limited 
conclusions can be drawn at this stage. The internal 
fragmentation of the Commission and the Council 
Secretariat (as that of other EU institutions) has increased. 
The growing size and expanded range of policy-
competences has affected both to some extent. And while in 
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the Commission the divide between administrative services 
and political level has been a problem which ongoing 
reforms seek to bridge, the Council Secretariat is having to 
accommodate the internal changes resulting from the rapid 
expansion of its competences in the field of foreign and 
security policy. The problem here is, as it has been in the 
Commission, that the differing organisational logics of 
distinct administrative tasks constitute internal tensions 
which then require substantive institutional resources for 
their resolution. 
 With respect to inter-institutional relations, the 
situation is different. Against a background of reduced 
expectations, Commission and Council Secretariat manage 
to co-operate well in areas of shared responsibility. Policy-
makers here rely on informal relations  in order to help 
bridge the inter-institutional divide, and such relations build 
on the broad foundation of a shared allegiance to the 
European project and a more specific commitment to, and 
knowledge of, the details of specific policies under 
deliberation. Consequently, the coherence of inter-
institutional relations – at least among these two institutions 
– is not as elusive as the formal institutional arrangement 
would lead us to expect.  
 One tentative conclusion which can be drawn from 
these observations concerns the EU’s response to 
institutional size: the analysis here suggests that, while there 
are increasing problems to internal coherence, inter-
institutional relations have been managed comparatively 
well, at least without the fundamental threats to coherence 
that may have been expected. If this is the case on a broader 
scale, the EU may be better served by more, but smaller, 
more self-contained and therefore more coherent 
institutions rather than the established institutions suffering 
from increasing problems with internal fragmentation. This 
 226
means in practice that, for example, a splitting off of the 
CFSP/ESDP aspects of the Council Secretariat and the 
creation of a separate foreign policy body of the EU may be 
a legitimate consideration. As far as the Commission is 
concerned, these observations about institutional coherence 
may engender similar thoughts about the issue of 
‘unbundling’ of Commission tasks – devolving specific 
tasks currently carried out by the Commission to separate 
institutions.  
 Given the manifold divisions, cleavages and 
tensions running through the Euro-polity and its 
institutions, there are clearly persistent and inherent 
challenges to the achievement of coherent governance. At 
the same time, however, there are established and strong, 
albeit informal, links which help to bridge such divisions 
and which assist the search for coherence. The ongoing 
institutional reforms which have been discussed above will 
have an impact on this situation, both in terms of their 
intended effects and their unintended side-effects. More 
significantly, the prospect of enlargement, implying the 
further growth of institutions and their internal diversity, 
will further muddy these waters. Even in the limited 
perspective offered here, the coherence of governance is a 
complex issue exhibiting unexpected features. A more 
comprehensive perspective will need to conduct more 
detailed research along both dimensions examined here, as 
well as the coherence of governance across different levels 
of the Euro-polity. 
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Chapter 7  
 
The Role of Supranational 
Institutions in EU Treaty 
Reform 
Why should we look at the role of supranational actors in 
EU treaty reform? Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs) 
are ‘intergovernmental’ and, we are told, their negotiations 
are “dominated by national governments” (Moravcsik and 
Nicolaïdes 1999: 69). Such a conclusion of the analysis of 
an IGC (in this case leading to the Amsterdam Treaty) is 
not surprising, given a liberal intergovernmentalist 
approach which sets out to “[explain] the national 
preferences of the major governments,… the bargaining 
outcomes among them … and the choice of institutional 
solutions to implement them” (ibid.: 59). With national 
governments holding centre stage, other actors – including 
supranational institutions – end up with marginal roles in 
the bargaining game In fact, according to this kind of 
analysis, “supranational intervention … is generally late, 
redundant [and] futile” (Moravcsik 1999: 269-270) 
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 This chapter, developing further ideas first 
presented in Christiansen (2002), takes issue with such a 
state-centric perspective, not (necessarily) because of a 
disagreement with its conclusions but because of the limited 
assumptions on which it is based. There are a number of 
reasons as to why these assumptions ought to be questioned, 
but two are of particular relevance for the present purposes 
here. 
 First, the focus on ‘bargaining’ is, in itself, a limited 
perspective which implicitly privileges the role of national 
governments in a particular phase of treaty reform. Treaty 
reform and IGCs are not only about ‘bargaining’ but are 
part of wider process comprising issue-framing, agenda-
setting, decision-making (at different political and 
administrative levels) as well as implementation and 
legitimation. Indeed, treaty reform is a continuous process 
in which IGCs and their final ‘summits’ are particular 
phases. They may have special significance, but they are, 
nevertheless, inextricably linked to the developments 
preceding and superseding them. Arguments about the 
relative weight of different actors in the ‘bargaining’ about 
substantive issues in IGCs neglects this procedural nature of 
treaty reform and thereby skews the role of other actors in 
them.  
 Second, IGCs are not an open arena for national 
governments to debate, and to bargain over, their respective 
positions and ‘institutional choices’. Instead, the IGC is an 
institution in its own right, in which the behaviour of 
participants – national as well as supranational – is subject 
to numerous rules (Sverdrup 2000; 2002; Christiansen, 
Falkner and Jørgensen 2002). There is one well-known and 
basic rule – the requirement of unanimity among member 
states in order to reach a decision about treaty change. 
However, there is a host of detailed rules governing the 
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negotiations, comprising secondary legislation, soft law and 
administrative practice as well as acquired cultural and 
social norms. In fact, the pursuit of treaty reform via the 
IGC format is an important, albeit implicit, institutional 
‘choice’, deserving analysis of the role of the various actors 
in its design. 
 These arguments justify a call for a more 
comprehensive approach to the study of treaty reform, one 
that moves beyond the limitations of traditional approaches 
by including the study of the role of supranational actors 
alongside that of state actors (Beach 2005). In the 
following, this chapter sets out to identify the key 
supranational actors in EU treaty reform and examines their 
involvement in the process. By way of conclusion, the 
chapter assesses the respective contributions made by 
supranational institutions to the process of the treaty reform 
and reflects on this development in the light of the 
experience of the negotiation of the Constitutional Treaty. 
 
 
Supranational agency in the process of EU treaty 
reform  
This understanding of IGCs follows the broader theoretical 
approach developed elsewhere in this special issue 
(Christiansen, Falkner and Jørgensen 2002). It is an 
approach which seeks to move the analysis of treaty reform 
beyond the limitations of traditional, state-centric 
approaches. This has both structural and actional 
implications for the conduct of empirical research, but for 
the purposes of this chapter the adoption of such a 
perspective is relevant and useful because it expands 
research avenues into the role of agency – that of 
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supranational actors – in treaty reform which are foreclosed 
by more traditional approaches. 
 However, it needs to be emphasised that the 
argument here is not one about the dominance of either 
national governments or supranational institutions in IGC 
negotiations. Such conclusions are a matter for empirical 
research in each and every case. The argument here is a 
conceptual one – that a systematic analysis of the role of 
supranational institutions in EU treaty reform is not only 
promising, but indeed necessary. Only the inclusion of 
supranational actors in the analysis of treaty reform will 
ensure that the subject is treated in the encompassing 
manner it deserves. 
 In the following, the chapter will look in more 
detail at the role of the various supranational institutions in 
EU treaty reform. These include the European Commission 
and the European Parliament, both of which have 
representatives participating in the actual negotiations and 
who also have a role to play in the wider process of treaty 
reform. Perhaps less obviously, this includes also the 
General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers which, by 
providing the Conference Secretariat of the IGC is 
intimately involved with the running of the IGC. 
 This inclusion of the Council Secretariat may 
require further justification since it is not usually regarded 
as either ‘supranational’ or as an ‘institution’. It is the case 
that the Council Secretariat is not one of the official 
institutions of the EU (as listed in Art.5 TEU), but merely 
an organ of the Council of Ministers. However, in spite of 
the official nomenclature, the Council Secretariat is clearly 
an institution, possessing a formal structure with a set of 
internal rules and administrative practices which regulate 
the work of a body of permanent staff. And it is located at 
the European level, possessing a degree of institutional 
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autonomy and therefore ought to be regarded as 
supranational. The matter is confused by the fact that the 
Council of Ministers is generally regarded as an 
intergovernmental institution, which appears to pitch it 
against the supranational institutions of the Union. But the 
status of the Council is not as clear-cut (Christiansen 
2005a), and indeed the entire Council, not only its 
Secretariat, can be seen as supranational (Wessels 1991). 
 As will be argued in more detail below, the role of 
the Council Secretariat in IGC negotiations is closely linked 
to that of the Presidency. The Presidency, of course, carries 
special responsibility for the IGC, and could also be 
conceptualised as a supranational institution, even though it 
is carried out by a national government. The duality of the 
Presidency as being both supranational and national is 
exemplified by the different roles played by member state 
officials or ministers, on the one hand, and Presidency 
representatives, on the other. However, while the 
Presidency is a mixed category, it will not be covered here 
in depth, except where its participation in IGC negotiations 
has  a bearing on the role of the Council Secretariat. 
 Other supranational institutions also have a role in 
the wider process of treaty reform, though not in the more 
narrowly defined proceedings of the IGC. The European 
Court of Justice has contributed substantially to the reform 
of the treaties. Indeed, one of the most important 
developments with regard to the treaty base of the European 
Union – the constitutionalisation of the treaties – is due to 
the case law of the ECJ rather than the decisions taken in 
the IGC format (Christiansen and Jørgensen 1999). As 
Greve and Jørgensen (2002) have also argued, treaty reform 
– and the involvement of the ECJ in this process – can be 
seen as constitutional politics. Given that the role of the 
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ECJ has been covered by these previous contributions to the 
literature, it is not part of the focus of this article. 
 Finally, bodies such as the Court of Auditors, the 
Committee of the Regions (CoR), the Economic and Social 
Committee (ESC) have a potential role in treaty reform, 
formally by issuing institutional opinions and discussion 
papers on the IGC or particular issues under negotiation. 
The impact of these is doubtful, however, and in any case is 
different from the direct and personal involvement of 
representatives of the institutions mentioned above. Both 
CoR and ESC, as well as the EU’s Ombudsman, were 
invited by the Convention drawing up the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights to present their views, but that was 
neither a particular privilege (since numerous other bodies 
and NGOs enjoyed a similar status) nor was it formally part 
of treaty reform (given that the Charter is not part of the EU 
treaties). 
 For present purposes, therefore, the article 
concentrates on the contribution to treaty reform made by 
the European Commission, the EP and the Council 
Secretariat – the three institutions which need to be 
regarded as the three main supranational actors in the 
process of treaty reform negotiations. However, before 
examining the role of these actors in the treaty reform 
process, we need to maintain an awareness of the way in 
which the negotiations are structured.  Of particular 
significance here is the “negotiation environment” and the 
fact that these are “multi-level negotiations” (Stubb 1998: 
15-17). 
 IGC negotiations are conducted on three different 
levels – official, ministerial and summit meetings (Forster 
1999; Stubb 1998). The dynamics of negotiations on each 
of these levels are very different. On the political level, the 
IGC involves meetings of foreign ministers (monthly on the 
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fringes of the General Affairs Council) and summit 
meetings of heads of state or government (at regular or 
special European Council). The foreign ministers’ meeting 
is widely regarded as the least effective level, given the lack 
of time (usually one hour per month) to make headway in 
the negotiations (Gray and Stubb, 2002) Actual political 
guidance and decisive positioning is therefore left to the 
European Council were final bargains are struck and where 
the threat of national vetoes – and of the ultimate failure of 
the talks – weighs heavily. 
 On the level of officials – the ‘personal 
representatives of the heads government’ and their advisers 
- meetings occurs on a weekly basis, but contact via email, 
phone, etc. is practically continuous. Ideas, proposals, drafts 
and reactions to drafts are constantly being exchanged, and 
the intensity of these contacts at the official level may rival 
or even eclipse the intensity of contact of officials within 
their institutional bureaucracy (interviews with conference 
participants). Here negotiations move slowly but 
methodically through the issues under debate, 
(re)constructing  the agenda, shaping decisions, indeed, 
where possible, taking decisions in advance of formal 
approval from the political level. The political level is left 
to debate, and  to decide on, those issues which could not be 
resolved by officials. While it is the ‘grand bargaining’ at 
the political level that is the traditional focus of 
intergovernmentalist theorising, the more mundane, slow-
moving and technical negotiation at the official level clearly 
has its place in treaty reform. As we will see below, the 
difference in the length of these processes – on the official 
level months or years, on political level hours or days – has 
a major impact on the nature of negotiation, and on the role 
of supranational actors in them. Clearly, EU treaty reform 
negotiations are more complex, and involve more levels, 
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than the liberal intergovernmentalist image of ‘two-level’ 
games suggests (Falkner 2002b). 
 The analytical challenge in this respect is not in 
deciding whether the political or the official level of 
negotiations is more important, but rather to establish the 
relationship between them. At the extreme, the link is a 
weak one, whether that is because months of negotiations 
are “thrown out of the window” by the European Council 
(Gray and Stubb 2002: 8) or because the political leaders 
don’t even discuss the issues on which agreement has been 
reached previously. But apart from such extremes, there are 
linkages between political and official levels, which means 
that a comprehensive analysis of treaty reform will need to 
look at both levels in order to come to a balanced 
judgement. Thus, in looking at  the role of supranational 
actors in these negotiations, we will also focus on both the 
official and the political level. Clearly, the opportunities for, 
and implications of, their involvement are very different on 
either of these two levels of negotiation. 
 
 
The European Commission and EU Treaty Reform 
The significance of the European Commission in the EU’s 
policy-process is well-documented and widely recognised. 
Even though the Commission does not actually decide on 
secondary legislation, its monopoly of initiative provides it 
with immense power to influence the shape of policies and 
thereby have an impact on the process of integration which 
is independent of that of the member states (Christiansen 
2005b). Additional resources, including its relations with 
interest groups and its role in monitoring compliance with 
EU legislation also help to put the European Commission at 
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‘the heart of the European Union’ (see, for example, the 
contributions to Nugent 2000 or Holman 2000). 
 With respect to treaty reform, the picture is 
different. Clearly, the Commission is not as central here as 
it is in the day-to-day policy-process. There is also much 
less empirical study of its involvement in IGC negotiations, 
though recent research has sought to redress the traditional 
paucity of research on Commission activity in the context 
of IGCs, albeit with contrasting results. Whereas liberal 
intergovernmentalists, as mentioned at the outset, have 
dismissed the potential of ‘informal entrepreneurship’ by 
successive Commission Presidents (Moravcsik 1999, 
Moravcsik and Nicolaides 1999), other authors have painted 
a more nuanced picture and argued that the Commission’s 
presence in the negotiations makes a difference (Ross 1995, 
Dinan 2000; Christiansen and Jørgensen 1998; Gray 2001; 
Budden 2002; Falkner 2002a). 
 This section, in seeking to conceptualise the role of 
the Commission in treaty reform, will look at the following 
aspects: first, the Commission’s internal management of 
participating in the negotiations; second, its potential for 
influence the course of the negotiations, distinguishing 
between the different dynamics of the political and official 
levels; and third, the Commission’s role in the legitimation 
of the result of any treaty change. The key arguments made 
here are that the importance of the Commission as an actor 
in treaty reform is derived from a) its potential for advocacy 
and leadership before and during the negotiations; b) the 
involvement of Commissioners and officials in the social 
process which long-term negotiations constitute; and c) its 
part in the legitimation of treaty reform and of its outcomes. 
These are arguments which relate to, but go beyond, the 
recognition of the Commission’s role in the liberal 
intergovernmentalist design (Moravcsik 1999: 276). 
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 The internal distribution of responsibility has 
changed from one IGC to another, but the Commission 
President takes overall charge of its negotiating stance. In 
the past two cases, the IGC was part of the portfolio of a 
specific Commissioner (Oreja during the 1996-97 IGC, 
Barnier during the 2000 IGC). In addition to the cabinets of 
the President and the Commissioner responsible who 
shadow the negotiations, a designated IGC Task Force 
conducted the day-to-day management of Commission 
input in the negotiations, overseen by a steering group 
composed of senior officials. It was on this level that the 
bulk of internal Commission decision-making took place in 
these IGCs (Gray 2001). 
 However, much depends on the Commission 
President, in order to raise the public profile of the 
Commission’s input, to ensure coherent and consistent 
negotiating line and to translate the role played by the 
Commission on the official level into results on the political 
level, especially in the context of the European Council. In 
the aftermath of the crisis of the Santer Commission and the 
dismissive treatment of the Prodi Commission – and of 
Prodi himself – by the French Presidency at Nice, the role 
played by Jacques Delors in IGCs is easily forgotten. 
Unlike Santer and Prodi, Delors had a close and personal 
involvement in all aspects of the IGC negotiations, and 
managed an enormous amount of detail with the help of a 
small group of close advisors (Ross 1995). In that respect, 
he provided considerably greater personal input and top-
down supervision of Commission involvement in treaty 
reform than either of his successors. 
 As a result, the experience of the IGCs leading to 
the Single European Act (SEA) and to Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) demonstrated not only how the 
Commission under the resourceful and effective leadership 
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of Delors was able to influence the substantive proceedings 
in these negotiations, but indeed how instrumental the 
Commission was on these occasions in order to launch the 
process of treaty reform and bring it to a successful 
conclusion (Dinan 2000). The “entrepreneurial success” of 
the Commission on the occasion of the SEA negotiations is 
acknowledged even by intergovernmentalists, though here it 
is considered to be a rare and exceptional event that was not 
repeated on previous or subsequent occasions (Moravcsik 
1999: 299). 
 In fact, the Commission’s very ‘right’ to participate 
in IGC was established in the 1985 IGC. It is still not a 
formal provision of the treaty, but an established practice. 
This is due not only to the precedent which Delors 
established in the course of the SEA negotiations, but also 
to the acknowledgement among member states that the 
Commission presence during the IGC is desirable, whatever 
disagreements individual member states have with the 
position taken by the Commission on specific issues. But 
with the waning of the Commission’s political weight from 
the end of the Delors tenure onwards, its ambition – and its 
influence – in IGCs has also been reduced. Neither the 
Santer nor the Prodi Commission entered their respective 
IGCs with anything like the clout of the first Delors 
Commission. This is, on the one hand, a reflection of the 
significance of the personal qualities of the Commission 
President – and Delors leadership credentials are well 
documented. Indeed, Delors was particularly strong and 
influential in European Councils – the arena in which the 
Commission possesses the least formal powers. But it is 
also a reflection  of the interaction between the general 
climate of the integration process, and the Commission’s 
place therein, and the fortunes of the IGC negotiations.  
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 It is evident here that the Commission’s 
participation in IGCs has served two distinct functions: on 
the one hand, to provide substantive inputs to the debate, in 
order to further the communitarisation of the integration 
project. On the other hand, the Commission can make a 
useful contribution to the negotiations in its traditional role 
as a mediator and broker among different member state 
positions. This twin role, however, creates a tension in the 
perception – and self-perception – of the Commission’s role 
in the IGC process, as these two roles are, to a significant 
extent, mutually exclusive: while a well-defined and 
officially sanctioned position may strengthen the hand of 
the Commission’s negotiators in terms of pursuing that 
specific agenda, it weakens their ability to mediate between 
different and possibly opposing positions among the 
member states. Mediation is an important part of the 
Commission’s role in the IGC, but the explicit statement of 
aims contained in its Opinion makes it difficult to appear as 
a mediator, and even more so to act as an ‘honest broker’ 
(Gray and Stubb 2002). 
This tension between contrasting roles in the negotiations 
goes some way to explain the difficulty of assessing the 
Commission’s influence in the IGC: if ‘successful’ as a 
mediator, the Commission may well fail to pursue its own 
agenda, and vice versa. Statements about the ‘success’ or 
otherwise of mediation efforts are therefore very difficult to 
make, given also that this role can be taken over more 
effectively by other players, in particular the Council 
Secretariat and the Presidency. 
 If at all, mediation by the Commission is more 
likely to occur on the official level, where a number of other 
factors come into play. On this level, for example, the role 
of expertise and of ideas have a greater influence on the 
course of the negotiations.   Though this depends on the 
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subject-matter under discussion, the dominant negotiating 
style and the individuals involved in the negotiations. If 
conditions are right, the possession of specialist knowledge 
about the issues being debated and the provision of good 
ideas about possible solutions may be divorced from the 
power associated with member states. 
 Admittedly, this may not be the typical situation in 
the IGC, but nevertheless certain aspects of IGC have these 
characteristics. It is in such situations that the quality of 
arguments rather than the political power associated with 
those making them carries the day. These are instances in 
which representatives of smaller member states or 
Commission officials can be especially effective – if indeed 
they possess the expert knowledge and/or powerful ideas 
which can sway the meeting (Gray 2001). 
 The significance of expertise is evident from the 
way in which the Commission’s input in IGCs has been 
more effective when substantive issues are being debated in 
areas in which the Commission possesses prior policy-
making experience. Thus, with regard to the SEA IGC and 
the IGCs on EPU (at least in areas of social policy; see 
Falkner 2002a) and EMU the Commission played an 
influential role in the negotiations, whereas – unable to 
match the expertise available to member state 
representatives – the Commission was less effective in areas 
like foreign and defence policy or internal security which 
were subject of the more recent IGCs (Dinan 2000). 
Numerous other factors play into the degree of the 
Commission’s effectiveness in the negotiations, but there is 
a clear correlation between the tendency of the more recent 
IGCs to be more occupied with institutional rather than 
economic issues, and the decline of the Commission’s 
influence in them. 
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 One area which deserves special attention here is 
that of negotiations about the powers of the Commission 
itself. Here, one would expect the Commission to be in a 
particularly strong position, assuming the Commission 
representatives’ privileged knowledge of the operation of 
the institution, and a coherent view of its role in the EU’s 
institutional architecture.  
 But in actual fact, there has been no such coherence 
of view as the Commission has long been divided on the 
question of its own size, and, as a result, it has been rather 
ineffective with respect to the issue of reform of the 
Commission which had been debated in both the 1996-7 
IGC and the 2000 IGC. With respect to the question of the 
number of Commissioners, which was a central issue in the 
IGC and such a divisive point at Nice itself, the 
Commission did not manage to forcefully push a unified 
position. In fact, in the Commission’s own Opinion on the 
IGC, two ‘scenarios’ rather than a single position were 
being presented (Commission 2000). This reflected a 
college of Commissioners deeply divided on this issue, and 
an institution that was unable to reconcile these differences 
and generate an effective negotiating position. As a result, 
in this area of central significance for its own operation, the 
Commission was hamstrung and reduced to reacting to the 
flow of the debate among member state representatives. 
This apparent trend in the declining ability of the 
Commission to effectively influence EU treaty reform has 
continued, if not deepened, with the more recent European 
Convention on the Future of Europe and the subsequent 
IGC negotiating the Constitutional Treaty. Most observers 
of this process have concluded that the Commission here 
did not manage to organise itself well for the new dynamics 
of this process. There was both a lack of internal coherence 
that prevented the development of a strong institutional 
position on many of the issues under discussion, as well as a 
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lack of of political skill when it came to communicate any 
Commission position (see for example Christiansen and 
Gray 2004; Kassim and Dimitrakopoulos 2005; Norman 
2003) 
 However, a different issue that can be considered 
concerns the Commission’s role in the advocacy for treaty 
reform. Before substance is being discussed, the case for 
holding an IGC has to be made in the first place. In 1985 
advocacy for an IGC was primarily provided by the 
Commission and based on the ‘need’ to re-launch Europe in 
the face of growing competition from Japan and the US in 
the global economy. The 1991 EMU IGC followed in a 
similar mould, and again was based on sustained pressure 
from Delors to complete the single market with a single 
currency. The IGC on European Political Union (EPU), on 
the other hand, was a reaction to the end of the Cold War 
and to German re-unification. Both Amsterdam and Nice 
have been presented as responses for the ‘need’ to prepare 
the EU for enlargement, though critics have complained 
that neither treaty reform has fully achieved that aim. 
 The ‘need’ for an IGC, however, is a matter of 
political judgement rather than an objective choice. The 
national veto, which elevates the position of member states 
once negotiations have begun, is suspended here: IGCs can 
be called on the basis of a majority vote. Rather than 
requiring consensus among member states, the launch of an 
IGC depends on the generation of sufficient momentum 
among governments that ensures support among the 
majority of member states. Pressure for treaty reform can 
come from a number of quarters, be it national 
governments, supranational institutions or indeed NGOs 
and civil society generally, and the Commission has always 
been at the fore-front in making the case for reform. 
 242
 This is not a formality. In the past, plans for IGCs 
have had to face scepticism, hostility and opposition from 
individual member states, and even though the spotlight 
tends to be on the discussions and the decisions during the 
IGC, the actual calling of an IGC is a decision that arguably 
at least as important. In the cases of the Amsterdam and 
Nice IGC (and of the IGC 2004) this has been less of an 
issue since provision for them was made in previous rounds 
of treaty reform.  
 Thus, advocacy for treaty reform may have become 
less important in the course of the 1990s, as the timing of 
future IGCs has become part of each treaty change, 
generating a sense of inevitability that one instance of treaty 
reform will follow the next. By the same token, however, 
the need to legitimise IGCs has become more important. 
Citizens wonder why it is that, as soon as one set of treaty 
changes is ratified and being implemented, discussions 
about the next are about to be begin. In fact, in the case of 
the Nice Treaty, the ‘post-Nice process’ involving a wide-
ranging debate about the future of Europe is in full swing 
when successful ratification of the treaty is nowhere in sight 
(thanks also to the Irish electorate). 
 A quick succession of IGCs can be rationally 
explained, and may indeed be legally required, because of 
‘leftovers’ – items which cannot be resolved in one IGC and 
therefore are being postponed to a future IGC. But this is 
not a practice which is likely to win public approval, and 
neither does it lend itself to the use of national governments 
who seek to return to the domestic public having gained a 
favourable outcome at the final summit – rather than having 
ended up postponing contentious decisions. That is why the 
image of a ‘new’ IGC, called because of a genuine need for 
further reform rather than in order to continue unfinished 
business, is a crucial device in order to legitimate the treaty 
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reform process. And in maintaining the discourse 
legitimating the calling of an IGC on the basis of ‘need’ for 
reform, and regarding the outcome as a success worthy of 
ratification, the complicity of the Commission is as 
important as that of national governments. 
 Incidentally, this argument about legitimation cuts 
both ways. Lack of Commission support for the IGC result 
generally, or lack of sensitivity for the political climate in 
individual member states during the ratification process can 
do much damage to the legitimacy of treaty reform. Thus, 
on both occasions when electorates have rejected the 
ratification of treaty change, blame has been put inter alia 
on the Commission: in the case of the Danish ‘No’ to 
Maastricht in 1992, Jacques Delors was alleged to have 
made comments about the further extension of Community 
competences which were regarded as damaging to the ‘Yes’ 
campaign (Dinan 2000: 265). More recently, Commission 
was accused of a similar insensitivity to domestic opinion in 
Ireland when it criticised the Irish government for 
unsatisfactory fiscal policies in the run-up to the Irish ‘No’ 
on Nice in 2001 (Laffan, 2000: 5). 
 These examples demonstrate not only the numerous 
ways in which the Commission is, directly or indirectly, 
involved in the process of treaty reform. It also drives home 
the earlier point about the linkages between treaty reform 
and policy-process. This brings us back to the starting point 
of this examination of the Commission’s role in treaty 
reform: the centrality of the Commission’s performance in 
the ordinary policy-process and in the making of secondary 
legislation contrasts with its more limited role in the context 
of IGCs. But there is no water-tight separation between 
these processes, and to the extent to which developments 
from one ‘spill over’ into the other, the Commission will 
either reap the benefits or, as the case may be, pay the price. 
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Its representatives’ familiarity with the organisation of the 
treaties, their knowledge of the substance of EU policies 
and the policy-making process and their experience in 
mediating between conflicting member state positions 
constitute resources which can be effectively deployed in 
the IGC negotiations.  
 
 
The European Parliament and EU Treaty Reform 
Like the Commission, the European Parliament (EP) has a 
role in IGCs which lacks a strong legal foundation, but is 
based on established practice. If anything, its foothold on a 
place at the table is even more tenuous than that of the 
Commission. Two MEPs (one from each of the two large 
parties) participate in the weekly administrative meetings as 
‘observers’, but have been excluded from the informal 
sessions which are often more important than the official 
ones. During the monthly ministerial meetings on the IGC, 
the EP President will be invited to participate during the 
official opening, but then has to leave when the actual 
negotiations start (Gray and Stubb 2002: 3). 
 In the conference room, the EP observers’ resources 
are more limited than that of any of the other participants, 
given their lack of access to extensive bureaucracies. MEPs 
have provided effective input into the negotiations, though 
this has been limited to the specific areas where issues of 
particular concern and expertise of MEPs are concerned. A 
case in point where the discussions in the 2000 IGC on 
questions relating to political parties (interviews with 
conference participants). 
 The expansion of the EP’s legislative powers, from 
consultation via co-operation to co-decision, in the course 
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of four instances of treaty change has been vast. 20 years 
on, the constitutional agenda of the first directly elected 
parliament, culminating in the adoption of the 1984 Draft 
Treaty on Political Union, has been largely completed. 
Crucially, what the parliament still lacks is a formal role in 
the treaty reform process, which would allow it to 
participate as fully in the constitutional politics of the EU as 
it does in the policy-process. 
So far, the EP’s influence in treaty reform has largely had to 
rely on indirect channels. Three such channels can be 
distinguished and need to be examined in more detail: the 
party federations linking the EP to national governments, 
the commitment of individual national governments and 
parliaments to support the EP’s aims, and the wider appeal 
to European citizens to expand the EP’s powers as part of a 
drive to enhance the democratic accountability of the EU. In 
addition to these channels, to be discussed below, one 
should also note that the EP has in several ways managed to 
change the way in which EU institutions interact with one 
another through informal arrangements. Such agreements 
negotiated between the EP and the other institutions have 
contributed to and even fore-shadowed subsequent treaty 
change and are therefore part of the process of 
constitutionalisation in the EU (Farrell and Heritier, 2003 
and 2004).  
 The role of party federations in linking the EP party 
groups to national parties is increasingly evident. These 
federations constitute a two-way channel between the 
national and the European level: political parties in the 
member states will seek to influence ‘their’ MEPs, but 
MEPs in turn will communicate the nature of EU debates, 
and the need for transnational party positions to their 
domestic party headquarters. Moreover, party federations 
have helped to integrate political parties in the EU 
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horizontally, engendering communication and exchange 
between national parties within the same party families and 
thereby helping to establish transnational party positions on 
EU issues. The EP party groups have had a crucial role in 
the process of Europeanisation of political parties. 
 With regard to the process of treaty reform, this has 
meant that party federations have the potential to contribute 
to the search for compromise solutions in the IGC. With 
respect to the SEA IGC, for example, research points to the 
influence exerted by the European Peoples’ Party over the 
national governments headed by their constituent parties 
(Budden 2002). Similarly, in the run-up to Nice, Socialist 
leaders, including the premiers of eight member states, and 
including the head of the Socialist group in the EP, met in 
Biarritz in preparation for the discussion on the IGC and the 
European Council there (Party of European Socialists 
2000). It is difficult to assess the direct impact of such 
transnational party meetings on the ongoing negotiations, 
though it can only be supportive of the search for 
compromise, working as they do as a counterweight to the 
entrenched national perspectives on the issues under debate. 
 The EP’s constitutional agenda has predominantly 
focused on the identification of a ‘democratic deficit’ in the 
EU. The existence of such a ‘democratic deficit’ in the EU 
has long been acknowledged, among observers and policy-
makers on the European level as well as on the national 
level. The issue had been thrown in stark focus when, after 
1979, the EP was the only EU institution being directly 
elected, yet had little say in the making of legislation having 
a direct effect on European citizens. In response not only to 
demands from the EP – most explicitly in the form of the 
1984 Draft Treaty – but to a general recognition that the 
legitimacy of the integration process required greater 
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attention to its democratic credentials, the EP’s powers have 
gradually been expanded.  
 The EP thus benefited from the effects of a public 
discourse about the EU’s ‘democratic deficit’. This 
discourse has been wide-spread and deeply entrenched ever 
since the mid-1980s. As such it is an example of the kind of 
collective idea, discussed in the introduction to this special 
issue, which hardly needs to be explicitly invoked – it has 
become part of the public understanding of the way in 
which the EU works. Even though the diagnosis 
underpinning the ‘democratic deficit’ contains several 
distinct problems, including, for example, the distance 
between citizens and EU institutions, the lack of 
transparency of the Council of Ministers or the unelected 
nature of the European Commission, discussion about 
remedies has concentrated on the expansion of 
parliamentary powers. Little has changed on these other 
fronts of the democratic agenda, yet the powers of the 
parliament have changed beyond recognition. 
 Clearly the EP has benefited from the way in which 
it (as well as other actors) has managed to establish a link 
between a general public discourse about European 
democracy to a specific programme of institutional reform. 
However weak or ineffective the EP may have been in the 
proceedings of IGCs itself, it has undoubtedly been 
successful with respect to agenda-setting. Evidence for this 
is particularly strong when, as was the case in the 
preparation of the IGC 1996-7, the IGC is preceded by a 
period of institutionalised deliberation about its agenda. 
Thus, one observer, while admitting the weakness of the EP 
representatives during the IGC itself, has pointed out that 
they were “very influential” in the Reflection Group, and 
that many of the ideas of the socialist EP representative in 
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the Group were to be found in the Group’s report (Stubb 
1998: 19). 
 In the course of IGC negotiations, collective ideas, 
promoted inter alia by the EP, about the need to counter the 
EU’s ‘democratic deficit’ have had to be translated into 
political action. Here, all governments have, over time, 
come to accept that something would need to be done about 
the EU’s lack of democratic accountability, in particular 
after the Danish people’s ‘No’ to Maastricht and the effect 
this had on the legitimacy of the integration process more 
generally. But while all member states have eventually 
come to agree (or accept) to the need to expanding the 
powers of the parliament, some have stood out as 
‘champions’ of the EP. Initially, i.e. on the occasion of the 
1985 IGC, this was Italy, no doubt also because Altiero 
Spinelli, the MEP who had who masterminded the 1984 
Draft Treaty, commanded strong loyalties in the Italian 
parliament.  
 The support from Italy included a commitment to 
ratify the treaty revision arising from the IGC only if also 
the EP itself gave its approval. This commitment, since then 
accompanied by a similar pledge from the Belgian 
legislature, provides the EP with an indirect veto over the 
results of treaty change. It is difficult to assess the strength 
of this, as yet, untested, quasi-veto:  on the one hand, the EP 
has tended to make substantial gains in the course of treaty 
reform but, on the other, the EP has not actually voted 
against instances of treaty revision even if they did not meet 
its main demands. 
 The potential of this ‘indirect veto’ for the EP has 
been evident again in the aftermath of the Nice Treaty, 
which had been criticised by MEPs immediately after the 
summit (European Parliament 2000, para.4). German EPP 
Members of the Parliament linked demands for the 
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inclusion of specific aspects of the EP agenda in the debates 
and negotiations of the post-Nice process with the threat of 
a vote against the treaty (European Voice 2001c), and the 
composition of, and input into, the Constitutional 
Convention subsequently did increase the role of the EP in 
treaty reform significantly. This demonstrates to what 
extent the negotiations of one IGC may lead to (perhaps 
limited) treaty change, but that their after-effects have a 
habit of ‘spilling over’ into the preparation of the next 
round of negotiations. The EP, even though it does not 
possess a formal ‘veto’ can be an effective player in this 
process. 
 The Convention itself was, of course, to a large 
extent dominated by MEPs and members of national 
parliaments. As such, the EP did indirectly contribute 
significantly and successfully to the agenda-setting that 
preceeded the IGC. The deliberative dimension of the new 
convention format did favour the logic of normal 
parliamentary work, and the appointment of Giscard 
d’Estaing – not only a former French President, but also 
MEP – further raised hopes that the Convention might be a 
vehicle for EP influence of EU treaty reform. However, this 
was compromised to some extent by a number of 
counterveiling factors: the way in which Giscard d’Estaing 
chaired the plenary meetings, the fact that negotiations 
occurred under the shadow of the subsequent IGC, leading 
to a more intergovernmental logic slipping into proceedings 
towards their end, and the important role that the 
Praesidium and the Secretariat (incl. John Kerr – a former 
UK Permanent Representative) played in the process of 
negotiation (Norman 2003). Overall, the convention method 
has certainly enhanced the role of the EP in the process of 
treaty reform, but the actual experience of the Convention 
turned out to be a mixed picture in terms of parliamentary 
success, and uncertain future of the Constitutional Treaty in 
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the light of ratification troubles has raised further question-
marks as to whether the EP can be an effective actor in this 
process.  
 
 
The Council Secretariat and EU Treaty Reform 
The EP’s role in treaty reform contrasts with that of the 
Council Secretariat. Unlike the EP, the Council Secretariat 
does not seek undue public exposure of its role in treaty 
reform, concentrating instead on working quietly inside the 
conference room. But, like the EP, the Council Secretariat 
has gained additional powers and responsibilities in recent 
rounds of treaty revision, in particular with respect to the 
establishment of the EU’s foreign, security and defence 
institutions – a development that, while reflecting concern 
among member states that such powers should not be 
accrued by the Commission, also underlines the ability of 
the Council Secretariat to provide institutional solutions in 
such a context. 
 Participant observers of the IGCs leading to 
Amsterdam and Nice Treaties have already pointed out that 
the Council Secretariat is, together with the Presidency, 
“one of the two key players” in any given IGC (Gray and 
Stubb 2002: 3). They also  remark that there is a “fluid 
relationship” between these two actors, where “on some 
issues the Presidency takes the lead, [while] on others it is 
the Council Secretariat which sets the agenda.” (p.3). 
 Staff from the Council Secretariat provides the 
administrative services for the IGC, in the guise of a 
‘conference secretariat’. As such, it’s role in the IGC 
proceedings is similar to that in the context of secondary 
law-making among the EU institutions, and many of the 
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routines and practices governing the IGC negotiations are 
‘imported’ from the established practices of the Council of 
Ministers. 
 In examining the Council Secretariat’s involvement 
in IGCs, a broad distinction can be made: on the one hand, 
the Secretariat provides logistical support, in terms of 
provision of meeting space, secretarial resources, etc. On 
the other hand, there is a more substantive side to the 
Secretariat’s work. This concerns the assistance of the 
Presidency in various aspects of its responsibilities. This 
includes, most notably, the drafting of the agenda and the 
minutes of the meetings at the various levels of negotiation, 
the drafting of summary reports and work on the draft 
treaties – tasks which require a great deal of the ‘technical’ 
legal expertise and specialist experience which the staff of 
the Secretariat possess, but which are also highly sensitive 
and political. 
 Arguably the most important aspect of the Council 
Secretariat’s role in IGCs is the provision of legal advice to 
the conference generally, and to the Presidency in 
particular. The Council Secretariat’s legal service is 
designated at the legal service of the conference, thus 
gaining a privileged position, if not a monopoly, with 
regard to the interpretation of new or revised legal articles 
being discussed. This puts the legal staff of the Council 
Secretariat in a crucial position: in the absence of recourse 
to judicial review of individual aspects of the negotiation 
results, the ‘legal advice’ of the Council’s legal service on 
proposals for draft articles is authoritative and can therefore 
constitute a constraint on the possibilities for treaty reform. 
 The Council Secretariat’s acquisition of this role as 
the provider of legal advice to the IGC may seem like a 
‘natural’ choice of governments, but matters are probably 
less innocent than that, given that such decisions concerning 
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organisational detail are drafted by the Council Secretariat 
itself. The SEA IGC, convened under the influence of 
Delors’ preferences for a negotiation format, was assisted 
by a legal service that included the legal advisers of both 
Commission and Council Secretariat. By the time of the 
next IGC, the Council Secretariat was made solely 
responsible for legal advice, and this has remained the 
practice ever since.  
 The capacity of the Council Secretariat to intervene 
in the negotiations – if requested – through the provision of 
legal advice stands alongside the more general, and 
substantive, advice the Council Secretariat staff can, and 
does, provide in the negotiations. Such an ability to provide 
advice, and the willingness of the Presidency and the other 
delegations to accept it, is derived from two aspects of the 
Secretariat’s involvement in IGCs. First, the Council 
Secretariat acts as the institutional memory of the 
conference. As the official record-keeper of the conference, 
the Secretariat has easy access to past discussions, 
documents and papers, and can use these, as appropriate, in 
order to influence ongoing negotiations – a resource which 
it shares with the European Commission (Gray 2001). 
 A second, related, point concerns the personal 
experience of the Secretariat staff involved in the IGC 
negotiations. In contrast to the situation in member states, 
where political change and administrative turnover in 
foreign offices tend to change the composition of national 
delegations, the staff in the Council Secretariat unit 
responsible – the ‘Directorate for General Political 
Questions’ – has experienced greater continuity and 
therefore possesses greater personal knowledge of the past 
IGC record. Possessing both the institutional record of, and 
the personal insights into, the intricate and complex matter 
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provides the Council Secretariat staff with a valuable 
resource in the negotiations.  
 However, statements about the potential influence 
of the Council Secretariat have to be qualified on a number 
of counts. First, the opportunities arising for the Secretariat 
staff to influence the negotiations lie predominantly in the 
area of fine-tuning the detail of treaty revisions, not in the 
decisions about the broad outlines of treaty reform. That is 
one reason why the involvement of the Council Secretariat 
has hardly reached the public limelight. Nevertheless, such 
influence in legal detail may have significant political 
significance and deserves to be addressed systematically in 
research on treaty reform. 
 A second, more important qualification concerns 
the Secretariat’s relationship with the Presidency which, as 
already noted, is a flexible one. Much of what has been said 
above regarding the significance of the Council 
Secretariat’s role in drafting agendas and meetings, 
providing legal and other advice and fine-tuning  the detail 
of negotiations crucially depends on the permissiveness of 
the Presidency to provide such opportunities for influence. 
That is why, ultimately, we can only speak of potential 
influence of the Secretariat. Formally, the Secretariat is 
charged with assisting the Presidency, and its influence is 
realised if and when a Presidency does indeed rely on the 
assistance which the Secretariat can offer. 
 In the past, this is what Presidencies have usually 
done, though there are also noteworthy exceptions. Until the 
French Presidency in the second half of 2000, any period of 
IGC negotiations had been presided over by one of the 
smaller states, and these generally welcome the assistance 
which the Council Secretariat can provide, given the 
pressure on a country’s resources during the Presidency. On 
that basis, the detail of IGC negotiations have usually been 
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managed in ‘Brussels’, i.e. in close co-operation between 
the Permanent Representation of the member state holding 
the Presidency and the staff of the Council Secretariat. This 
co-operation routinely stretches to the first draft of the 
minutes of meetings, the conclusions of ministerial and 
European Council meetings or even draft treaties being 
written in the Council Secretariat. Given the significance 
which is usually attached the role of the Presidency in 
steering the IGC, this ‘behind the scenes’ influence of the 
Council Secretariat is remarkable, as is the lack of empirical 
research into the effects of such influence. 
 The French government, however, in taking over 
the Presidency in July 2000, decided to move day-to-day 
responsibility for the IGC from Brussels to Paris, and 
maintained exceptionally close control over aspects of the 
negotiations which would usually be done by the Council 
Secretariat. The French pushed the debate on the 
substantive issues ahead, but there were also claims that 
before and during Nice, that the French Presidency was 
heavy-handed and used – some might say, abused – the 
privileged position in order to further its particular agenda. 
In any case, this first IGC Presidency of a large member 
state demonstrated the ability of the state in question to take 
over the day-to-day running of the negotiations from the 
Council Secretariat – as well as the problems which such a 
strategy entails. 
 Another example of such a ‘nationalisation’ of the 
IGC Presidency was the infamous first Dutch draft during 
the Maastricht IGC on European Political Union. In drafting 
the EPU treaty in the Dutch foreign ministry, Dutch Europe 
Minister Piet Dankert departed sharply from the previous 
Luxembourg draft and antagonised the majority of member 
states. In the event, the draft failed in moving the 
negotiations ahead – in fact, they moved back to the 
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previous text composed by the Luxembourg Presidency 
with the assistance of the Council Secretariat. Such 
examples are exceptions which serve to emphasise the rule, 
which is the close co-operation between Presidency and 
Council Secretariat in the drafting of treaty revisions. And 
they also demonstrate that a Presidency is actually more 
effective in moving the negotiations towards a successful 
conclusion if it relies on the assistance of the Council 
Secretariat rather than attempting to ‘go it alone’ (Gray and 
Stubb, 2002). 
 As the EU appears to move to a more open form of 
negotiating treaty change, via the debate about the future of 
Europe, and the adoption of a convention method to prepare 
the 2004 IGC, it might be asked what such changes hold in 
store for the Council Secretariat. One might assume that a 
greater degree of openness would diminish the role of the 
Secretariat, and therefore also its potential for influence. 
However, the experience of the Fundamental Rights Charter 
Convention already suggested otherwise. Here, again, the 
Council Secretariat, providing the Convention’s secretariat 
and legal service – as they had done for the Reflection 
Group in 1995 (Lipsius 1995) – turned out to be an 
influential player in the proceedings (de Burca 2000).  
 The trend continued for the European Convention, 
though with some important changes. The Convention 
Secretariat was composed not only of Council, but also of 
Commission and EP Secretariat officials. Crucially, there 
was an appointed Secretary-General of the Convention (Sir 
John Kerr). Kerr had not been recruited from the Council 
Secretariat, but – as former British Permanent 
Representative – was used to the Council working methods. 
He is credited with playing an influential role in the 
Convention, not only through the effective use of the 
expertise at his – and the Convention President’s – disposal, 
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but in the course of the process also more openly as 
participant in the meetings of the Praesidium. Together with 
Giscard and the two Vice-Presidents (Guiliano Amato and 
Jean-Luc Dehaene), Kerr did have an important part in the 
successful conclusion of the Convention (Norman 2003). 
 The IGC then reverted back to the standard practice 
of having a conference secretariat which was recruited from 
the political unit and the legal service of the Council 
Secretariat. It found itself in the opposite position of the 
previous IGC leading to the Nice Treaty: where the French 
government had monopolised the Presidency input into the 
IGC, the Italian Presidency did provide very little political 
guidance and even less substantive input. The resultant 
vacuum was filled, to some extent, by the secretariat staff 
who drafted and summary reports about Member State 
positions and even their position papers on various issues. 
However, the ultimate failure of the 2003 Brussels 
European Council demonstrated, in the absence of the 
political gravitas that only the Presidency itself can provide, 
the Council Secretariat is as ineffective as it is when the 
Presidency takes over the running of the IGC altogether 
(see also Beach 2005). The most amenable environment for 
the influence of Council Secretariat offials is the ‘middle 
way’ – a Presidency that on the one hand does make use the 
expertise, be it procedural or substantive, of the Council 
Secretariat, but also has a sense of purpose in seeking to 
conclude the negotiations successfully. The Irish Presidency 
which then did achieve the success of finding agreement on 
the Constitutional Treaty was a good example of that.  
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Conclusions 
The study of supranational agency confirms the need to 
analyse treaty reform as a process, to consider its structural 
elements and the way in which structures interact with 
action. The present examination of the role of supranational 
institutions has helped to point to important aspects of the 
treaty reform process which are only marginally addressed 
by traditional analyses, if at all. In particular, four areas in 
which the activity of supranational actors can make a 
difference have been identified. 
 First, IGCs have a structure consisting of rules 
governing the interaction among players. Supranational 
institutions may not be strong players with respect to the 
negotiation of outcomes, but they have considerable 
influence in the setting of these rules, and therefore in the 
structuring of IGCs. Many of these formal and informal 
rules rely on established practices governing EU policy-
making, and have been ‘imported’ as a side-effect of relying 
on the existing institutional structure of the EU. This 
includes the use of fora like the European Council and the 
General Affairs Council for the debate of IGC matters, the 
familiarity of participants – whether representing member 
states or EU institutions – with existing procedures but also 
the very involvement of supranational actors in the 
negotiations which have both an interest and a habit to 
extend these working methods to the IGC. Thus, 
Commission President Delors had a major role in the setting 
up of the first, major IGC of recent times, not only in terms 
of substantive issues, but also in terms of the format and the 
structure of the talks. Without such a strong Commission 
influence at that time, probably an entirely different format 
of negotiating treaty reform would have evolved. Less 
strikingly, but much more consistently, the involvement of 
the Council Secretariat and of its legal service have ensured 
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that IGC negotiations have remained wedded to the 
standard operating procedures of the EU, despite their 
different constitutional status. 
 Second, a particular aspect of this 
institutionalisation is provision for a process of agenda-
setting which is fairly open, and which is also tied to the 
existing EU policy-process. It includes consultation of other 
institutions, participation of their representatives in arenas 
of ‘structured reflection’, such as the Reflection Group or a 
Convention, and also permits them to commission special 
reports from independent advisers or ‘wise men’. This 
participation in the agenda-setting phase of the IGC in turn 
provides a privileged  platform from which to generate a 
wider public discourse about the need for, and the aims of, 
EU treaty reform – an opportunity which Commission and 
Parliament have used to the full. Even if such ploys do not 
have a direct effect on the IGC negotiations at hand, they 
tend to create an air of expectation which means that issues 
are being addressed in a future IGC. 
 Third, supranational institutions have a special role 
in the legitimation of treaty reform, due to their particular 
standing among the IGC players. They stand apart because 
they do not possess formal veto rights over the outcome of 
the negotiations, but at the same time they can claim to 
represent the common European interest, and to protect this 
against the particularistic challenges by national 
governments. Because of this they occupy a certain moral 
ground (though not necessarily a higher moral ground) 
which may induce specific dynamics both inside and 
outside the conference room. On the inside, it strengthens 
the legitimacy of a country’s, or group of countries’, 
negotiating stance if they are able to point to support from 
the Commission in presenting proposals or opposition to 
proposals. On the outside, the verdict of Commission or EP 
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on the agreed treaty change as well as their general activity 
within the EU have an impact, positive as well as negative, 
on the ratification process. 
 Fourth, representatives of supranational institutions 
in the IGC are participants in a social process. IGC 
negotiations are, after all, not conducted by ‘member states’ 
or ‘supranational institutions’, but by a select group of 
individuals. Accordingly, a number of observers have 
pointed to the significance of personal relations among the 
conference participants (Stubb 1998; Gray and Stubb, 2002; 
Gray 2001). At the same time, the duration and intensity of 
an IGC engenders among this group an esprit des corps. In 
terms of their unrivalled, specialist knowledge of the 
substance and working methods of the IGC, and the value 
which they come to attach to the outcome of treaty reform, 
this group can be considered as an epistemic community. 
This development is one particular aspect of the social 
process of European integration which occurs at the 
domestic as well as at the transnational European level – a 
process whose relevance for future research is recognised 
by rationalists and social constructivists alike (Moravcsik 
1999: 302; Christiansen et al. 2001). 
 This transnational community of negotiators 
conducts the everyday IGC proceedings in the face of at 
times opposing political positions imposed by national 
capitals. Yet they are also operating in an environment in 
which the continuous and long-term interaction among 
group members becomes a unifying element and where 
ideas and knowledge, independent of their origin, can have 
an impact on the negotiations – notwithstanding the 
potential for subsequent vetoes or disagreements on the 
political levels. Examples of this can be found with respect 
to each of the three institutions: regarding the Commission  
in the case of the Single Market or monetary union; 
 260
regarding the European Parliament in matters concerning its 
own competences; and regarding the Council Secretariat 
with respect to the institutional, procedural and legal 
matters. 
 The argument here is simply that the involvement 
of supranational actors in the treaty reform process matters, 
and that evidence of their influence can be found along a 
number of different avenues. This does not elevate them to 
the status of national governments, and the argument here is 
not that one or the other ought to be seen as the n-th 
member state in the IGC. However, their participation in the 
IGC has an influence on the format, the conduct and the 
dynamics of the negotiations. That is why their role in the 
treaty reform process deserves more systematic 
investigation. Here, only the broad outlines of the 
involvement of Commission, Parliament and Council 
Secretariat could be provided. Further research along these 
lines will expand our empirical knowledge about the role of 
supranational actors in treaty reform, and thus contribute to 
an encompassing understanding of this process. An aim that 
is all the more important as treaty reform is set to remain on 
top of the EU’s agenda for the foreseeable future. 
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Chapter 8 
 
The Process of EU Treaty 
Reform: Constitutionalising 
the European Union 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The first few years of the new millennium have been a 
roller-coaster ride for the European Union. This recent 
period of European integration has taken place in the 
shadow of significant enlargement of the EU: the arrival of 
25 and more member states that was seen as requiring a 
fundamental overhaul of the institutional structures of the 
Union. It was against this background that the EU launched, 
in the year 2000, a major revision of the treaties. And even 
though, at the end of that year, at the Nice European 
Council, a new treaty was agreed, this treaty reform did not 
satisfy the high expectations that had been placed in it. The 
changes that had been agreed were relatively modest, 
decisions on some key institutional issues were postponed, 
and the actual method of negotiating treaty change was 
called into question due to the lack of attention that could 
be given to important questions in the course of the final 
summit. Rather than preparing the Union for the major 
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challenges to come, the experience of the Nice European 
Council raised questions about the status quo, and there 
were calls for a review of the way in the EU changed its 
treaty provisions. 
 From this comparative ‘low point’ the Union soon 
after departed to scale new heights when it launched, at the 
Laeken summit, a constitutional convention that set about to 
draft a Constitutional Treaty. And even though national 
governments eventually adopted, in the summer of 2004, a 
revised version of this treaty, the aspirations to settle the 
Union’s finalite politique through such a ‘European 
Constitutions’ were in tatters less than a year later when the 
electorates in France and the Netherlands rejected the treaty 
in public referendums. Given the need for the ratification of 
treaty change in every member state in order to for it to 
come into effect, this result implied a constitutional crisis 
for the EU; it was followed, first by the insistence of the 
European elites to maintain the momentum and continue 
with the ratification effort in other member states, but later 
by the recognition that there was a need for a period of 
reflection. At the end of the period it became clear not only 
that the existing Constitutional Treaty could not be ratified 
unchanged (and that therefore a new round of treaty reform 
would be necessary) but that the label ‘constitutional’ was 
not, any more, tenable to describe the content of any new or 
revised treaty. Once these fundamental points had been 
accepted, the agreement on a mandate for a new 
Intergovernmental Conference and the subsequent 
negotiations of a Reform Treaty were swift, and at the 
beginning of 2008 the member states and institutions were 
confident that by the end of the year this institutional 
reform of the Union would (finally) be ratified. 
 This road to institutional reform that the Union has 
taken since the turn of the century, travelling along a rather 
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torturous path from Nice to Lisbon, including the scenic 
route via the heights of formal, explicit constitutionalism, 
has created some interest among political scientists and 
constitutional lawyers studying EU reform, and reignited 
the debate about the underlying dynamics of European 
integration. This chapter seeks to contribute to this debate 
by viewing recent developments through the lenses of an 
institutionalist perspective on EU treaty reform1. Its main 
argument is that despite the ‘failure’ of the Constitutional 
Treaty, these recent developments actually confirm the 
thesis of incremental EU constitutionalisation advancing as 
a continuous process which involves, but is not solely based 
on, the revision of the treaties through negotiation in 
intergovernmental conferences, followed by domestic 
ratification. 
 The development and application of such an 
institutionalist perspective on the reform of the EU treaties 
is appropriate because this has traditionally been studied as 
a series of individual events, be it theoretically as grand 
bargains from a liberal intergovernmentalist perspective 
(Moravcsik 1998), or else empirically in terms of single 
case studies (Laursen 2006; Laursen 2005; Laursen and 
Vanhoonacker; 1992; Edwards and Pijpers, 1997; 
Galloway, 2001; Best et al. 2000, Mazzucelli 1997). It is 
the contention underlying the approach presented here that 
this traditional way of studying treaty reform misses out 
important aspects of the process, and hence only provides a 
partial view of the object of analysis. In contrast to this 
                                                          
1 The conceptual part of this chapter builds on and further develops 
arguments and concepts that have been previously published in a number 
of different papers (Christiansen and Jørgensen, 1999; Christiansen, 
Falkner and Jørgensen, 2004). The conceptual and empirical work on the 
constitutionalisation of the EU is presented in greater detail in 
Christiansen and Reh (forthcoming). See also Große Hüttmann (2005) for 
a similar approach. 
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traditional perspective, the chapter therefore advances the 
following arguments: 
first, that treaty reform is, in fact, to be seen as a 
continuous process in which each instance has been 
linked to the previous and subsequent instances; 
second, that this treaty reform process is part of a 
wider, long-term process of constitutionalising the 
European Union; and 
third, that this process of European 
constitutionalisation has both formal and informal 
dimensions. 
It is on the basis of this conception that the chapter 
then looks at the recent past in order to assess the nature of 
developments from Nice to Lisbon. The chapter concludes 
by arguing that, even if the formal attempt at adopting a 
‘European Constitution’ did not succeed, the 
constitutionalisation process can be seen to continue in the 
absence of the formal constitutional terminology. Indeed, 
the experience of the negotiation and ratification of the 
Lisbon Treaty demonstrates that the process of EU treaty 
reform has reverted back to the method that had been 
customary prior to the Laeken European Council.  
 
Conceptualising the Process of EU Treaty Reform  
To say that EU treaty reform is a process appears to be 
stating the obvious but adopting a procedural approach has 
major significance regarding the way in which the 
phenomenon is studied. A process-oriented perspective 
avoids looking at treaty reform in a static manner and 
instead recognises the potential linkages between the ‘daily’ 
policy-making process, the major events and the gradual 
establishment of a set of rules, norms and institutions 
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governing policy-making in the EU. Furthermore, such a 
perspective forces us not only to regard both actors and 
structures in treaty reform as significant in their own right, 
but also to study their interaction over time in order to 
develop a comprehensive understanding of the nature of 
this process. 
 Even though the revision of the treaty has its own 
particular set of rules and is somewhat removed from the 
everyday politics of the Union, it remains closely tied to the 
wider process of integration, and also to the ‘normal’, 
‘everyday’ process of policy-making in the EU (Wincott 
1995). The conceptual divide between ‘extraordinary’ treaty 
reform and ‘normal’ policy-making that the traditional 
approach maintains therefore hinders, rather than helps, a 
better understanding of the process2. What is important in 
this context is to remain attentive to the mutual influence 
that treaty reform and policy-making processes have on one 
another – an aspect of the constitutional politics of the 
Union that is only captured when charting the course of 
treaty reform over time.  
 The reform of the treaty through an 
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) has usually taken a 
number of years, considering the time required for 
preparation, negotiation and ratification of any change that 
is agreed. In the case of the SEA, the IGC itself was 
actually very brief, but the implementation of the legislative 
programme arising from it took more than seven years. 
                                                          
2 Liberal Intergovernmentalism views the treaty reform in terms of a 
sequence of three steps: first, the pluralist interplay of different domestic 
interests within each member state, resulting in the fixing of national 
preferences; second, the projection of, and bargaining over, these 
preferences within the European arena; and, third, the determination of 
European institutional choices as the outcome of this ‘two-level’ game. 
(Moravcsik 1993).  
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Subsequent IGCs have tended to last progressively longer, 
both in terms of the duration of the negotiations, with 
longer periods of preparation and more lengthy and difficult 
ratification of the agreements reached.  
 While individual IGCs have become longer, they 
have also occurred more frequently. What was initially a 
rare event in the history of integration, became from the 
early 1990s onwards a regular feature of European politics. 
Since 1985 an IGC in order to revise the treaty has on 
average been convened every 5 years. 
 Treaty reform through IGCs is not only a process of 
change because of the close links that we discussed before 
between the policy-process and constitutional politics. The 
decisions taken in the context of one particular IGC often 
contained already the seeds of the next round of treaty 
reform. Thus, the need for, indeed the date of, the next 
review of the treaty had already been written into the 
Maastricht Treaty. To this legally prescribed continuity of 
reform we need to add the agenda-setting power of the 
‘leftovers’ – unresolved issues that could not be included in 
one instance of reform, but which are then postponed being 
put them on the agenda of the following one.  
 Beyond the meta-process of these constitutional 
politics threading itself through the summits of IGCs and 
the valleys of the policy-process, each IGC itself is a 
process rather than an event, as traditional approaches 
would have it. The few days of the concluding summit, 
when statesmen and -women hammer out the final details of 
the treaty in the limelight of intense media interest, are only 
the ‘endgame’. This is just one particular aspect of a much 
longer process that includes months or even years of 
preparation previously, and months, if not years, of 
implementation and ratification afterwards.  
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 Any IGC needs an agenda, and the period during 
which such an agenda is set begins long before the actual 
launch of the IGC, and may continue into the early phase of 
negotiations. An agenda is, logically, what determines the 
decision of having an IGC in the first place. The perceived 
need for revising the treaty rests on the desire among 
decision-makers to change the institutional arrangements, 
agree on the move of policy-areas from one legislature 
procedure to another, or to extend the Union’s range of 
competences. This formal agenda is what constitutes the 
brief of the IGC, but the agenda-setting process also 
includes much wider questions such as the framing of the 
issues that are to be discussed, the public justification of the 
reform process and the positioning of the various actors in 
advance of the start of negotiations. The latter includes, for 
example, the drawing of ‘red lines’ by national 
governments – negotiating positions which are announced 
publicly and across which they are then not willing to 
retreat.  
 The agenda-setting phase is particularly important 
for those actors who do not possess formal decision-making 
power. Here we need to think in particular of the 
Commission and the European Parliament, but also of 
private interests, non-governmental organizations and civil 
society in the broader sense. The Commission and the 
Parliament both launch position papers in advance of an 
IGC, thus setting usually ambitious benchmarks of what the 
IGC is expected to achieve. But even earlier, both 
institutions as well as the ECJ may have had a significant, if 
largely hidden, impact on the IGC through their decisions 
and actions in the years preceding the IGC. Indeed, they 
may have been instrumental in the very decision to launch 
the IGC, as was the case with the Single European Act 
which followed the pressure of reform that had been 
building up after the Parliament’s Draft Treaty of European 
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Union and the Commission’s White Paper on the 1992 
Programme.  
 While the agenda may appear to be set largely by 
actors, we also need to note that external forces and 
structural elements contribute to agenda-setting. The above-
mentioned ‘left-overs’ and deadlines for further reform 
already fixed on previous occasions belong to this category, 
as to unpredictable events such as the 1989 fall of the Berlin 
Wall which hugely influenced the agenda ahead of the 
Maastricht Treaty, including the launch of a second IGC on 
Political Union alongside the one on Economic and 
Monetary Union which had already been planned.  
 The agenda-setting phase is not only an essential 
part of preparing for an efficient conduct the IGC, it is also 
a politically highly significant phase because it shapes the 
subsequent negotiations by specifically including or 
excluding particular issues. Thus governments that seek to 
draw ‘red lines’ and manage to keep the undesired reform 
off the agenda have achieve that objective already before 
the IGC has actually begun. Agenda-setting is therefore an 
important dimension of EU treaty reform. 
 The decision-making phase of an IGC begins with 
the formal Council decision that established the IGCs and 
sets out its remit. Negotiations in the IGC then usually 
involve three different levels: the level of Heads of State 
and Government (HSG) which debates key issues at least 
twice – at the outset and at the final summit meeting, but 
may also meet during the IGC to take stock and provide 
now impetus; the level of Foreign Ministers, who regularly 
review IGC progress in the context of their Council 
meetings during an IGC3; and, third, the so-called ‘personal 
                                                          
3 While foreign ministers (or those ministers holding the EU 
portfolio in national cabinets) have a designated task in dealing with IGC 
matters in the Council, other sectoral ministers may of course also 
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representatives’ nominated by governments who 
collectively, in the formation of the Group of Personal 
Representatives, who carry out the bulk of detailed 
negotiations on the articles and issues in question4. On 
occasion, this Group may devolve the preparation of 
decision-taking further down to a Friends of the Presidency 
group or another working group that can be established for 
a particular issue. The Group of Personal Representatives 
and any such working groups it may choose to create 
constitute the administrative layer of the IGC negotiations. 
It comprises officials who are experts in the field, that is to 
say they are familiar with the nature of EU law and with the 
process of decision-making and legislation in the EU. In 
order for national representatives to be effective players at 
this level they also need to be familiar with the ‘way of 
doing things’ in Brussels. It is in this context that the 
institutionalist recognition of a ‘logic of appropriateness’ 
holds more explanatory power than that of  a rationalist 
‘logic of consequences’ (March and Olsen, 1989).  
 The ultimate aim of the IGC is, of course, to come 
to a consensual agreement. Any treaty change requires the 
signatures of all HSG and negotiations therefore occur 
under the shadow of the national veto.  Negotiations 
proceed on the various levels in terms of the search for 
consensual agreement, which may come about for a number 
reasons. While on some issues there may be consensus 
already among the governments that a particular sector 
needs to be communitarised or a decision-rule needs to be 
                                                                                                            
coordinate matters in the area of their competence if and when an IGC has 
such matters on its agenda. The case of finance ministers dealing with 
monetary issues is one case in point (Puetter, 2007).  
4 Recent research has demonstrated the potential significance of the 
‘pre-cooking’ of IGC decisions that takes place through the “delegated 
preparation” by these groups (Reh 2007a, 2007b). 
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modified, in other areas there may be ‘hard bargaining’ 
among member state representatives based on opposing 
national positions. Depending on the distance between these 
positions, this may either involve compromising around a 
median position that is acceptable to all, horse-trading to 
enable different delegations to obtain gains in return for 
giving in on other issues, or indeed the postponement of 
decision-taking on issues where no agreement can be found 
– thus creating ‘leftovers’ for subsequent rounds of reform. 
 One important feature of the decision-making phase 
needs to be mentioned here: the role of the Presidency. Just 
as in the realm of running of the Union’s ‘everyday’ 
business, the Presidency also takes the lead in all aspects of 
the IGC negotiations. Presidency officials are chairing the 
Group of Personal Representatives and working group 
meetings, their ministers and prime ministers the meetings 
their respective levels. More important still is the 
Presidency’s responsibility to direct the negotiations 
between meetings, for example through the drafting of 
interim reports, outline treaties or draft articles. These are 
crucially important tools for the progress of negotiations: 
getting these wrong, as in the infamous case of the Dankert 
draft of the Maastricht Treaty may seriously jeopardise 
agreement, whereas skilful drafting of such texts can move 
negotiations ahead.  
 In these and other ways a Presidency puts its stamp 
on the negotiations and shapes the final outcome. Both in 
style and substance, IGCs therefore reflect the working 
methods and the agenda of the country or countries that 
held the Presidency during the negotiations (within the 
usual, well-known constraints that apply to all 
Presidencies)5. Once the final summit has been held, 
                                                          
5 See, for example, the different styles and approaches employed by 
the Italian and Irish Presidencies during the 2003-2004 IGC (Crum 2007). 
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agreement reached and the new text adopted, the IGC 
comes to an end, but this is not the end of the process. 
Signing of the new treaty is followed by the process of 
ratification, which again has its own dynamics.  
 Actually, there is a period between the conclusion 
of the IGC and the signing of the new treaty, which can take 
between 2 weeks and several months and which is officially  
required for linguistic and technical editing of the agreed 
text. This is essentially an opportunity for lawyers and 
linguists to go through the political agreement that the 
negotiators have reached and ensure that it is recorded in 
precise legal language. However, beyond a purely technical 
exercise it is also an opportunity to negotiate further on 
precise details of specific provisions, as was the case, for 
example, after the signing of the Nice Treaty when the 
provisions on voting weights in the Council agreed by the 
IGC contained mathematical inaccuracies. 
 Once the treaty is then signed by the HSG is needs 
to be ratified in each member state. Only when ratification 
in all member states is completed, and the relevant 
documents have been deposited, will the new treaty 
provisions enter into force. There may have been a time in 
the past when the assumption was that ratification was 
merely a formality, but at least since the Danish ‘no’ vote 
on the Maastricht Treaty this is not a viable belief. Instead, 
the significance of ratification is now widely recognised, 
and the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty at the ballot 
boxes of both France and the Netherlands has been another 
seismic shift towards the recognition that treaty reform does 
not end with the signature of statesmen and –women at the 
European Council concluding the IGC.  
                                                                                                            
The author argues that the outcome of the IGC is best understood in terms 
of a combination of the input from both Presidencies.  
 272
 This development points to the importance of 
public referendums, but these are not the only ways in 
which the treaty change can be ratified. The more common 
method is that of parliamentary ratification. Normally one 
would expect that to be a less hazard-prone method of 
ratification, given the majority support that governments 
usually enjoys in national parliaments. The phenomenon of 
minority governments, once quite common in Scandinavian 
countries, is not that wide-spread in recent years. But that 
still leaves the possibility for changing majorities, in cases 
where elections force a change of government between the 
end of the IGC and the vote in parliament.  
 Ratification can also be difficult if and when a 
government relies on a small minority and is in danger of a 
backbench rebellion. John Major’s government in the UK is 
a case in point, with his slim majority putting the passage of 
the bill ratifying the Maastricht Treaty into jeopardy. And 
even in countries where the government enjoyed big 
majorities in parliament there is the potential for threats to 
the ratification if and when individual MPs or opposition 
parties choose to challenge the treaty revision in court. 
 National supreme courts have become regular 
points of judicial review in recent times, not only because 
euroscepticism has been on the rise and governments have 
been challenged on EU reform issues more frequently. 
Also, as the substance of EU reforms has had deeper 
implications for domestic systems, judicial review by 
national supreme courts has become more frequent. In a 
nutshell, the process of constitutionalising Europe has 
increasingly come into contact, if not conflict, with the 
constitutional provisions in the member states, thus calling 
on national constitutional courts to adjudicate on the 
ratification of far-reaching EU treaty reforms6. The 
                                                          
6 See the various contributions to Albi and Ziller eds (2006). 
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important ‘Maastricht Judgement’ of the German 
Constitutional Court setting out the limits for further EU 
reform in terms of the German Grundgesetz is just one of 
the better known of a number of such judgements 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht 1994).  
 The ratification phase of any treaty change is 
important not only because problems at this point may 
scupper anything that has been previously agreed and send 
the decision-makers back to the negotiating table, if not the 
drawing board. But even short of that, more modest ‘re-
negotiations’ have been undertaken in order to facilitate 
renewed attempts at passing ratification referenda. The way 
in which the union dealt with the Danish ‘no’ after 
Maastricht and with the Irish ‘no’ after Nice are both cases 
in point. 
 Having established the different stages of EU treaty 
reform, and the links between them, facilitates a further 
conceptual move concerning the cyclical nature of this 
process: each round of treaty reform, and the developments 
inbetween each round, provides feedback into a future 
round. Figure 1 illustrates these dynamic relationships in 
the treaty reform process. 
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Figure 1 The Different Stages in the EU Treaty Reform Process 
 
Adopting such an institutionalist perspective on EU 
treaty reform has two particular implications when it comes 
to identifying the forces which drive this process: first, it 
facilitates the expansion of the number of actors that are 
seen to be involved in the process, and, second, it requires 
the identification of the elements of structure constituting 
the constraints and opportunities for political action.  
In terms of actorness, IGCs are traditionally seen as 
the business of the member states—their very name 
indicates that they are, by definition, intergovernmental. 
Indeed, most scholars would argue that it is treaty reform, 
more than any other aspect of EU politics, which remains 
the forum within which states may protect their national 
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interests and shape the broad direction of the integration 
process. Clearly, member states play the key role in IGCs, 
given the need for unanimous agreement of any Treaty 
change. However, when looking at the various actors 
involved in EU reform - and in constitutional politics more 
generally—we quickly recognize a much more complex 
picture. The previous discussion already introduced the role 
played by European Commission, European Parliament and 
the European Court of Justice in the process of Europe's 
incremental constitutionalisation. More recent research has 
further established the wide range of institutional and non-
governmental actors that are involved in treaty reform and 
constitutional politics7. 
With respect to the political structures within which 
treaty reform negotiations take place, a three-fold 
distinction between different elements can be made: first, 
legal-institutional structures, comprising the formal rules 
and informal institutions that govern the IGC negotiations; 
second, the ideas and discourses that provide the frame 
within which detailed discussions take place, and which are 
so deeply embedded in the consciousness of the participants 
that there are not immediately changeable; and, third, the 
temporal dimension which exerting constraints as well as 
opportunities through the time pressure that scheduling 
imposes on the negotiations8. 
                                                          
7 On the role of the supranational institutions, see the previous 
chapter in this volume (Christiansen 2002) as well as Beach (2005) for a 
more detailed analysis of the influence of these institutions in EU treaty 
reform. Individual studies of the roles played by the various institutions 
are contained in the special issue of  the Journal of European Public 
Policy on ‘Political Agency in the Constitutional Politics of the European 
Union’ (Beach and Christiansen 2007) and a special section of 
Comparative European Politics on ‘Preference Formation and the 
Institutions of the EU’ (Dimitrakopoulos and Hussein Kassim 2005)  
8 The identification of different elements of structure follows the 
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The institutional context to negotiations is to a large 
extent set by the Council machinery. Since the SEA, during 
which also the Commission was involved in the running of 
the IGC, the ‘conference secretariat’ is made up of officials 
from the General Secretariat of the Council. Together with 
the Presidency chairing the meetings and the Group of 
Personal Representatives usually consisting of a high 
number of Permanent Representatives, this means that IGC 
sessions at the administrative level quite ‘naturally’ acquire 
the format of Council working group meetings. This 
includes not only formal procedures about the tabling of 
proposals and the management of the actual meetings but 
also important, if unwritten, rules of the game in the 
Council. One such pattern is, for example, the tendency to 
finding solutions for ‘routine questions’ at the working 
group level, and only to pass on dossiers to the political 
level as a last resort if solutions to these cannot be found 
among officials (Foullieux et al 2007). 
The concept of institutional and legal structures 
surrounding treaty negotiations also includes arrangements 
concerning details of protocol, managing the agenda and 
internal communication – this ‘institutionalisation’ of the 
IGC might not influence substantive negotiations directly, 
but it privileges the Brussels insiders who are more at ease 
with these matters, and thus indirectly has an impact on 
proceedings. 
The second element of structure, that of ideas and 
discourses, goes somewhat deeper than the institutional 
dimension. It identifies the way in which ideational 
discourses provide the mental frame for negotiations, 
permitting some ideas to influence the drafting of treaty 
                                                                                                            
conceptual discussion in Chapter 1 of this volume (Christiansen 1998). 
The material dimension of structure has been excluded from the analysis 
here in order to permit a tighter focus on the other elements.  
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change while others are excluded from consideration.9 This 
is an  element of structure that has significant bearing 
especially during the agenda-setting and ratification phases 
of an IGC, but can also influence the actual negotiations. 
Depending on the way in which ideas and concepts are 
framed at the outset, specific proposals at the IGC have 
greater or lesser chances of being accepted and turned into 
concrete treaty provisions. 
Finally, a third element of structure can be 
identified in terms of the temporal constraints surrounding 
the negotiations. ‘Time’ is, to some extent, a tool that can 
be used by participants, in particular the Presidency, to 
direct negotiations and influence discussions in such a way 
that it ‘forces’ delegations to come to a compromise. But, 
once employed, it also binds the Presidency within a 
specific time-frame that then takes on a life of its own, also 
binding those who originally devised it. In particular, a 
deadline by which an IGC is scheduled to end, structures 
the negotiations and creates expectations of success and 
failure with regard to the completion of the IGC. However, 
the temporal governance of treaty reform is also influenced 
by ‘external’ events, be it the EU’s budgetary cycle (in 
particular the time-table for the revision of the financial 
perspectives), the EP’s electoral cycle or indeed domestic 
political events such as important national elections10. 
All these elements of structure combine to provide 
a framework for IGC negotiations, a structure that is to a 
large extent outside the control of individual actors who 
                                                          
9 For a discussion of the wider significance of discourses for 
European integration, see Diez (2001) and Rosamond. For a more specific 
treatment of legal and constitutional discourses in the EU, see Shaw 
(2000).  
10 For a discussion of the more general notion of the temporal 
dimension of European politics, see Ekengren (2002) and Goetz (2006).   
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have to accommodate their pursuit of national and 
institutional interests within it. Developing an 
understanding for these elements of structure that shape 
IGC negotiations is an important part of a comprehensive 
analysis of EU treaty reform. It is also a departure from the 
previous intergovernmentalist approach which saw treaty 
reform negotiations exclusively in terms of national  
preferences and bargaining among member state 
representatives. The wider range of actors involved, and the 
recognition of structural factors bearing on the negotiations, 
ensures that these ‘blind spots’ are eliminated from the 
study of treaty reform.  
 
The Nature of the EU’s Constitutional Politics 
The previous section developed the concept of EU treaty 
reform and discussed the important analytical significance 
of this concept. One crucial aspect of this institutionalist 
conception of treaty reform is that it allows us to see treaty 
reform not only in the context of the EU’s ‘everyday’ 
policy-process, but also in terms of its links to other 
important developments in the EU. The procedural 
approach is sensitive to the links between ordinary EU 
politics and treaty reform, but is equally perceptive with 
regard to the constitutional dimension of EU politics. This 
constitutional dimension, defined as the development of 
commonly agreed basic rules and norms that shape the 
governance of the European Union, differs in important 
ways from the constitutional experience of most European 
states. Constitutional rules and norms have developed over 
time, and while some of these have been enshrined in the 
written text of the EU treaties, others are based on less 
formal agreements or indeed on established practice. 
Constitutionalism in the EU, then, is more akin to the style 
of British rather than Continental European 
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constitutionalism – rather than relying on a single 
constitutional document, it involves a number of different 
texts and practices.  
 An analysis of constitutional politics therefore also 
needs to go beyond the study of intergovernmental 
conferences and include a range of different developments. 
Constitutionalisation in the EU must then also be studied as 
a process, albeit one that is significantly broader than treaty 
reform. In order to approach the subject systematically, we 
can distinguish between the following sources of 
constitutional rules and norms: 
• Case law from the European Court of Justice, 
developing important constitutional principles11 
• Conclusions from the European Council and other EU 
summits, setting out fundamental decisions and 
directions for the institutions of the EU12 
                                                          
11 The judgements from the ECJ in the 1960s and 1970s, laying 
down key principles such as supremacy of EC law, the direct effect of EC 
directives and the origins of a human rights regime for the Community, 
are generally accepted now to have been of constitutional significance. 
Indeed it was the Court itself which, on the back of its own legislation, 
first started to refer to the EU’s “constitutional order” – something that 
EU lawyers are now treating as a matter of fact. 
12 The European Council has on several occasion taken fundamental 
decisions which has a constitutional impact on the future development of 
the Union. For example, the expansion of EU competences in key areas 
such as foreign policy (EPC) or monetary policy (ERM) was initially 
agreed in the context of such summit meetings. The fact that such 
decisions are then later codified in the context of treaty reform (CFSP and 
Euro, respectively) illustrates the previous argument about the link 
between treaty reform and other aspects of EU constitutional politics. As a 
matter of fact, the very creation of the European Council as an institution 
of the Union was initially an informal development that only much later, 
when it had become established practice, was formally included in the text 
of the Treaty. 
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• Intergovernmental Conferences agreeing on treaty 
changes as well as European Conventions preparing 
these 
• Key decisions and established practices by the EU 
institutions having constitutional character13 
From this list is becomes clear that treaty reform and 
constitutional politics are closely linked, but that they are 
not the same: constitutionalisation goes beyond treaty 
reform, but also treaty reform includes a large number of 
issues and decisions which are not of a constitutional 
nature. This latter phenomenon is, arguably, one of the 
persistent problems that prevents treaty reform from 
becoming more transparent and more accessible to the 
wider public: given the size and the complexity of the 
consolidated treaties, these go much beyond the citizens’ 
understanding of what is ‘constitutional’14 
 In adopting such a broad perspective, it becomes 
evident that many important constitutional developments 
have, in the past, taken place under the guise of ‘normal’ 
politics or as treaty reform. Through a process of 
“integration by stealth” (Majone xxx) the EU has, over 
                                                          
13 Examples for this can be found in past inter-institutional 
agreements adopted by Commission and EP, for instance with regard to 
the approval of the Commission President and individual Commissioners. 
Also EU legislation with constitutional implications, for example in the 
area of comitology, would fall in this category, as would the inter-
institutional agreement on the EU’s multi-annual financial perspective.   
14 One frequent observation has been that the US Constitutional is 
comparatively compact and easily accessible for citizens, whereas the EU 
treaties, with their many sectoral provisions are not. With this objective in 
mind, but also with a view to facilitating a less cumbersome revision of 
the ‘non-constitutional’ parts of the treaties, there has been a proposal for 
dividing the treaty into two parts – constitutional and non-constitutional – 
and have different revision regimes for either part (EUI…) 
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time, transformed itself into a polity that is based on much 
more than international treaties. The changing nature of the 
EU, from the original international organisation towards the 
transnational polity that we confront today, is in part due to 
the continuous process of constitutionalisation that has 
taken place over several decades. In order to study this 
process – in order to study constitutionalisation as process – 
it is crucial to establish the links between decisions taken at 
different points and in different fora, and then bring these 
diverse influences together in a single stream of 
constitutionalisation. 
 However, beyond the past informal process of 
constitutionalisation which remained unseen and/or 
informal due to the nature of the decision-making 
processes, there has been a more recent attempt at 
formalising this process. As indicated at the outset of this 
chapter, from 2000 onwards the EU moved towards a 
policy of officially constitutionalising itself, of giving itself 
a formal ‘European Constitution’. While on the one hand, 
this process of formal constitutionalisation was closely 
linked to previous developments, it provided on the other 
hand a departure from past practice in a number of ways: 
first, there was a radical shift in the use of language, both in 
terms of the discourse about the text that was being 
negotiated and in terms of the discourse contained within 
the text itself; second, there was a change in the method of 
treaty change, in that the traditional IGC was preceded by a 
‘European Convention’ that agreed a draft treaty which was 
subsequently developed further in the IGC; and, third, there 
was a perception in many member states that, given the 
formal-constitutional nature of this process, the 
endorsement of the people would be required in the 
ratification of the ‘Constitution’. A large number of 
member states therefore held referendums in order to ratify 
the treaty change. 
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 While it is important to identify these key 
differences between the previous, informal aspects of 
constitutionalisation and the more recent, formal dimension  
of constitutionalisation, it is equally important to recognise 
the close linkage between the two. In contrast to those who 
have argued that the drafting of a Constitutional Treaty 
could be seen as a ‘constitutional moment’ of the European 
Union (Walker 2004), the view taken here is that we have 
witnessed ‘constitutionalisation by different means’, the 
formalisation of an already existing path towards 
constitutionalisation rather than a break with the past. What 
the developments in the period between 2000 and 2004 did 
was to make visible and explicit the constitutional 
foundations and aspirations of  the European Union, when 
these had been previously kept away from public view. 
Before looking at these recent developments in more 
empirical detail in a moment, we have therefore identified 
three broad domains of constitutionalisation: 
• “Formal constitutionalisation” – the explicit creation of 
a written constitutional document for the EU, involving 
a public process of deliberation and legitimated through 
popular vote in the member states.  
• “Informal constitutionalisation through treaty reform” – 
the de facto creation of a constitutional foundation 
through incremental changes to the founding treaties of 
the EU. 
• “Information constitutionalisation outside treaty 
reform” – the implicit constitutionalisation of the EU 
through established practices and key decisions by the 
EU institutions and national governments with 
constitutional character.  
Developments in each of these domains has, over time 
contributed to the process of constitututionalisation of the 
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Union, and the accumulated effect has been the progressive 
creation of a constitutional order in Europe. 
 In terms of conceptualising constitutional politics in 
the EU, so far two elements have been identified: on the 
one hand, the very nature of constitutionalisation as a 
continuous process, and, on the other hand, the distinction 
between the different degrees of formality that have 
contributed to this process. in terms of conducting an 
analysis of constitutionalisation in the European Union, this 
then requires a chronological study of those decisions and 
other factors that have contributed to constitutionalisation, 
and to chart these across time in search for a temporal 
pattern. A schematic illustration of this conception is 
provided by Figure 2. It is on this basis that the remainder 
of this chapter will now examine the process of 
constitutionalisation that taken place in Europe, with 
particular focus on the recent attempt at formal 
constitutionalisation.  
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Figure 2 Conceptualising Constitutional Politics in the European 
Union 
1 9 6 0 s  a n d  1 9 7 0 s          1 9 8 0           1 9 9 0                   2 0 0 0                     2 0 0 4                                             2 0 0 7  
I n f o r m
a l  
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s a t i o n  
o u t s i d e  T r e a t y  R e f o r m
 
I n f o r m
a l  
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s a t i o n  
t h r o u g h  T r e a t y  R e f o r m  
F o r m
a l  
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s a t i o n  
D e g r e e  o f  
F o r m
a l i s a t i o n  
T i m
e  
 
 285
Constitutionalising the European Union: From Nice 
to Lisbon (via Laeken) 
The first observation when starting to examine the recent 
developments regarding the constitutional reform process in 
the EU is the recognition that the debate about a ‘European 
Constitution’ was deeply embedded in the existing 
integration process. The talk about, and the work on, a 
constitutional document was indeed a radical departure 
from the previous practice of avoiding at all cost the 
language, symbols and other trappings of statehood. But in 
spite of this discursive break with the past, there was never 
any serious idea to compose such a constitutional document 
from scratch. Instead, the debate about the ‘European 
Constitution’ that began, among the European political 
elites, in 2000 took account of the previously established 
patterns and foundations of European integration. It linked 
to previous aspirations of the European movement, in 
particular constitutional federalism; it build on the advances 
of European constitutional law; and it was situated within 
the reform debate of the European Union in preparation of 
Eastern enlargement. In fact, the launch of the debate 
occurred during the final stages of the Nice IGC and was 
initially seen as an attempt as an attempt to achieve a more 
federalist outcome of that particular IGC. 
 Its impact on the actual negotiations at that 
particular time was in fact minimal, as the IGC was too 
advanced in order to be able to accommodate a return to 
broad and far-reaching questions about the EU’s 
foundations. The initial assessment was, therefore, that the 
Nice Treaty was a defeat for pro-integrationist forces and 
served to preserve the status quo. However, the ‘defeat’ of 
these high aspirations was only temporary, and in fact the 
momentum right after the Nice European Council was 
building for a deeper revision of the treaties. This was due 
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in part because the outcome of the Nice European Council 
was questionable, both with regard to the content of the 
revised Treaty and with regard to the way in which it had 
been negotiated. The treaty reform, while having been 
launched at a major review of the institutional provisions of 
the Union in preparation for enlargement, failed to achieve 
this aim, and while there were modest extensions of co-
decision, most other important decisions were postponed to 
a future round of reform. The extension of qualified 
majority voting was linked to a new way of calculating the 
qualified majority – a triple majority that actually made 
decision-making more cumbersome than the previous 
system.  
 Equally damaging was the actual experience of the 
final summit, where negotiators spent three days bargaining 
over the final issues, and were seen to be more concerned 
about parochial interests rather than the search for workable 
solutions for the ‘new Europe’. France, holding the 
Presidency, spent significant diplomatic resources on the 
defence of its voting parity with Germany, Belgium did the 
same, though with less success, vis-à-vis the Netherlands, 
and the then candidate states were seen to be excluded from 
the negotiations about arrangements that would apply to 
them as much as to the old member states. 
 The Nice summit therefore ended not only with an 
imperfect treaty, but also with a number of important 
‘leftovers’ requiring further treaty change, with a desire by 
many involved in the negotiations to reform also the format 
of negotiations; and with an explicit mandate, contained in 
Declaration 23 attached to the Nice Treaty to launch a 
process to engender a wider debate about the ‘Future of 
Europe’. In different circumstances this might not have had 
the consequences that it did, but given the contingencies at 
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the time these developments set onto a course for a period 
of formal constitutionalisation. 
 Belgium held the Presidency in the second half of 
2001, when the details of this ‘post-Nice process’ where 
being worked out, and at the Laeken European Council in 
December 2001 managed to achieve a maximalist 
interpretation of the aims of the ‘post-Nice process’ which 
included the inclusion of a possible ‘constitutional 
document’ in the mandate of the European Convention that 
was being agreed on. This was taken one step further by the 
Convention itself which, under the leadership of Giscard 
d’Estaing, set out to draft a Constitutional Treaty rather 
than providing the subsequent IGC merely with a report or 
a number of scenarios – outcomes that would also have 
been possible under the Laeken mandate. 
 At the Laeken Summit, another important decision 
was taken, namely the nomination of Valery Giscard 
d’Estaing as the Chairman of the Convention, with Jean-
Luc Dehaene and Guiliano Amato, former prime ministers 
of Belgium and Italy, respectively, as Vice-Chairs. Giscard 
d’Estaing had previously been French President, but had 
also served many years as a member of the European 
Parliament and thus combined the roles of representing both 
member state and EU institutional interests. A further 
important appointment in the Convention was that of John 
Kerr, the former UK Permanent Representative, as 
Secretary-General. He brought with him not only close 
connections to the British establishment, but also 
experience and familiarity of Coreper/Council procedures. 
 The European Convention thus had a strong 
leadership, both in political and administrative terms. 
Giscard had a clear vision of the direction he wanted the 
Convention to go, and even though he suffered certain 
setbacks in the closing stages of the Convention, his agenda 
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of formally constitutionalising the European Union did 
resonate with the membership of the Convention15. The 
Convention was made up of representatives of national 
governments, members of the European Commission, 
members of national parliaments and of the European 
Parliament, and even though there were differences among 
its members about the substance of any draft Constitutional 
Treaty, Giscard’s approach of seeking ‘consensus’ (rather 
than either the more formal unanimity or majority-voting) 
proved to be effective in achieving a final agreement. 
 The members of the Convention organised 
themselves in a number of working groups on specific, 
mainly sectoral issues, but due to the parliamentary 
majority of the membership there was also a strong party-
political dimension to the Convention’s work. In the final 
analysis, though, the Convention was very much a top-
down affair, with a ‘Praesidium’ bringing together 12 key 
members of the Convention steering the drafting of the new 
Treaty (Kleine 2005). This Praesidium, which – unlike the 
plenary sessions or the working groups, met in private, was 
supported by a very effective secretariat composed of 
officials from Commission, EP Secretariat and, above all, 
Council Secretariat (Deloche-Gaudez 2005). 
 Giscard’s handling of the Convention was 
controversial, also because his constitutional ambitions so 
explicitly went beyond the kind of treaty reform that had 
been initially expected. And while the draft treaty in the end 
did include a lot of the language of statehood (flags, 
symbols, a European President and Foreign Minister, 
European laws, a supremacy of EU law clause) he did not 
succeed with proposals for a re-naming of the Union as a 
                                                          
15 For a detailed examination of the proceedings of the Convention, 
see Norman (2003); for an analysis of Giscard’s leadership, see Kleine 
(2007).  
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‘United States of Europe’. He was also heavy-handed in the 
use of his procedural resources, frequently ignoring 
opposition from the floor to his own preferences with 
regard to specific aspects of the treaty, the preamble being a 
case in point. Finally, he was criticised towards the end of 
the Convention when he was seen to consult extensively 
with national governments, anticipating their views in 
advance of the subsequent IGC, at the expense of listening 
to opinion within the Convention. 
 The European Convention therefore was not the 
‘deliberative forum’ that many constitutionalists had hoped 
to see16. There was a certain degree of deliberation, but 
negotiations about the final draft treaty were neither fully 
transparent nor did they necessary reflect the substantive 
work that had taken place in the working groups. Still, the 
Convention, when it completed its work in the summer of 
2003 did achieve two significant objectives: first, to 
actually having been able to agree on a single, 
comprehensive draft treaty, and, second, to have set the 
agenda for the Constitutional IGC that followed the 
Convention, and that had the formal power to agree on 
changes to the treaty17. 
 Treaty reform, as we discussed earlier, always 
implies an agenda-setting phase, and it is possible to see the 
Convention as simply a forum for more systematic agenda-
setting. Previous IGCs had been preceded by reflection 
groups, and one perspective on the Convention can be to 
see it as a ‘super-Reflection Group’. However, given the 
strength of opinion, the detailed work and the high degree 
                                                          
16 See the discussion in Eriksen et al. (2004) and the analysis by 
Kleine (2006). 
17 See Milton et al (2005) and Church and Phinnemore (2005) for a 
detailed look at the substantive content of the Constitutional Treaty.  
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of consensus that had been achieved In the Convention, the 
approach of the Italian Presidency to minimise any changes 
to the Draft Treaty in the IGC appeared as an obvious 
choice. The Convention Draft did indeed constitute the 
basis of negotiations in the IGC, and even though the Italian 
strategy of seeking to avoid the ‘re-opening’ of individual 
articles appeared to fail when the December 2003 summit 
ended without agreement, the following Irish Presidency 
then succeeded in getting agreement on a revised version of 
the draft treaty approved at the final summit in June 2004. 
Heads of State and Government then met in Rome in 
October 2004 for a formal signing ceremony of the “Treaty 
Establishing a Constitution for Europe” – a document that 
from then on was widely referred to as the ‘European 
Constitution’. 
 While a lot of work, energy, diplomatic skill and 
other resources had gone into drafting this treaty, the 
process was still not complete without ratification. Given 
the constitutional aspirations of this treaty, it generated 
significant public interest and in a large number of member 
states a popular referendum was seen as the ratification 
method of choice. This included not only countries that 
regularly held referendums in the past, but also several 
others which had not previously submitted EU matters to 
such a test, and indeed some where referendums had never 
been held before. The Netherlands was one such case in 
point. France and the UK had both called referendums for 
reasons that were regarded as more politically than legally 
motivated, and in both cases doubts were raised about the 
likelihood of achieving a positive result of such a vote18. 
                                                          
18 See Closa (2007) for a detailed discussion of the motivations 
behind individual countries’ choices in favour of holding referendums.  
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 In the end, it was first in the Netherlands at the end 
of May 2005, and a few days later in France, that the 
electorates of two of the original member states voted 
against the Constitutional Treaty. Analysis of the voting 
intentions and of the public debate in these countries has 
sought to show that the result was less a verdict on the 
actual text of the treaty, but was best explained by a variety 
of factors which included both European and domestic 
issues. While the ‘no’ votes in these tow countries were a 
severe shock to the ‘system’, there was nevertheless an 
immediate reflex by the EU institutions to persist with the 
ratification process, and indeed several countries did ratify 
the Constitutional Treaty in subsequent months, including 
Luxembourg by referendum. There had, after all, been 
previous precedents when initial ‘no’ votes had been 
overturned subsequently, after domestic politics had a 
chance to react and make arrangements for a second vote 
that would assure a more favourable reception19.  
 There was, however, also a sense that the 
opposition to the Constitutional Treaty had been so strong 
in these two countries, and that these countries were so 
central to the European project, that it would be difficult if 
not impossible to overcome this double ‘no’. Also, a 
number of member states decided to put their referendums 
on hold after the rejection of the treaty in France and the 
Netherlands. A more concerted effort was therefore 
perceived to be necessary in order to keep the constitutional 
project going. Both the European Commission and the 
member states acted in response to the ‘constitutional 
crisis’. The Commission (2005) identified a gap in the 
                                                          
19 Denmark initially voted ‘no’ on the Maastricht Treaty, and the 
ratified the Treaty after a second, favourable referendum, and the Irish 
government lost a referendum on the Nice Treaty, which was then 
overturned in a second referendum.  
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communication between the EU and the citizens, and 
launched a programme aimed at enhancing the opportunity 
for dialogue between citizens and elites, the so-called “Plan 
D” (Wallstrom 2007). Governments, coming together in the 
European Council (Presidency 2005), agreed that what was 
need for a ‘reflection period’ which would last until 2007 
and enable a possible re-negotiation of the treaty in time for 
the next EP elections in 2009. This period of ‘reflection’ 
about the future of the constitutional project would also, 
and conveniently, include the national elections that were 
due in both France and the Netherlands, thus allowing any 
new government to re-present the European issue 
differently to their electorate.  
 The reflection period, which lasted from mid-2005 
to mid-2007, served the actors to buy time. During this 
period, the Union celebrated its 50th anniversary, which 
included the adoption of a ‘solemn declaration’ in Berlin 
about the Union’s values and aims, and thus provided a text 
with some constitutional principles (Presidency 2007). In 
terms of treaty change, the realisation by early 2007 was 
clearly that, despite previous statements to the contrary,  a 
re-negotiation of the treaty was both necessary and possible. 
The German and the Portuguese Presidencies collaborated 
closely in order to launch a new IGC in the summer of 2007 
– Berlin managing to get agreement on an extremely 
detailed mandate for the IGC, and Lisbon then following up 
on this with a conference that was concluded in the second 
half of the year. The Lisbon Treaty was signed by Heads of 
State and Government in December 2007. 
 A number of factors facilitated this process: there 
had indeed been the anticipated change in domestic politics 
in key countries, namely in France with the election of 
Nicolas Sarkozy as President. EU enlargement, which had 
been one of the main reasons that were given for the need 
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of a fundamental, constitutional over-haul of the Union, and 
which had been one reason for the opposition towards the 
Constitutional Treaty, had happened without the Union 
suffering any immediate or obvious negative effects as a 
result20, and Turkish accession to the EU, while still on the 
agenda, had clearly moved into the background of public 
deliberation. Above all there had been a growing 
acceptance among the EU’s political elite that, while a 
reform of the treaty was still seen to be necessary, that this 
should rather not be presented as a constitutional project. 
Ratification of ‘ordinary’ treaty change would be more 
easily achieved if referendums could be avoided, and for 
this to be the case, the language of constitutionalism had to 
be replaced (Delauche-Gaudez 2007). 
 This reversal from the high degree of politicisation 
that treaty reform had ‘enjoyed’ during and after the 
European Convention, to the active de-politicisation of 
negotiations towards a ‘Reform Treaty’ is remarkable21, as 
is the fact that substantively the vast majority of provisions 
that had been contained in the Constitutional Treaty were 
included in the Lisbon Treaty22. The Treaty contains key 
                                                          
20 See Best et al. (forthcoming) for a discussion of the impact that 
EU enlargement has had on the workings of the key institutions in the 
European Union. The contributors conclude that there is no significant 
detrimental effect on the efficient function of the EU institutions.  
21 In the Lisbon Treaty IGC, the political level was almost entirely 
absent, and detailed negotiations on the basis of the June 2007 mandate 
were conducted. 
22 Most observers agree that the Lisbon Treaty is essentially the 
Constitutional Treaty, minus the name, the flag/symbols clause, the title of 
the Foreign Minister and the terminology for EU legislative acts. Ways of 
‘measuring’ the degree of congruence between the two treaties differ, but 
according to MEP Alexander Stubb the Lisbon Treaty is “99.5 per cent” 
identical with the Constitutional Treaty. 
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elements of the original Treaty that would need to be 
regarded as constitutional: 
• the President of the Council of the European Union will 
be chosen by the prime ministers and national 
presidents for a term of 30 month. This office does not 
empower the elected top politician to take any 
executive decisions. Furthermore, the Presidency 
system will be revised, with representatives from three 
member states jointly running sectoral Council 
meetings over period of 18 month. 
• the High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the 
Commission will combine the functions of the current 
Foreign Policy and Security Chief and the External 
Relations Commissioner. The powers of the High 
Representative are limited to implement policies, but 
s/he will play an important role in representing the 
EU’s globally. 
• the President of the European Commission will be 
elected by the European Parliament, based on a 
proposal from the European Council. The size of the 
College will be reduced from 2014 onwards. Only 2/3 
of MS will have a Commissioner at any one time, 
rotating every 5 years. 
• the Commission’s delegations will form part of a 
‘European External Action Service’ of the Union and 
will come under the joint responsibility of the Council 
and the Commission.  
• the European Parliament, comprising 750 members 
and a President, will gain further powers as the co-
decision procedure becomes the ‘ordinary legislative 
procedure’ and is expanded to further areas. 
Additionally, the new budgetary procedure requires the 
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approval by both the Council of Ministers and the 
Parliament. 
• national parliaments also get more involved in the 
legislative process. They are being notified of proposed 
legislation and have eight weeks to deliver their 
comments.23 
• qualified majority voting was extended to new policy 
areas. As from 2014 onwards, a new voting system 
shall be introduced: a vote is passed if 55% of MS are 
in favour and if these countries represent 65% of the 
EU’s population – an element that is making the size of 
the country’s population much more important.  
• the European Court of Justice is granted enhanced 
powers to rule on cases dealing with EU Justice and 
Home Affairs legislation24. The Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, agreed in 2000 as a “solemn proclamation”, will 
become legally binding with the Lisbon Treaty.25   
Ratification of this treaty remains, of course, an 
important issue, but here the changes that national 
governments have made to the domestic arrangements make 
an ultimate adoption of the treaty by all member states more 
likely. All member states except Ireland have decided to 
                                                          
23 When 1/3 of national parliaments objects to a proposal, the 
Commission has to consider whether to maintain, amend or withdraw the 
legislative proposal; when the majority of the national parliaments object, 
and the Commission still wants to press ahead with its proposal, the 
European Parliament, and the Council consider both sides of the argument 
and come up with a decision. 
24 Special provisions were given to Denmark and the United Kingdom 
25 Special provisions were given to Poland and the United Kingdom 
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rely on parliamentary ratification only – something that is 
especially remarkable in countries like Poland, Denmark 
and the UK which had been previously committed to 
referendums on the Constitutional Treaty. Both France and 
the Netherlands are also not going to have a referendum on 
this occasion, and in all member states parliamentary 
majorities appear to be sufficiently strong in order to 
facilitate approval of the Lisbon Treaty. 
The outcome of the popular vote In Ireland cannot 
be taken for granted, in particular after the initial rejection 
of the Nice Treaty, and a rejection of the Lisbon Treaty 
there would also be very difficult to overcome given the 
previous experience of an overturned referendum result. It 
is for this reason that the Irish government may hold the 
referendum as late as possible in 2008, in order to ensure 
that the momentum is in favour of overall ratification and 
thus avoiding that the Irish electorate takes the issue to the 
brink. Beyond the Irish referendum, there  is also the 
possibility for judicial review of the Treaty by national 
supreme courts, a scenario that might be likely in both 
Germany and the Czech Republic. Overall, the chances of 
ratification are uncertain, but appear to be significantly 
higher than they were for the Constitutional Treaty (Duff 
2007; Palmer 2007; Kurpas 2005; Hagemann 2007). 
 
Conclusions 
While the outcome of ratification, at the time of writing in 
early 2008, cannot be predicted, we can already say now 
that the Union appears to have found a way out of the 
constitutional impasse. The three elements that formalised 
constitutionalisation after the Nice Treaty – the use of the 
convention method for deliberation of treaty changes, the 
adoption of a language of constitutionalism, and – at least in 
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many member states - the search for legitimation of treaty 
change through public referendums – have not been present 
any more in the (negotiation of) the new treaty. Instead, the 
Lisbon Treaty has reverted back to the pre-Laeken practice 
with regard to language, negotiation method and ratification 
format, even though in substance it maintains the 
constitutional elements that the formal ‘constitution’ had 
already contained. 
 This observation demonstrates that the Lisbon 
Treaty is, indeed, ‘constitutionalisation without the name’ – 
the continuation of a process that began decades ago and is 
being carried forward despite the ‘failure’ of the formal 
project to design a ‘European Constitution’. Our analysis, 
on the basis of the conceptualisation developed earlier in 
the chapter, has demonstrated that neither was the 
Constitutional Treaty a radical break with the past, nor was 
the Lisbon Treaty a radical break with the constitutional 
project. In both cases there was a huge shift in the degree of 
formalisation of the constitutional process – a shift that, as 
the politics in the ratification phase have shown, has been 
hugely significant – but it did not change the underlying 
trend towards greater constitutionalisation. The thesis of a 
continuous process of constitutionalisation in the European 
Union, taking different forms at different times, is therefore 
confirmed rather than disproven by the experience of treaty 
reform since the turn of the century. 
 In terms of the future outlook, we can say that the 
signs are that constitutionalisation will continue further, but 
that not only a formal constitutional project, but probably 
also ‘ordinary’ treaty reform itself, are not likely to happen 
in the near future, for a number of reasons. Given the 
torturous process by which the Union managed to arrive at 
the Lisbon Treaty, there is a certain degree of treaty reform 
fatigue detectable, both among governments and 
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electorates. Even if the Lisbon Treaty is unlikely to last the 
“50 years” which Giscard d’Estaing had predicted the 
Constitutional Treaty to last without revision, governments 
will seek to avoid another, major treaty reform in the 
foreseeable future. The Lisbon Treaty is, in many ways, a 
much more fundamental overhaul of institutions and 
procedures than either the Amsterdam Treaty or the Nice 
Treaty were. The Lisbon Treaty also include a new article 
concerning the changes to the treaty revision procedure. 
This article (Art.33) provides for both an ordinary and a 
simplified procedure for changing the treaties. This means 
that major reform project would – again – require the 
convening of a European Convention, but it would also 
allow minor reform steps to be taken via the simplified 
procedure, the so-called passarelle clause, which allows the 
European Council, acting unanimously, to make changes to 
parts of the treaty, for example with regard to the extension 
of the ordinary legislative procedure into new areas.  
 If and when the Lisbon Treaty is ratified, there is 
then an expectation that constitutionalisation will continue 
further,  even if the formal method of Constitutional 
Convention and Intergovernmental Conference is not 
applied. Thus, having moved from a fairly informal process 
of constitutionalisation to become highly formal and 
politicised in the context of the Constitutional Treaty, 
constitutionalisation is again becoming less formal in the 
wake of the ratification failure of that treaty. The path that 
the constitutionalisation process has taken over this period 
is illustrated by Figure 3 below. It emphasises the nature of 
constitutionalisation as a process, linking the various 
contributions that have been made to the process while also 
recognising the shifts in formalisation that have taken place 
over time. 
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 This analysis of EU treaty reform from Nice to 
Lisbon, via Laeken, confirms the key arguments that were 
spelled out at the beginning of this chapter: there is a very 
close linkage between treaty reform and 
constitutionalisation; treaty reform itself is best viewed in 
terms of a continuous process; and constitutionalisation has 
both formal and informal dimensions. Looking at the period 
from the mid 1980s until today, it is evident that treaty 
reform has been a constant feature of the political life of the 
Union during this time. The project to draft and adopt a 
‘European Constitution’ must be seen in this context: it 
build on the previous rounds of treaty reform, and fuelled 
further treaty reform after the ‘constitution’ itself failed. 
The ‘Constitutional Treaty’ itself may have turned out to be 
a brief episode in the integration process, but 
constitutionalisation, albeit with a different name, is very 
much alive and present. 
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Figure 3 The Different Stages of the EU’s Constitutionalisation 
Process 
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Conclusions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The aim of this book has been to develop and apply a 
framework of analysis for the study of institutional politics 
in the European Union. We discussed, in the introduction 
and in Chapter 1 the need for such a framework to be 
sensitive to the influence of both structural and actional 
factors in the explanation of institutional politics. Institutions 
are social constructs which persist over time, and which 
therefore imply a degree of continuity, but which are also 
subject to change. In order to allow us to understand the 
dynamics behind both continuity and change, any 
explanation needs to be sensitive to the roles played by 
actors as well as by their structural environment.  
 In the framework that was developed in Chapter 1, 
change is being conceptualised as a number of layers, each 
having a different ‘depth’ and occurring over a different 
period of time. ‘Shallow change’, in this perspective, 
happens within shorter time-frames, such as in the context of 
EU policy-making. Deeper change occurs over longer 
periods of time – decades or even centuries – and involves 
changes to the institutional structure of the polity, and 
beyond that to social transformations in society. Given the 
centrality of time in this conceptualisation of change, the 
analysis of institutional politics requires a process-based 
approach. In other words, institutions – which can be 
understood either in the sociological sense of systems of 
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norms and rules, or in terms of organisational units – need to 
be studied as processes, so that the interplay of actors and 
structures can analysed systematically. 
 The institutions of the EU – seen in the 
organizational meaning of the concept – are involved in all 
three of these dimensions of change: they are closely 
involved in the EU’s policy-process, though to different 
degrees in different sectors; they are both subjects and 
objects in processes of institutional reform and the 
constitutionalisation of the EU; and they ultimately 
contribute to deeper social changes and the development of a 
European polity. 
 Based on this framework, this book has focused on 
the study of institutional politics at the intermediate level of 
change, i.e. the development of organisational structures and 
debates about constitutional reforms in the EU. In the 
context of an integration process which centrally relies on 
legal and institutional structures in order to sustain itself, the 
treaty base of the EU’s institutional architecture is clearly of 
paramount importance in this regard. The EU treaties are the 
basis on which institutional were developed, and even if 
their evolution is governed also by other factors, the legal 
framework is an important structural element. 
It is for this reason that several chapters of this book 
have looked in some depth at the way in which the EU 
treaties have been revised. In particular, we have focused on 
the reform of the treaties as a continuous process, which in 
turn is part of a wider process of constitutionalisation of the 
European Union. It is this conceptualisation of treaty change 
as process, based on the overall framework of analysis 
developed in Chapter 1, that the role played by institutional 
actors in this context becomes evident. Chapter 7 discussed 
in some detail the role of the supranational actors in this 
process of treaty reform, identifying the potential 
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contribution made to the process  by the European 
Commission, the European Parliament and the General 
Secretariat of the Council of Ministers. While the actual 
influence of each of these institutions in EU treaty reform is 
an empirical question that requires detailed analysis in 
specific areas or periods of time (an analysis that can be 
expanded to include other key actors at the European level 
such as the European Court of Justice or the Presidency), 
such empirical analysis can only be conducted on the basis 
of the prior recognition that this is indeed an area that needs 
to be analysed, and it is the value of the institutionalist 
approach developed here to be sensitive to this.  
Chapter 8 provided a more detailed discussion, both 
of the way in which treaty reform and constitutional politics 
is conceptualised here, but also of the actual application of 
such a conceptualisation to the study of recent developments 
since 2000. The chapter demonstrates the close linkages 
between ‘ordinary’ treaty reform and the ‘extraordinary’ 
attempt to adopt a formal ‘Constitution’ for the European 
Union. Seen as a single process, both the previous and 
subsequent revisions of the treaty (at Nice and at Lisbon) are 
part and parcel of the formal constitutional project that was 
launched at Laeken and failed to materialise after the 
rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by the electorates of 
the Netherlands and France. 
This institutional approach to treaty reform and the 
procedural conception of constitutional politics in the EU 
provide a much more comprehensive treatment of the 
subject than traditional, liberal intergovernmentalist 
approaches have done. The inclusion of a much wider range 
of actors and the recognition of the structural constraints and 
opportunities that have a bearing on the process, facilitates 
an understanding of the nature of constitutionalisation of the 
EU that a more narrow, interest-based approach would miss. 
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The original mainstream understanding of treaty reform up 
to the late 1990s had been that each Intergovernmental 
Conference could be studied in isolation, and that the 
dominant driving force in explaining the outcome of each 
such ‘bargain’ was provided by the preferences, strategies 
and resources that the (large) member states brought to the 
negotiating table. There were several ‘blind spots’ in this 
theory: the neglect of European integration as a ‘two-way’ 
process in which member states bargain at the EU level, but 
also themselves influenced and changed through processes 
of Europeanisation; the influences to treaty reform arising 
from the policy-making and litigation before the ECJ; and 
the institutional and sociological factors shaping debates and 
negotiations before and after the IGC. 
The discussion in this book, in particular in Chapters 
7 and 8, sought to close this gap. While the argument 
provided here is a theoretical one, the evidence that this is 
backed by empirical observation over the last decade is 
overwhelming. The linkages that the institutionalist 
approach seeks to identify have been laid bare by the 
developments in the EU, most tellingly by the formal 
endorsement of the member states for a ‘post-Nice process’ 
linking the various stages in the attempt to formally revise 
the treaty towards a formal constitutional document. Thus, 
the conceptual move that have been advocated here, from an 
event-historical to an institutionalist understanding of treaty 
reform, has been matched by an empirical move in the 
political practice of the European Union itself. Further 
empirical research certainly needs to take place, and the 
ultimate destination of the constitutionalisation process 
remains unclear, but the case for a procedural and 
institutionalist approach to constitutional and institutional 
reform in the EU has, I believe, been made. 
If Chapters 7 and 8 sought to apply the insights of an 
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institutionalist perspective in order to illuminate our 
understanding of the wider processes of constitutional and 
treaty reform in the EU, the preceding chapters have 
addressed the internal and external workings of individual 
institutions in the same way. Two institutions had been 
singled out for a more detailed analysis: the European 
Commission (Chapter 4) and the Council Secretariat 
(Chapter 5). These are key institutions that are involved in 
both the legislative and the executive work of the European 
Union. Each hold considerable interest for the academic 
observer: the Commission because of its centrality not just in 
the policy-process, but for the overall path of European 
integration, and the Council Secretariat because it constitutes 
an important element in EU politics that remains largely 
under-researched. 
The application of the institutionalist framework to 
the study of these two organisations implied a closer look at 
the interplay between external forces – the tensions of 
European governance – and their internal workings. The 
study of the Commission focused on the was in which 
different parts of the organisation have to reconcile the 
contradictions contained in the wider structure of the 
European Union. In particular, the focus here has been on 
the different political and administrative logics that are at 
play in the Commission, and which translate into internal 
tensions within the institutions. There clearly is both a 
political and a bureaucratic dimension to the work of the 
Commission, and Chapter 4 demonstrated the impact that 
this has on the internal politics of the institutions. On the one 
hand, tensions arising from the contradictory demands 
placed upon the Commission lead to persistent 
inconsistencies in its actions, and a case study of 
Commission activity demonstrated the bureaucratic politics 
that occur between different administrative units of the 
Commission. On the other hand, the Commission has 
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devised mechanisms to overcome the divide between 
political and bureaucratic logics within its organisation, 
namely the central role played by the cabinets in the internal 
procedures and the rise of networks that transcendent 
different sectors and levels in the Commission hierarchy. 
This study of the Commission provides a more 
sophisticated understanding of the nature of the organisation, 
going beyond the ‘single actor’ image that is frequently 
portrayed in both public debate and academic analyses. It 
shows the Commission to be an internally highly fragmented 
institution, a feature of its organisational life that also helps 
to explain the varying degrees of influence in the EU policy-
process that the Commission has had over time, and across 
sectors. The ‘crisis’ of the Commission in 1999, which led to 
the resignation of the college of Commissioners under 
President Santer, be seen as a consequence of such internal 
tensions: the collegial logic among the Commissioners being 
at odds with the hierarchical logic among the services, and 
the use of personal networks being employed in order to 
bridge the gulf, mismanagement could be related to the lack 
of individual responsibility that Commissioners and officials 
would take. Subsequent reforms have sought to tackle both 
the administrative weaknesses and the lack of political 
leadership in the Commission, but in the process the 
Commission’s effectiveness in relations to other institutions 
and vis-à-vis the member states has suffered. This shows 
how the procedural approach of studying institutional 
change (and continuity) is a valuable guide to an 
understanding of the dynamics behind the Commission’s 
changing role in the institutional politics of the EU. 
One of the institutions that has risen in importance 
within the institutional architecture of the Union, just as the 
Commission has waned, has been the Council Secretariat. 
This organisation was studied, from much the same 
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perspective as previously the Commission, in Chapter 5. 
Again, the internal divisions are being laid bare, in relation 
to the contradictory aims that the Union is placing on the 
institution. As the result of the acquisition of new 
competences in the foreign policy, defence planning and 
crisis management field, an increasing separation between 
the ‘old’ part of the institution, dealing with the traditional 
legislative work in collaboration with the Presidency, and 
the ‘new’ part under the High Representative, can be 
observed. And, much like in the Commission, the growth in 
size and diversity of tasks in the Council Secretariat can be 
seen to threaten the overall coherence and consistency of 
their work.  
Traditional analyses have usually seen the 
Commission as a supranational institution, and the Council 
is regularly referred to as an intergovernmental machinery. 
The value of the analysis undertaken here is that is 
demonstrates the more complex reality of either institution: 
the Commission, both at the political and at the 
administrative level, incorporates strong elements of 
intergovernmentalism, something that has become more 
explicit in the debate about the numbers of Commissioners 
in the college (including the potential loss of member states 
having always ‘their’ Commissioner represented in the 
college). At the same time, it has also shown that the 
Council has an important supranational dimension in the 
Council Secretariat, which in some areas has become an 
executive branch of the Union, and thus can be seen as a sort 
of mini-Commission.  
Given these, usually hidden, similarities between the 
two institutions it is less surprising then that, in terms of 
their co-operation with one another, there are fewer 
problems than are traditionally anticipated. Chapter 6 looked 
at this inter-institutional relationship with a view to establish 
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the degree of coherence that can be found. While there is a 
general perception of rivalry between the institutions, we 
find that there is also a significant amount of co-operation, 
resulting in a high degree of overall coherence in the work of 
the institutions. This finding is related to the structural 
factors that were discussed earlier, namely the legal-
institutional mechanisms and the ideational constructs at 
play. Officials in both institutions are subject to the same 
expectations when it comes to recruitment and promotion, 
are working under similar staff regulations, and generally 
share the same ideas about the nature and direction of the 
European Union. While individual institutional affiliation 
clearly matters (and thus creates diverging interests and 
distinctive approaches to specific questions), there is a wider 
conception of being part of the ‘European civil service’ 
which encompasses officials in both institutions (as well as 
those in others). 
This discussion of similarities and cooperation 
across two institutions often seen as rivals is valuable not 
only with respect to our understanding of EU institutional 
politics in general, but in particular at a time when a partial 
merger between parts of the two institutions is being 
considered. In the context of the changes to be introduced by 
the Lisbon Treaty, the High Representative (currently 
heading the Council Secretariat) and the Commission Vice-
President for External Relations will be functions carried out 
by one and the same person. Underneath them, a newly-
created ‘European External Action Service’ will bring 
together parts of the Council and Commission services, and 
the existing Commission delegations around the word will 
be managed jointly by Council and Commission. While 
these changes are, in many ways radical, their success is 
conceivable against the background of the analysis of the 
relations between the two institutions that was undertaken in 
Chapter 6.  
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In conclusion we can therefore say that the 
framework developed in this thesis, and applied to a number 
of institutional contexts in the European Union, has 
demonstrated its value. Studying institutional politics from a 
procedural and institutionalist perspective has given us new 
insights into the functioning of individual institutions such 
as the Commission and the Council Secretariat, it has 
brought about a better understanding of the inter-institutional 
relationship between them, and it has allowed us to develop 
a much broader and encompassing approach to EU treaty 
reform and constitutionalisation. This is the case both with 
regard to academic study, where this approach opens new 
doors and provides for original empirical work to be 
undertaken, but in addition it also facilitates an improved 
ability to assess and respond to actual policy-developments, 
be it at the level of individual institutional changes or at the 
level of EU treaty reform. As the EU is evolving further, 
much remains that needs to be studied and understood. But, 
considering the challenges that lie ahead for research on the 
institutional politics of the European Union, the concepts 
and frameworks developed here hopefully provide useful 
tools for those seeking to engage in such research in the 
future.  
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